The ultrasonic testing regime was not effective in consistently identifying corrosion and wasting of the rail web at unsealed level crossings.
The method of constructing crossings at unsealed roads heightened the potential for corrosion and track degradation and limited the opportunity for effective visual inspection. The network standard for crossing construction did not directly address the particular challenges of unsealed roads.
GWA had no documented system in place to assess the suitability of second-hand components for re-use.
The frequency of driver reporting and locomotive cab rides by track inspectors had been insufficient for identifying rough track through the derailment site.
When travelling at speeds near 90 km/h on track having particular track irregularities, the WOE class wagons appear to be susceptible to harmonic oscillations of sufficient magnitude to produce wheel unloading, flange climb and derailment.
After re-railing the track, permitted train speed was increased without due consideration of the effects of cyclic track irregularities on the dynamic performance of the WOE class wagon.
The loss of brake pipe integrity during the derailment event did not result in the train brakes automatically activating.
A register for recording ‘special locations’ in accordance with the ARTC Engineering (Track & Civil) Code of Practice - Section 10 – Flooding, had not been established to manage track infrastructure prone to flood damage.
The ARTC’s processes for developing and implementing changes to operational procedures as a result of incident investigation findings were ineffective at mitigating the risk of future similar incidents.
The ARTC did not have a comprehensive system in place to identify and actively manage risks associated with severe weather events that were likely to affect the safety of their rail network.
Genesee & Wyoming Australia had no procedure in place to verify (either in total or by random selection) that the nature or condition of freight provided by their customers, complied with their Standard Condition of Carriage.
The limited interoperability between The Australian Advanced Air Traffic System and Australian Defence Air Traffic System increased the risk of error due to the need for a number of manual interventions or processes to facilitate the coordination and processing of traffic.
Controllers were routinely exposed to ‘not concerned’ radar tracks that were generally inconsequential in the en route environment, leading to a high level of expectancy that such tracks were not relevant for aircraft separation purposes. Training did not emphasise the importance of scanning ‘not concerned’ radar tracks in jurisdiction airspace.
There was a significant underreporting by Virgin Australia Regional Airlines Pty Ltd ATR72 terrain awareness warning system-related occurrences.
The convergence of many published air routes overhead Adelaide, combined with the convergence point being positioned on the sector boundary of the Augusta and Tailem Bend sectors, reduced the separation assurance provided by strategically separated one-way air routes and increased the potential requirement for controller intervention to assure separation.
There were no forms or checklists to provide practical guidance for completing the steps required to implement Absolute Signal Blocking (ASB) or to provide an auditable record of the process.
Differences exist in the way signallers and Protection Officers (POs) identify trains to each other.
Not all major infrastructure was marked on the ATRICS screens for the North Shore panel.
The Sydney Trains regime for auditing worksite protection arrangements was not effective in identifying emerging trends or safety critical issues when using Absolute Signal Blocking (ASB).
Rule NWT 308 Absolute Signal Blocking and procedure NPR703 Using Absolute Signal Blocking did not provide any guidance on acceptable methods for determining the location of rail traffic in the section or confirming the clearance of rail traffic past a proposed work location.
