The scheduled ultrasonic tests conducted in November 2013 on the 80 lb/yd rail between Northgate and Alice Springs had been ineffective in detecting and quantifying the significant defects present at 1036.541 km and 975.244 km locations.
The placement of the insulated rail joints adjacent to signal DYN150 was not in accordance with the ARTC engineering procedure ESC-07-01.
The practice of using a third party (the shunt planner) to facilitate communication between Network Control Officers and train drivers at the Melbourne Freight Terminal prevented an effective response to the emergency.
Track defect monitoring and reporting was not being conducted as specified in the Westrail Narrow Gauge Mainline Code of Practice, limiting the awareness of the deteriorating track condition and the need for reassessment of track operating limits.
The poor condition of Royal Pescadores’ anchoring equipment was indicative of inadequate maintenance. The shipboard management team were not aware of the equipment’s maintenance history nor able to provide relevant documents from the ship’s planned maintenance system.
The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) recommendation for having a means of slipping the anchor cable bitter outside the chain locker had not been provided on board Royal Pescadores. Further, the ship’s classification society, ClassNK, does not consider that the IACS recommended slipping arrangement is necessary for reducing safety risk.
While the Fremantle vessel traffic service (VTS) operational procedures were aimed at having precautionary measures in place for adverse weather conditions, the triggers specified in the procedures only referred to BoM-issued severe weather and gale warnings. As no wind speed limits were specified, the gale force winds experienced at Fremantle throughout the early hours of 8 May did not trigger the VTS procedural responses until 0600 – after the receipt of BoM-issued warnings.
The rail transport operator (GWA) had not maintained sufficient oversight of the activities of the rail infrastructure manager (Transfield Services), allowing the track to deteriorate to a level where trains could not be reliably run in a safe manner.
V/Line’s process for the inspection of level crossing sighting did not provide explicit instructions for the identification and removal of problem vegetation.
The Pacific National freight loading manual, and application of it, was ineffective at preventing load
shift with rod-in-coil product.
There was a breakdown in the NCO handover process used at Morisset which resulted in ASB being granted to the Protection Officer at Warnervale without the exact location of trains being properly established, signals V8 and V6 being set back to stop and blocking facilities applied in accordance with Network Rule NWT 308.
The Public Transport Authority of Western Australia did not have documented instructions to ensure a consistent and safe approach to maintaining automatic pedestrian crossing equipment.
Unlike other Australian standard arrival routes that included a visual segment, the visual approach to runway 34 at Melbourne via the SHEED waypoint could be issued to super or heavy jet aircraft operated by foreign operators, despite there being more occurrences involving the SHEED waypoint than other comparable approaches.
The LIZZI FIVE RWY 34 VICTOR ARRIVAL required a 3.5° descent profile after passing the SHEED waypoint for visual approach to runway 34 at Melbourne, increasing the risk of an unstable approach.
The Virgin Australia procedures did not require its flight crews to, whenever practicable, announce flight mode changes.
Air traffic control did not, and was not required to provide traffic information to aircraft using adjacent runways and abeam each other during independent visual approach procedures at Sydney.
Over the past 26 years, investigations into 41 collisions between trading ships and small vessels on the Australian coast have identified that not maintaining a proper lookout and taking early avoiding action, in accordance with the collision regulations, has been a consistent and continuing contributor to such collisions.
Kota Wajar’s safety management system procedures with regard to posting a dedicated lookout were not effectively implemented.
Brisbane Marine Pilots’ standard passage plan and master-pilot exchange did not ensure that a ship’s bridge team is provided adequate information with respect to local traffic and areas where attention must be paid to other vessels, including small craft.
The presentation of the runway 34 visual approach in the operator's Route and Airport Information Manual increased the risk of the runway threshold crossing altitude being entered into the runway extension waypoint.
