At approximately 0523 hours GMT on 30th April, 1970, a Boeing 707/338C aircraft, registered VH-EAD, ran off the runway and became bogged in soft sand after commencing a take-off from Runway 25 at Fiumicino Airport, Rome, Italy. The aircraft was engaged in operating Qantas Flight 755/192, a regular public transport flight from Sydney to London with intermediate stops at Hong Kong, New Delhi, Teheran and Rome. The aircraft was only slightly damaged in the occurrence and only one passenger of the ten crew members and 45 passengers on board sustained a minor injury during the emergency evacuation.

The aircraft, with the student pilot at the controls, took-off and climbed to 500 feet and then turned left as it was intended to carry out a normal circuit. The take-off was made into the east on the single strip and into a wind from the east at a speed of 10-15 knots. When the aircraft had reached about 600 feet the engine faltered and the power was reduced to 2300 RPM with the engine vibrating spasmodically. Application of carburettor heat did not improve the performance of the engine. When the aircraft had climbed to about 700 feet the instructor took over control, decided to make a downwind landing and turned the aircraft to the Bight in order to fly back across wind preparatory to landing. After flying across wind and turning back again an "S" turn was made to line up with the direction of the strip. The aircraft crossed the end of the strip, which is 2,700 feet long, at about 400 feet above the ground and only touched down briefly near the far end of the strip. The pilot then attempted to conduct a go-around using all the engine power remaining but speed was slow and the engine power decayed to about 1600 RPM. He then decided to land in a paddock. The aircraft was pulled up over trees and a power line on the paddock boundary and then sank,landing heavily on the port main wheel and nose wheel. The nose undercarriage leg detached and after sliding a short distance the aircraft overturned.

Before commencing operations from Oobagooma Homestead on a series of flights to be made for the purpose of pegging mineral claims, the pilot briefed all passengers on safety precautions in flight and on the ground. The briefing included instructions for movement near the helicopter while the rotors were in motion and a caution that the area near the tail rotor was to be avoided at all times. After landing a second time at Margaret Beach, the aircraft engine was held at flight idle power while passengers alighted and unloaded equipment. The aircraft was then moved to slightly higher, level ground and again held at flight idle while the pilot and the field assistant in charge of pegging discussed whether to continue pegging or stop for lunch. They decided to continue pegging and the field assistant then walked to an area to the right hand side and to the rear of the aircraft to pick up a box of pegging tapes. While returning to the aircraft and looking down at the box which was held in both hands, he walked around the rear of the helicopter and was struck on the head by the rotating tail rotor, which inflicted severe head injuries. The pilot considered that evacuation by air was unwise in view of possible shock loading having occurred to the helicopter transmission. A member of a picnic party, fortuitously at the beach, conveyed the injured man by boat to Cockatoo Island where a doctor gave medical attention pending the arrival of an aircraft which conveyed the injured passenger to Derby.

The aircraft was taking off into the south, from a one-way agricultural strip situated along the spine of a mountain ridge. The length of the strip was 1,420 feet. The surface of the strip was generally good but over the last 200 feet at the southern end a number of flat boulders protruded up to 3 inches above the soil and there was a transverse downslope of about 9 degrees to the left. Twenty-six take-offs had begn made from the strip at slightly below the maximum take-off weight for the aircraft type. On the twenty-seventh take-off, the aircraft lifted off normally then sank and touched the ground in the area which contained the boulders. The pilot heard a loud 'crack'. He continued with the flight and after spreading the fertiliser established at the left main landing assembly had broken away from the aircraft. He then flew to Archerfield and landed on a prepared grass surface. As the speed decayed the left lower wing-tip and the propeller contacted the ground. The aircraft skidded 87 feet and swung to the left. The tail rose and the aircraft came to rest balanced on the propeller, the right wing-tips and the right main wheel. Subsequent examination of the failed leg showed that fatigue cracks had initiated at fretting damage in the decarburised skin. A number of cracks propagated and joined to form a single crack 1 1/8 inches long by approximately 0. 050 inches deep. It is considered likely that cracks up to 0.050 inches deep were present when the 5,000 landing inspection was carried out on the leg some 150 landings prior to the accident.

The aircraft was to land at a newly constructed airstrip near the camp of a survey party. At a previous stop the pilot was given some details of the size of the strip and he assessed it as suitable for the aircraft type. The aircraft was flown to the strip empty, the pilot made an in flight inspection and a normal landing. After landing, it became obvious that the width of the strip was below the minimum specified for safe operation and that the surface was very soft. From the southern end the strip rose 20 feet in 2000 feet and immediately beyond this crest curved 7 degrees to the right. The pilot warned another aircraft of the company of conditions at the strip and advised the pilot to divert to a nearby aerodrome. He refuelled the aircraft and then prepared to take off into the north using approximately 2000 feet of the northern end of the strip in a cross wind of 10 to 15 knots from the right. The take off began slightly to the left of the strip centre line and the aircraft became briefly airborne at the crest at a speed of about 70 knots. The aircraft sank back to the ground and because of the change in direction of the strip at that point and the influence of the cross wind, immediately ran off the strip to the left. The aircraft tracked over scrub and rough ground until the nosewheel struck a rocky outcrop and collapsed. The aircraft came to rest 365 feet left of the centre of the strip and 215 feet beyond the northern end.

The pilot submitted a flight plan for a NOSAR flight to Paraburdoo indicating a time interval of 75 minutes and an ETD of 1630 hours WST. The time of last light at Paraburdoo was 1800 hours WST. The aircraft did not depart until 1711 hours and at 1733 hours, in a response to a query from Port Hedland flight service unit reminding the pilot of last light considerations, the pilot advised that he would divert to Wittenoom. Subsequent calculations indicate that it would not have been possible for the aircraft to have arrived at Wittenoom before last light. Effective VHF radio communications with the aircraft were then lost and the pilot has stated that his HF radio transmitter did not operate. The pilot became unsure of his position and in the failing light he decided to make a precautionary landing on a flat area covered in what appeared to be low bushes but which were, in fact, rocks. After touching down the aircraft struck rocks and subsequently overturned. Following an air search the aircraft was located at 0810 hours on 10th June, 1971 and the occupants were then rescued.

The aircraft was engaged on a charter flight to uplift five persons and the cabin seating was so arranged. When a sixth passenger was presented the pilot agreed to carry the extra person, seated on the floor of the aircraft and without a safety belt. A quantity of unsecured freight and baggage was also carried in the.rear of the cabin. Weather information passed to the aircraft en route warned of moderate to severe turbulence and the Perth Airport weather was 7/8 of cloud with a base of 500 feet and visibility down to 2,000 yards in rain. The flight proceeded normally to a position some 24 miles east of Perth, where an area of severe turbulence was encountered. The aircraft was in cloud at an altitude of 5, 000 feet and the pilot first used full power and a high nose attitude to counteract a sharp rate of descent. He then lowered the nose and reduced power to cope with a severe updraft. The effect of these manoeuvres and the resultant steep dive and recovery was that the unsecured passenger and freight forcibly contacted alternately the ceiling and the floor of the cabin slightly injuring the passenger and damaging some of the freight. This manoeuvre cycle was probably repeated before the aircraft eventually broke cloud with a ground clearance of 1,000 feet and the pilot regained control. During these manoeuvres the aircraft sustained extensive damage to the main spars and other major components. Instrument flight was then resumed and an instrument approach and a normal landing made at Perth Airport.

The aircraft stood overnight in the open at the station airstrip ready for an early morning take off. In a daily inspection made soon after first light, the pilot found that a heavy dew had left beads of moisture covering the aircraft exterior. This was cleaned off the windscreen, which was also misting internally. After a normal warm up and ground test the pilot cleaned the inside of the windscreen and lined up for take off. At this time forward vision was somewhat obscured but the pilot anticipated that outside condensation would clear as the aircraft gathered speed. The take off was commenced but the pilot found that the windscreen did not clear as expected and when full power had been applied and at a speed of about 50 knots, moisture blowing back off the nose of the aircraft caused almost complete loss of forward vision. Finding that the aircraft was moving to the left side of the strip the pilot closed both throttles to abandon the take off and attempted to brake to the right but was too late to prevent the aircraft from swinging left off the strip. The wings were damaged by impact with small trees and the aircraft groundlooped to the right and skidded to a halt. The passengers left by the normal exit and there was no fire.

The aircraft was refuelled before the flight in circumstances such that some fuel transfer between tanks may have taken place. This would have resulted in a slight reduction in the total fuel carried, but allowance for normal fuel reserves would have adequately provided for this contingency. The pilot considered, from past experience of the type of operation and the power settings to be used, that the total endurance of the aircraft would be 5 hours based on the full capacity of the tanks. After some 4 hours 40 minutes flying time the aircraft was returning to Yanrey Station and was at a height of about 800 feet above terrain, when the engine failed. The pilot noted that the fuel pressure was zero and he changed the fuel tank selection from "Left" to "Both", turned on the fuel booster pump and checked that the fuel shut off valve was in the "On" position. The engine did not regain power and the pilot carried out a forced landing in the only cleared area within gliding distance. Towards the end of the landing roll the port mainplane struck a small tree, causing the aircraft to veer to the left as it came to rest. Damage was confined to the outer leading edge of the port mainplane. Subsequent to the landing, both fuel gauges were found to be reading 2 gallons, but there was no available fuel in the tanks.

On the 38th landing since commencing work that day the aircraft made a three point landing with the hopper open and empty and full flap lowered. As the aircraft touched down the port undercarriage main spring leg fractured eight inches from the inboard end at the bend radius. The port wing dropped and after travelling about 300 feet the pilot was unable to maintain control of the aircraft, which commenced turning and sliding to the left and turned through 180 degrees before coming to rest 525 feet after touch down. Examination of the broken undercarriage leg suggests that the quality of the shot peening of the component, a possible small material defect and the presence of light surface corrosion may all have been factors in the initiation of a fatigue crack which led to the eventual failure of the leg.