Approximately thirty minutes after departure a peculiar odour was noticed in the cabin which the pilot attributed to a boiling battery. He turned off the master switch and, since the odour then partially dissipated, continued the flight and advised that he would only use the aircraft's electrics to report at scheduled times. However, as the flight progressed, the fumes in the cabin became so obnoxious that a forced landing became imperative. The pilot advised his intentions and landed on a lone small claypan but over-ran into the surrounding uneven sand. During the landing the forward baggage compartment door flew open and portions of a burning foam plastic mattress fell out, igniting small spinifex bushes. After disembarkation, the fire, now obviously in the baggage compartment, was quickly extinguished and the spinifex fires were trampled out. The investigation established that a rolled foam mattress, which was the last item loaded at Birdsville, partially unravelled itself in flight and contacted the illuminated hot naked bulb in the baggage compartment light causing the foam to smoulder and emit acrid smoke and fumes which were carried back to the cabin. The composition of the foam was such that the smouldering would continue even when the heat source was removed but it is probable that the mattress did not burst into flames until the door flew open during the landing roll.

The aircraft was engaged on type endorsement training and the pilot in command was occupying the right hand seat. After climbing to 3, 000 feet in the Delissaville area, a series of simulated engine failures was carried out and on each occasion the undercarriage warning horn was silenced by opening the throttle of the inoperative engine. At the conclusion of these exercises the pilot under instruction was told to carry out an asymmetric landing and for this exercise the starboard throttle was set to the zero-thrust position which also silenced the warning horn. During the descent circuit, and approach to land, however, the warning horn sounded almost continuously due to the almost closed position of the port throttle. Reference was not made to the check list provided in the aircraft during these stages of the flight and, when the pilot under instruction did not lower the undercarriage, his omission was not detected by the instructor. The significance of the horn escaped both pilots probably due to the familiarity with its sound during the preceding exercises and the landing was completed with the wheels retracted.

The pilot had flown various Cessna types of aircraft but his experience on the Cessna 177 type was limited. The Cessna 177 differs from the other types which the pilot had flown in that it has a fuel shut-off selector located near the carburettor heat control. After taking off from an authorised landing area on the property of one of his passengers the pilot decided to land in another nearby field. At about 500 feet on final approach he selected what he thought was carburettor heat and shortly afterwards there was a complete loss of engine power. He then prepared to make a forced landing into a nearer field and during a subsequent cockpit check found that he had inadvertently operated the fuel shut-off instead of the carburettor heat. The fuel was selected on, the engine re-started and the pilot applied full power with the intention of abandoning the landing. The nose leg then struck and was damaged by a power wire of which the pilot was not aware. The aircraft was landed straight ahead and the nose leg collapsed when it contacted the ground.

Realising he was unlikely to become safely airborne over obstacles ahead, abandoned the take off and endeavoured to stop the aircraft, but he was unable to do so before it entered a swamp where the nose landing gear was torn off. The aircraft came to rest in swamp grass, substantially damaged.

As the aircraft neared the water it was levelled and full collective pitch was applied to cushion the touchdown. The aircraft struck the water at a forward speed estimated to be 20 knots, the nose pitched down into the 6 feet deep water and the aircraft overturned. After leaving the aircraft both pilots noticed that the wind was now easterly at about 5 knots.

The pilot submitted flight plan details to Moorabbin by telephone at approximately 1245 hours EST indicating that he intended to track direct to Mildura at an altitude below 5000 feet and that the estimated time for the flight was 104 minutes. At 1334 hours the pilot advised Melbourne Flight Service Unit by radio that he had departed from Lovely Banks at 1330 hours and estimated that he would be over Maryborough at 1400 hours. This communication was acknowledged and no further calls were received from the aircraft. Between 1345 hours and 1350 hours, the sound of an aircraft was heard in the Yendon area, some 15 miles south east of Ballarat. The engine noise, which was normal when first heard, rose to a high pitch and intensity and then ceased abruptly. The wreckage of the aircraft was found shortly afterwards at a position approximately 2 miles west of the direct track from Lovely Banks to Maryborough. Examination of the wreckage indicated that the aircraft had struck the ground at high speed in a steep nose down attitude. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and there was no fire. There is evidence from witnesses on the ground in the general vicinity of the accident site that the cloud base was low and there were showers in the area. Another pilot, on a flight from Melton, was approaching the Yendon area a few minutes before the time of the accident and was forced to turn back when he encountered increasing cloud and a lowering cloud base with considerable rain ahead.

Both aircraft converging on Moorabbin apt.BLM in blind spot below combing of RCN.Plt RCN didn't see BLM until too late to avoid collision. Wreckage of both aircraft fell into built up area, causing minor damage.

The weather was fine with a light breeze and occasional slight turbulence. The pilot, who held a first-class agricultural rating, made preliminary inspections of the area both from the ground and from the air, but did not accurately establish the position of overhead wires and other features. He decided on a broad spraying plan which he intended to develop as the operation progressed. The main section of the undulating terrain was treated by making runs in a single direction during which the aircraft passed beneath a primary power line approximately 40 feet above ground level. The pilot then commenced a run in the opposite direction to cover a small section which remained. While on the approach to this final run the pilot selected a fence as the point at which he could begin his climb away. He believed he would then have passed safely below both the primary power line and a spur line which ran to a nearby house. The spur line was in fact some 90 feet beyond the fence and as the aircraft climbed away it struck the wire and became inverted. After continuing out of control for a short distance the aircraft struck a group of telephone wires then continued on its descending path and made violent contact with a road. There was no outbreak of fire and the pilot was able to release himself from the wreckage.

The pilot under instruction had no prior experience with DH82 aircraft. His instructor gave him a preflight briefing on the external and internal checks and the engine starting procedure but did not point out that the mixture control lever on the throttle quadrant was disconnected. With the pilot under instruction occupying the rear cockpit and the instructor standing behind the propeller the starting procedure was commenced without the aid of wheel chocks. In response to the instructor's call, the pilot under instruction set what he believed to be the throttle lever in the start position and switched on the magnetos. The throttle was in fact in the full forward (fully open) position and the pilot under instruction had mistakenly operated the mixture control lever in the belief that it was the throttle lever. The instructor swung the propeller from behind and, when the engine started, the aircraft surged forward under high power. The instructor was forced to jump clear and the aircraft commenced to swing in a wide left arc through 180 degrees until it struck a cyclone wire fence and came to rest, tail high, on the fence line.

The weather was fine with a light breeze and occasional slight turbulence. The pilot, who held a first-class agricultural rating, made preliminary inspections of the area both from the ground and from the air, but did not accurately establish the position of overhead wires and other features. He decided on a broad spraying plan which he intended to develop as the operation progressed. The main section of the undulating terrain was treated by making runs in a single direction during which the aircraft passed beneath a primary power line approximately 40 feet above ground level. The pilot then commenced a run in the opposite direction to cover a small section which remained. While on the approach to this final run the pilot selected a fence as the point at which he could begin his climb away. He believed he would then have passed safely below both the primary power line and a spur line which ran to a nearby house. The spur line was in fact some 90 feet beyond the fence and as the aircraft climbed away it struck the wire and became inverted. After continuing out of control for a short distance the aircraft struck a group of telephone wires then continued on its descending path and made violent contact with a road. There was no outbreak of fire and the pilot was able to release himself from the wreckage.