The automatic warning system (AWS) provided the same audible alarm and visual indication to a driver on the approach to all restricted indications. The potential for habituation, and the absence of a higher priority alert when approaching a signal displaying a red aspect, reduced the effectiveness of the AWS to prevent signals passed at danger (SPADs). This placed substantial reliance on procedural or administrative controls to prevent SPADs, which are fundamentally limited in their usefulness.
The aircraft was not fitted nor required to be fitted with a crash-resistant fuel system under the current standards or those in place at the time of manufacture. As a result, post-impact fire presents a significant risk of fire-related injuries and fatalities to aircraft occupants.
Response by the United States Federal Aviation Administration
The Federal Aviation Administration is forming a cross-organisational team to review the topic of post-crash fires and identify potential risk mitigations.
Failure of the inboard programming roller cartridge was due to undetected fatigue cracking that occurred in an area that was not included in the detailed flap actuation system inspection.
Coulson Aviation fleet of C-130 aircraft were not fitted with a windshear detection system, which increased the risk of a windshear encounter and/or delayed response to a windshear encounter during low level operations.
Cessna 206 aircraft that feature a rear double cargo door do not meet the aircraft certification basis for the design of cabin exits. Wing flap extensions beyond 10° will block the forward portion of the rear double cargo door, significantly hampering emergency egress. This has previously resulted in fatalities.
Cessna 206 aircraft that feature a rear double cargo door do not meet the aircraft certification basis for the design of cabin exits. Wing flap extensions beyond 10° will block the forward portion of the rear double cargo door, significantly hampering emergency egress. This has previously resulted in fatalities.
Annex 6 to the Convention of International Civil Aviation did not mandate the fitment of flight recorders for passenger-carrying aircraft under 5,700 kg. Consequently, the determination of factors that influenced this accident, and numerous other accidents have been hampered by a lack of recorded data pertaining to the flight. This has likely resulted in important safety issues not being identified, which may remain a hazard to current and future passenger carrying operations.
There was no regulatory requirement from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority for piston‑engine aircraft to carry a carbon monoxide detector with an active warning to alert pilots to the presence of elevated levels of carbon monoxide in the cabin.
Australian civil aviation regulations did not mandate the fitment of flight recorders for passenger-carrying aircraft under 5,700 kg. Consequently, the determination of factors that influenced this accident, and other accidents have been hampered by a lack of recorded data pertaining to the flight. This has likely resulted in the non‑identification of safety issues, which continue to present a hazard to current and future passenger-carrying operations.
Response by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
The ARTC systems for managing track lateral stability did not lead to the location being managed as a location potentially vulnerable to instability.
Response by Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC)
