The automatic warning system (AWS) provided the same audible alarm and visual indication to a driver on the approach to all restricted indications. The potential for habituation, and the absence of a higher priority alert when approaching a signal displaying a red aspect, reduced the effectiveness of the AWS to prevent signals passed at danger (SPADs). This placed substantial reliance on procedural or administrative controls to prevent SPADs, which are fundamentally limited in their usefulness.
Response by Queensland Rail
On 11 April 2025, Queensland Rail reported to the ATSB that it has taken the following safety initiatives to address the issue of potential habituation and the lack of higher priority alert tone/volume for red signals in automatic warning systems (AWS), which can reduce their effectiveness in preventing signal passed at danger (SPADs):
On 10 April 2025, the ATSB requested Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (TMR), as the project sponsor of ETCS Level 2 program, provide information on the anticipated implementation schedule of the program for the Queensland Rail network.
On 28 April 2025, TMR responded that there is a long-term plan to deploy ETCS throughout the entirety of the South East Queensland (SEQ) rail network. Deployment is occurring in stages and full deployment will take many decades. Numerous factors are considered to determine which stages are to be prioritised. Operationalisation of ETCS requires the SEQ rail network to be sectorised, with Sector 1 being the priority. Sector 1 is the north‑south corridor joining the Gold Coast and Sunshine Coast through the Brisbane CBD.
Cross River Rail (CRR) (twin tunnels under the Brisbane River, exiting in the vicinity of Exhibition on the northside and Dutton Park on the southside) is the first ETCS deployment funded and currently under construction. CRR also deploys ETCS overland from the southern tunnel portal to Moorooka Station, plus the Shorncliffe Pilot Line from Nudgee to Shorncliffe. The Shorncliffe Pilot Line is anticipated to be in revenue service by the end of 2025. The sections between Beenleigh and Varsity Lakes are also in delivery and are expected to be in revenue service by the end of 2026. Further sections have been funded but are not yet in delivery including a new spur line, the Direct Sunshine Coast Rail Line (Beerwah to Birtinya), Elimbah to Beerwah, and Kuraby to Beenleigh.
Although yet to be funded, the sections from Moorooka to Kuraby, and from Elimbah to Northgate are in planning with the desire to have virtually the entirety of Sector 1 (coast to coast) in revenue service by 2032. Subsequent deployments are anticipated but not yet in planning, with Sector 2 (from Ipswich to Shorncliffe) the likely next sector for ETCS deployment based upon the volume of services on that line.
The TMR response identified priority sectors of the SEQ network planned for ETCS Level 2 implementation. Bowen Hill Station and surrounding areas were in sector 2 (Shorncliffe, Domestic Airport, Doomben, Springfield, Rosewood lines) and sector 3 (Ferny Grove and Cleveland line).
The ATSB notes the response by Queensland Rail and the actions taken in relation to the prevention of signal passed at danger occurrences. While welcome, these actions do not address the identified issue.
However, the ATSB also acknowledges the substantial difficulty in widespread modification of the AWS technology to distinguish between the alerts that occur in response to signals with a red aspect compared to other restricted signals. Additionally, Queensland Rail is reliant upon the implementation of ETCS Level 2 across the South East Queensland network to replace AWS technology, which will take many years.
As such, the safety issue will be closed as not addressed.
While that means that the risk associated with the identified constraint of the AWS remains, safety action taken in response to safety issue RO‑2023‑004‑SI‑01 provides an opportunity to mitigate both issues.
While Queensland Rail has taken actions in relation to the prevention of signal passed at danger occurrences, these actions do not address the identified issue.
However, given the substantial difficulty in widespread modification of the AWS technology to distinguish between the alerts that occur in response to signals with a red aspect compared to other restricted signals, and noting the system will be in place for many years to come, the safety issue will be closed as not addressed.
The ATSB notes that safety action taken in response to safety issue RO-2023-004-SI-01 provides an opportunity to assess if the controls in place are appropriate to address the continued risk posed by this issue.