The Registered Operator's maintenance control practices did not ensure compliance with all Airworthiness Directives.
There was the potential for the incorrect use of the dipstick to result in the over-reading of the fuel quantity.
While Petra Frontier had undergone an initial flag State inspection on 4 May 2009 and routine class surveys, the most recent being a class survey completed on 12 August 2009, neither authority was aware that the ship was unseaworthy in relation to critical safety equipment when it departed Singapore.
Information contained in the approved flight manual and pilot's operating handbook was not applicable to the engine that was fitted to the aircraft.
Petra Frontier’s safety management system contained procedures outlining how fire and abandon ship drills should be carried out in accordance with SOLAS and Marshall Islands requirements. However, it also contained a drill schedule that provided some contradictory information.
Maintenance processes did not identify or correct the deterioration of the drip shield.
The operator’s flight crew quick reference handbook did not include sufficient information for flight crew to manage the emergency.
The priority level of the battery discharge messages that were provided by the engine indicating and crew alerting system did not accurately reflect the risk presented by the battery discharge status.
Maintenance processes did not identify or correct the deterioration of the galley floor sealing
The aircraft operator’s documented design objectives did not explicitly require the protection of non-structural systems from liquid contact or ingress.
The Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia suggestion that an additional hazard identification check be carried out prior to a cleanup run was not routinely practiced by the pilots, or monitored by the operator.
The United States Federal Aviation Administration regulations and associated guidance material did not fully address the potential harm to flight safety posed by liquid contamination of electrical system units in transport category aircraft.
The removal of fluid quantity markings from, and unapproved modifications to the helicopter’s spray tank by the operator increased the risk of overweight operations
Maintenance processes did not identify or correct the inoperability of the forward drain line heater.
The location of the decompression panel and absence of cabin floor sealing above the main equipment centre increased the risk of liquid ingress into the aircraft’s electrical systems.
Maintenance processes did not identify or correct the corrosion in the generator control units.
