The galley drain operation and maintenance processes did not adequately prevent blockage and overflow of the aircraft’s drain lines.
The operator’s flight crew quick reference handbook did not include sufficient information for flight crew to manage the emergency.
The floor sealing around the forward galley was not of sufficient extent to prevent liquids from passing through to the under floor area.
Maintenance processes did not identify or correct the corrosion in the generator control units.
The priority level of the battery discharge messages that were provided by the engine indicating and crew alerting system did not accurately reflect the risk presented by the battery discharge status.
The aircraft operator’s documented design objectives did not explicitly require the protection of non-structural systems from liquid contact or ingress.
Maintenance processes did not identify or correct the deterioration of the galley floor sealing
The location of the decompression panel and absence of cabin floor sealing above the main equipment centre increased the risk of liquid ingress into the aircraft’s electrical systems.
The United States Federal Aviation Administration regulations and associated guidance material did not fully address the potential harm to flight safety posed by liquid contamination of electrical system units in transport category aircraft.
The removal of fluid quantity markings from, and unapproved modifications to the helicopter’s spray tank by the operator increased the risk of overweight operations
The Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia suggestion that an additional hazard identification check be carried out prior to a cleanup run was not routinely practiced by the pilots, or monitored by the operator.
Maintenance processes did not identify or correct the deterioration of the drip shield.
There was no direct supervision of the joint testing operations.
Neither the maintenance provider, nor the helicopter operator appreciated the potential significance of mid-span transposition information to the joint testing task.
The recording lineworker’s shoulder restraint had been repaired using an unapproved stitch pattern and density.
The operator's joint testing procedures were not comprehensive with respect to hazard identification and the use of standard phraseology.
On 30 November 2010 the ATSB had, in close consultation with Rolls-Royce and the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch, established that the occurrence was directly related to the fatigue cracking of an oil feed stub pipe within the No.2 engine’s HP/IP bearing support structure. The ATSB identified the following safety issue:
The Out of Hours telephone numbers for Proserpine Airport, listed in the Jeppesen Airways Manual, were incorrect.
Practices used within the ATS Group did not ensure that NOTAMs were effectively reviewed and communicated.
There were no published communications procedures or phraseology that should before used by pilots during firebombing operations to provide separation assurance at fire locations when there was no air attack supervisor present.
