Regulatory oversight processes for military air traffic services do not provide independent assessment and assurance as to the safety of civilian aircraft operations.
The air traffic services provider’s fatigue risk management system (FRMS) did not effectively manage the fatigue risk associated with allocating additional duty periods.
The air traffic controller provider’s processes for monitoring and managing controller workloads did not ensure that newly-endorsed controllers had sufficient skills and techniques to manage the high workload situations to which they were exposed.
There was a disproportionate rate of loss of separation incidents which leads to a higher risk of collision in military terminal area airspace in general and all airspace around Darwin and Williamtown in particular. Furthermore, loss of separation incidents in military airspace more commonly involved contributing air traffic controller actions relative to equivalent civil airspace occurrences.
Although the air traffic services provider has been working on the issue for several years, there was still no automated air traffic conflict detection system available for conflictions involving aircraft that were not subject to radar or ADS-B surveillance services.
Although the air traffic services provider has been working on the issue for several years, there was still no automated air traffic conflict detection system available for conflictions involving aircraft that were not subject to radar or ADS-B surveillance services.
The air traffic services provider had limited formal guidance to controllers and pilots regarding the conditions in which it was safe and appropriate to use block levels.
The air traffic services provider had limited formal guidance regarding how to determine appropriate consolidation periods for en route controllers on one sector before they were transitioned to commence training on another sector.
The air traffic services provider’s processes for monitoring and managing controller workloads did not ensure that newly-endorsed controllers had sufficient skills and techniques to manage the high workload situations to which they were exposed.
TasRail had not instigated proactive action to manage the elevated risks associated with ongoing track stability issues at, or near, the derailment site in accordance with their maintenance procedures.
Track inspections were not consistently conducted at intervals of not more than 96 hours, in accordance with TasRail’s standard.
The twist defect was not detected by TasRail’s inspection/monitoring systems, increasing the risk of derailment.
The ARTC had not instigated proactive action to manage the increased risk of a buckling event in accordance with their procedure ETM-06-06 (Managing Track Stability – Concrete Sleepered Track) at section 1.11.5 - ‘Special Locations’.
Limited guidance was provided by the operator and Air Ambulance Victoria for to crews on the selection of the most appropriate winch rescue equipment given operational and medical considerations, and the conditions when various types of equipment should be considered.
The design cooling characteristics of the Engine Alliance GP7200 high pressure turbine (HPT) stage-2 nozzle components led to higher than expected metal surface temperatures during operation, rendering the nozzles susceptible to distress, premature degradation and failure.
The threshold limits for the engine trend monitoring program were not set at a level that provided sufficient opportunity for inspection of the engine before failure could occur from the effects of HPT stage-2 nozzle degradation.
The ARTC’s systems and operational procedures provided limited additional information or guidance to assist network control staff in identifying and assessing a potential threat to the serviceability of the infrastructure resulting from significant weather events.
ClassNK did not have in place a system which ensured that updated service advice from the engine manufacturer was being implemented on board ships with engines which its surveyors were routinely and regularly surveying.
The ship’s planned maintenance system did not include all of the main engine manufacturer’s maintenance requirements. Furthermore, the maintenance records did not include sufficient detail to confirm that the main engine was maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s requirements.
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 lack clarity regarding the requirement for aircraft manufacturers’ supplemental inspections, where available, to be carried out when an aircraft is being maintained in accordance with the CASA maintenance schedule.
