The Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 allow class B aircraft registration holders to maintain their aircraft using the CASA maintenance schedule in situations where a more appropriate manufacturer’s maintenance schedule exists.
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 lack clarity regarding the requirement for aircraft manufacturers’ supplemental inspections, where available, to be carried out when an aircraft is being maintained in accordance with the CASA maintenance schedule.
West Coast Wilderness Railway had not considered all of the risks associated with the operation of road-rail vehicles on the steep railway. As a result, documented operational procedures had not been developed and locations where vehicles could be safely on/off railed had not been defined.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau advises balloon operators to review their risk controls in relation to the safety of cold-air inflation fans, especially in relation to passenger proximity to operating fans, and the security of loose items, such as passenger clothing.
Subsurface cracks appeared to be more common on wheels made with Class BM grade steel while operating under conditions of high speed cyclic loading, such as the SCT class locomotives
The wheel inspection processes prior to the failure of locomotive wheel L4 on SCT 008 were not effective in detecting surface damage or cracks
The engine manufacturer did not require its manufacturing engineers to consult with the design engineers to ensure that design intent would be maintained when introducing manufacturing datums.
The engine manufacturer's process for retrospective concessions did not specify when in the process the Chief Engineer and Business Quality Director approvals were to be obtained. Having them as the final approval in the process resulted in an increased probability that the fleet-wide risk assessment would not occur.
The engine manufacturer did not have a requirement for an expert review of statistical analyses used in retrospective concession applications.
The calculation method in the aircraft manufacturer’s landing distance performance application was overly conservative and this could prevent the calculation of a valid landing distance at weights below the maximum landing weight with multiple system failures.
The procedure for the first article inspection process contained ambiguities that resulted in an interpretation whereby the use of the manufacturing stage drawings was deemed to be acceptable.
The evolution of the current advisory material relating to the minimisation of hazards resulting from uncontained engine rotor failures was based on service experience, including accident investigation findings. The damage to Airbus A380-842 VH-OQA exceeded the modelling used in the UERF safety analysis and, therefore, represents an opportunity to incorporate any lessons learned from this accident into the advisory material.
The manufacturer’s classification, relating to the criticality of failure, of the HP/IP bearing support assembly was inappropriate for the effects of a fire within the buffer space and hence, the requirement for an appropriate level of process control was not communicated to the manufacturing staff.
The coordinate measuring machine was programmed to measure the location of the oil feed stub pipe interference bore with respect to the manufacturing datum, instead of the design definition datum as specified on both the design and manufacturing stage drawings.
A culture existed within the engine manufacturer's Hucknall facility where it was considered acceptable to not declare what manufacturing personnel determined to be minor non-conformances in manufactured components.
Numerous other engines within the Trent 900 fleet were also found to contain a critical reduction in the oil feed stub pipe wall thickness.
The engine manufacturer’s group quality procedures did not provide any guidance on how manufacturing personnel were to determine the significance of a non-conformance, from a quality assurance perspective.
The stevedoring company had not identified stevedore fatigue as a risk to the company or its operations and, as a result, had not implemented a system to manage fatigue. Consequently, its operations were exposed to a level of fatigue-related risk that had not been assessed and treated.
While the risk of aluminium ingot stacks toppling over had been identified by the stevedoring company as a result of past incidents, its procedure for loading aluminium products had not evolved to adequately address this risk. Furthermore, the implementation of basic precautions such as using ladders to climb between ingot tiers was not effectively monitored or enforced.
The aluminium ingot lifts in Newcastle, comprising multiple stacks of ingot packs strapped together, with an effective height to width ratio of 5:1 were inherently unstable. Furthermore, handling and stowage of ingot lifts involved the risk of a lift being disturbed and one or more of its packs falling or toppling because the lifting and other straps were not designed to restrain the packs as a single homogenous cargo unit and were prone to failure.
