The pilot was assigned to a task for which he most likely lacked experience on both the helicopter type and the nature of the flying.
On the southern approach to the level crossing, the Stop Sign Ahead (W3-1) warning sign was not located in accordance with the requirements of AS 1742.7-2007 standard.
The boundary fence between the railway maintenance access track and Gallagher Road had been removed. As a result, over time and with regular use, the false perception that the maintenance access track was part of Gallagher Road was created and reinforced.
At the time of the occurrence there was limited advisory material available to owners, operators and maintenance personnel to alert them to the possibility of MS21042 nut failure and to assist with appropriately detailed inspections aimed at identifying affected items.
The nut manufacturer’s production control and quality control processes failed to prevent the release of one or more lots of MS21042L-4 nuts that remained in a partially-embrittled state after cadmium electroplating.
Poor wheel/rail adhesion was not recognised as a risk in any of Queensland Rail’s risk registers and therefore this risk to the safety of rail operations was not being actively managed.
Queensland Rail’s strategic risk monitoring and analysis processes were ineffective in identifying safety issues pertinent to their fleet from rail safety occurrences in other jurisdictions involving poor wheel/rail adhesion.
Queensland Rail’s risk management procedures did not sufficiently mitigate risk to the safe operation of trains in circumstances when local environmental conditions result in contaminated rail running surfaces and reduced wheel/rail adhesion.
Queensland Rail’s strategic risk monitoring and analysis processes were ineffective in precipitating appropriate safety action to the findings and recommendations of their investigations into the Beerwah SPADs in 2009 which identified wheel/rail adhesion issues.
Emergency management simulation exercises to test the preparedness of network control staff, train crew, and station customer service staff to respond cooperatively to rail safety emergencies had not been undertaken in accordance with the Queensland Rail Emergency Management Plan.
The Queensland Rail driver’s manual did not explain the effects of low adhesion at the wheel/rail interface, how low adhesion is a precursor to prolonged wheel slide events and why these elements reduce the likelihood of achieving expected braking rates.
Despite numerous occurrences of slip-slide events in the years leading up to the accident at Cleveland, Queensland Rail’s risk management processes did not precipitate a broad, cross-divisional, consideration of solutions to the issue including an investigation of the factors relating to poor wheel/rail adhesion.
The national rail occurrence standard and guidelines (ON-S1/OC-G1) do not include significant train wheel slip/slide occurrences as a notification category/type which has the potential to lead to rail safety regulators being unaware of significant and/or systemic safety issues related to wheel/rail adhesion.
The successful management of an emergency event from a remote location is critically dependent on clear and effective communication protocols. Communications within train control, and between train control and Cleveland station, were not sufficiently coordinated and resulted in misunderstandings at the Cleveland station accident site.
The Queensland Rail internal emergency debrief following the Cleveland station collision identified issues related to working with external agencies but did not address critical communication shortfalls within train control and between train control and the staff located at the Cleveland station accident site.
Though airborne search and rescue service providers were regularly tasked to provide assistance to pilots in distress, there was limited specific guidance on the conduct of such assistance.
The Manual of Air Traffic Services differed from the Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Part 172 Manual of Standards concerning the requirements for issuing a night visual approach to an instrument flight rules aircraft, increasing the risk of ambiguity in the application of these requirements by controllers.
The Tiger Airways Australia Pty Ltd documentation and training package relating to the Avalon airspace structure and night visual approach guidance contained incorrect material and omissions that increased the risk of confusion and misunderstanding by flight crews.
The level crossing is longer than necessary. Shortening it would reduce the amount of time that a vehicle spends within the crossing and improve the visual information available to motorists when assessing their ability to clear the crossing.
There is no available refuge or escape area within the traffic island at the northbound exit of the level crossing.
