Ground strike

The pilot in command was undergoing a check flight with a licensed pilot in the right hand seat acting as check pilot.

Both pilots stated that on downwind a landing gear down indication was noted. The gear down indication was again checked final. The aircraft landed normally on the mainwheels but as the nose was lowered the nose gear collapsed and the propeller and nose struck the runway.

After landing, the pilot stated that the landing gear lever was in the "down" position. The landing gear operation was checked by a maintenance engineer and found to be normal.

The reason for the gear collapse was not determined.

The tug aircraft, VH-WGC, was holding to the left of the threshold of the strip while a knot was being cleared in the tow rope attached to a glider to be launched.

Another glider, VH-IKU, was engaged on solo circuits and was to land to the right of VH-WGC. VH-IKU bounced on landing and began to swing to the left. In an attempt to correct the swing, the pilot mistakenly applied left rudder, and the glider struck the tail of the tug. The occupants of all aircraft escaped without injury.

The aircraft was to take off from Lindeman Island. The strip was reported as being a bit rough. The pilot held the control column full back during the take-off run, however the nose gear struck the ground three or four times. As the aircraft speed approached take-off speed the nose gear collapsed, and the aircraft skidded to a halt in a nose-down attitude.

When the pilot of VH-SWT requested start approval and clearance at 0535 EST, the callsign was not that which had been flight planned. Processing of the new callsign and the allocation of a transponder code, along with other arrivals and departures, delayed the departure of SWT for about 20 minutes. The aircraft was to depart from runway 01 at the taxiway A7 intersection.

At 0557, at B747 aircraft landed on runway 19. At this time, the high intensity runway edge lights, as well as the runway centreline lighting, were selected for runway 19. The B747 was still on the runway but south of the A7 intersection when SWT was cleared to line up. Because of this, the runway 19 high intensity edge lights were left on as were the runway 19 centreline lights. (The high intensity edge lighting and the centreline lighting cannot be selected for both runway 01 and runway 19 at the same time.) This meant that the only runway lighting illuminated for runway 01 was the white omnidirectional runway edge lighting. The green taxiway centreline lights were on.

These extended from taxiway A7 to the runway 01 centreline. When SWT was issued with a transponder code and cleared for an immediate departure, the aircraft was at the holding point at A7. The pilot read back the incorrect code and was again given the correct code. To enter the code into the transponder, he had to lean across the cockpit to the right side of the instrument panel. He did this as the aircraft entered the runway. When he looked forward again, he saw a line of white lights directly ahead and commenced the takeoff roll. Almost immediately, he heard a noise from the left side of the aircraft and rejected the take-off. 

The left propeller had struck one of the high intensity runway edge lights. The propeller was damaged and the light housing destroyed. It appears that when the pilot leaned across the cockpit to enter the transponder code, he veered left of the taxiway lights leading to the runway centreline and then assumed that the omnidirectional edge lighting depicted the runway centreline. As a result of this incident, Airservices Australia has written to the airport operator proposing that the lighting system be modified so that the centreline lights for runways 01 and 19 are omni-directional.

A letter supporting this proposal has been sent from BASI Brisbane Field Office to Brisbane Airport Corporation Limited. The operator is issuing a memo to all pilots advising them of the incident and the runway lighting arrangements which can apply when one runway is being used for arrivals and the other for departures.

The helicopter was being used for flight training. The student had been experiencing some problems in stabilising the hover so the instructor placed the helicopter light on the skids to allow the student to practice use of the cyclic control. Because the student had a tendency to allow the helicopter to drift right as the helicopter came light on the skids, the instructor gave the student control of the cyclic and yaw pedals whilst he retained control of the collective.

After several attempts, the student's cyclic control had apparently improved sufficiently that the instructor was confident to bring the helicopter into the hover. However, during the following three attempts the student found hover control difficult and after several seconds in the hover, the instructor had to take control. During the fourth attempt, the student allowed the helicopter to drift right slightly. With the helicopter approximately 1 ft off the ground, the student unexpectedly made a large right cyclic input and allowed the helicopter to yaw left. The instructor did not respond quickly enough to prevent the helicopter sinking and the right rear skid struck the ground. As the ground contact was firmer than normal, the instructor decided to air taxi the helicopter to the parking area. The helicopter's airframe, right skid and tailboom were found damaged.

The pilot reported that during the turn around at Brewarrina, he had not stopped the engines and the freight was placed in the aircraft through the rear cabin door. The cockpit door was not opened during the turn around. The pilot said he carried out the pre-takeoff checks and backtracked on runway 21 to use the full length of the runway for takeoff. After becoming airborne and establishing a positive climb rate he selected the gear up. Seconds later the pilot heard an explosion-like sound and noticed the cockpit door had opened. The pilot said his initial reaction was to grab the door and attempt to close it, but due to the aircraft being in a critical stage of flight he concentrated on flying the aircraft. Judging that he had sufficient runway ahead of him to land the aircraft he closed the throttles. The pilot said that after losing considerable height he realised the gear was not down, so he immediately applied full power. The pilot flew the aircraft away from the runway surface and carried out a 500 ft circuit. He subsequently carried out a normal landing, and taxied clear of the runway.

An inspection of the aircraft revealed that both propellers had contacted the runway, the step behind the right-wing root had been bent up, and the ADF sensor antenna had also been bent. The pilot said that he was certain that the cockpit door had been positively locked before the previous departure from Bourke, and that the locking handle had not been moved since that time.

The pilot noticed as he flared the aircraft for landing that the landing gear was not extended. During the subsequent go-around scraping noises were heard. The aircraft was climbed to circuit height and the gear selector was recycled.

The subsequent extension of the landing gear was normal and the aircraft landed without further incident. Damage to the aircraft was confined to the inboard section of the right flap.

The pilot of the Cessna 172 aircraft made a normal approach in light wind conditions for runway 21. During the landing roll, the aircraft initially tracked to the right side of the runway before slewing heavily to the left. As a result, the propeller struck the runway, bending the tips of both blades back at right angles.

A maintenance investigation did not reveal any defects that may have contributed to this occurrence.

A group of pilots were undertaking endorsement training on the aircraft. They had been briefed on ground handling and starting procedures for the aircraft. The starting procedure involved turning the propeller through with full throttle and ignition off, in order to pass fuel mixture to the cylinders. After that process the throttle was set to be set to 1/4 inch open and the ignition switches turned on for hand starting.

On this occasion the instructor was outside the aircraft to hand swing the propeller and the pilot undergoing the endorsement was in the cockpit. The throttle had been set full open for the priming procedure and the instructor had asked for it to be set to 1/4 inch open. At this time the throttle was moved to a position which the trainee assumed was the appropriate setting. When the engine started it went quickly to a high rpm condition, the tail rose, and the propeller was destroyed by contact with the ground.

The trainee had not closed the throttle initially in order to obtain the correct datum from which to set the throttle for start. He later found that the throttle control movement was much greater than had been expected. In his previous experience, with nose-wheeled aircraft, a high rpm after start was of no concern from an aircraft attitude aspect, however with a tail-wheeled aircraft the tail can rise unexpectedly.

Factors

1. The trainee pilot was unfamiliar with the engine control movement;

2. The starting throttle position was not set from the closed throttle position;

3. The throttle was set too far open for start;

4. The flight controls were not set to help keep the tail low;

5. Timely action to reduce engine rpm was not taken;

6. The instructor did not check that the throttle and flight controls were properly set for start.

It was reported that the pilot was hovering the helicopter in a 12-15 kt headwind, 10-15 ft above trees. Consequently, a less than average power setting was required to maintain height. The wind strength suddenly reduced, and the helicopter descended towards the trees. The pilot increased collective pitch and power to stop the descent and re-establish the hover. Although the helicopter came close to the tree tops the pilot did not believe there had been any contact with them.

Shortly afterwards, the pilot heard an unusual noise coming from the main rotor blades. He landed to investigate and found dents and holes in all three main rotor blades.