AGAIR management exercised ineffective operational control over the line scanning activities. As a result, the ongoing intermittent pressurisation defect was not formally recorded, the issues with the aircraft were not communicated to the AGAIR safety manager, and the hazardous practice of operating the aircraft at a cabin altitude that required the use of supplemental oxygen, without access to a suitable oxygen supply, was allowed to continue.
Implemented actions do not address, in full, the matters raised within the safety issue.
AGAIR stated that it has ceased line scanning activities. AGAIR also stated that the organisation’s exposition has been amended to address the matters raised within the safety issue. This included the insertion of the following information:
AGAIR advised the ATSB that the ‘aircraft daily fuel & flight log’ has been amended to include a column to record the cabin differential during pressurised cruise flight.
AGAIR has also incorporated ‘pressurisation system failure’, ‘oxygen system failure’, ‘hypoxia’, and ‘any hazards unique to multispectral imaging/line scanning operations’ into the organisation’s hazard register.
Additionally, AGAIR advised the ATSB that it has made changes to its recruitment process.
While the ATSB recognises the changes implemented by AGAIR to date, the actions taken do not address, in full, the matters raised within the safety issue relating to effective operational control. The HOFO was responsible for ensuring the operation was compliant with aviation legislation and conformed to company standards. However, the ATSB found multiple instances where these requirements were not met. The response from AGAIR does not address how the organisation intends to assure future legislative and procedural compliance by line pilots and management personnel.
The ATSB recommends AGAIR initiates an independent review of their organisational structure and oversight of operational activities to assure ongoing effective operational control by management.
