Although the operator provided its flight crew with basic awareness training in crew resource management (CRM), it was limited in nature and did not ensure flight crew were provided with sufficient case studies and practical experience in applying relevant CRM techniques.
The operator’s risk controls did not provide assurance that the occupants on an air ambulance aircraft would be able to effectively respond in the event of a ditching or similar emergency. Specific examples included:
The operator and air ambulance provider did not have a structured process in place to conduct pre-flight risk assessments for air ambulance tasks, nor was there any regulatory requirement for such a process.
The operator’s risk controls did not provide assurance that the operator’s Westwind pilots would conduct adequate in-flight fuel management and related activities during flights to remote islands or isolated aerodromes. Limitations included:
The operator’s Westwind pilots generally used a conservative approach to fuel planning, and the operator placed no restrictions on the amount of fuel that pilots uploaded. However, the operator’s risk controls did not provide assurance that there would be sufficient fuel on board flights to remote islands or isolated aerodromes. Limitations included:
Classification of parachuting operations in the private category did not provide comparable risk controls to other similar aviation activities that involve the carriage of the general public for payment.
It was likely that the parachutists on the accident flight, as well as those that had participated in previous flights, were not secured to the single-point restraints that were fitted to VH-FRT. While research indicates that single-point restraints provide limited protection when compared to dual-point restraints, they do reduce the risk of load shift following an in-flight upset, which can lead to aircraft controllability issues.
Research has identified that rear‑facing occupants of parachuting aircraft have a higher chance of survival when secured by dual-point restraints, rather than the standard single-point restraints that were generally fitted to Australian parachuting aircraft.
Some Cessna 206 parachuting aircraft, including VH-FRT, had their flight control systems modified without an appropriate maintenance procedure or approval. That increased the risk of flight control obstruction.
Despite being categorised as mandatory for the pilot’s seat by the aircraft manufacturer, a secondary seat stop modification designed to prevent uncommanded rearward pilot seat movement and potential loss of control was not fitted to VH-FRT, nor was it required to be under United States or Australian regulations.
Despite a steady overall increase in passenger numbers and a mixture of types of operations, Ballina/Byron Gateway Airport did not have traffic advisory and/or air traffic control facilities capable of providing timely information to the crews of VH-EWL and VH-VQS of the impending traffic conflict. It is likely the absence of these facilities, which have been shown to provide good mitigation at other airports with similar traffic levels, increased the risk of a mid-air conflict in the Ballina area.
The aircraft manufacturer did not account for the transient elevator deflections that occur as a result of the system flexibility and control column input during a pitch disconnect event at all speeds within the flight envelope. As such, there is no assurance that the aircraft has sufficient strength to withstand the loads resulting from a pitch disconnect.
At the time of the occurrence, the approved QantasLink training did not provide first officers with sufficient familiarity on the use of the oxygen mask and smoke goggles. This likely contributed to the crew's communication difficulties, including with air traffic control.
Airservices Australia did not provide procedures with associated local instructions to Melbourne air traffic controllers regarding how to coordinate runway changes at Melbourne Airport. Furthermore, an absence of system tools increased the risk of the controllers forgetting to coordinate those changes with the Essendon Aerodrome Controller.
Compromised separation recovery training deficiencies existed within the Department of Defence at the time of the occurrence, increasing the risk of inappropriate management of aircraft in close proximity.
In‑flight opening of the tip-up canopy in a number of Van’s Aircraft Inc. models has resulted in varying consequences, including a significant pitch down tendency, increasing the risk of a loss of control.
The procedures provided to ground and flight crews by Malaysia Airlines Berhad and the towbarless tractor operator did not provide clear guidance or instruction on coordinating activities related to pushback and, in the case of the tractor operator, were informally replaced by local procedures
The Citation aircraft did not have an annunciator light to show that the parking brake is engaged, and the manufacturer’s before take-off checklist did not include a check to ensure the parking brake is disengaged.
Inadvertent application of opposing pitch control inputs by flight crew can activate the pitch uncoupling mechanism which, in certain high-energy situations, can result in catastrophic damage to the aircraft structure before crews are able to react.
The automatic broadcast services did not have the capacity to recognise and actively disseminate special weather reports (SPECI) to pilots, thus not meeting the intent of the SPECI alerting function provided by controller-initiated flight information service.
