The power turbine shaft in Pratt & Whitney Canada PW100 series engines operating in certain marine environments is susceptible to corrosion pitting, which can grow undetected between scheduled inspections. This increases the risk of shaft fracture resulting in engine failure.
The visual flight rules permitted balloons to arrive and depart in foggy conditions without assurance that sufficient visibility existed to see and avoid obstacles.
Cloncurry Air Maintenance had adopted a number of practices, which included using abbreviated inspection checklists, not recording all flight control disturbances and not progressively certifying for every inspection item as the work was completed, which increased the risk of memory-related errors and the omission of tasks.
The scheduled inspections recommended by Rolls-Royce to detect cracking in Trent 700 fan blades, were insufficient to detect early onset fatigue cracks in the membrane to panel bond before those cracks could progress to failure.
The Trent 700 blade manufacturing process produced a variation in internal membrane-to-panel acute corner geometry that, in combination with the inherent high level of blade panel stress, could lead to increased localised stresses in those corner areas and the initiation and propagation of fatigue cracking.
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority provided no guidance for operators concerning the risks associated with vehicle‑assisted deflation.
Picture This Ballooning's safety risk management processes and practices were not sufficient to facilitate the identification of key operational risks associated with vehicle-assisted deflation.
Picture This Ballooning did not have any procedures for conducting vehicle-assisted deflation.
The similarities between the Trim Interrupt and Flap Interrupt switches and the proximal location of the two switches unnecessarily increased the risk of mis-selection and contributed to the excessive out-of-trim condition.
The Cicaré 7T/B/BT mandatory service bulletin (BSC007) for the general stabiliser support assembly provided limited guidance for disassembly of the manufactured component and did not stipulate a compliance period within which to perform the inspection nor provide consideration for repeat inspections. This potentially reduced the opportunity to detect the presence of crack initiation and growth in the stabiliser support assembly.
The pre-flight safety briefing and safety information card did not include a clear instruction on how to activate the flow of oxygen from the passenger oxygen masks and that the bag may not inflate when oxygen is flowing. This resulted in some passengers not understanding whether or not there was oxygen flowing in the mask.
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) did not have an effective framework to approve and oversight air displays, predominantly due to the following factors:
There were a total of 16 engine malfunction events globally over a 4-year period attributed to modification of the Advantage 70™ engine. The modification increased the engine outer duct gas path temperature, which led to distortion and liberation of the outer transition duct segments.
The Civil Aviation Advisory Publication for Aeroplane Landing Areas (92-1(1)) did not have guidance for the inclusion of a safe runway overrun area.
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s procedures and guidance for scoping a surveillance event included several important aspects, but it did not formally include the nature of the operator’s activities, the inherent threats or hazards associated with those activities, and the risk controls that were important for managing those threats or hazards.
There was no requirement for operators of passenger transport flights in aircraft with six or less seats to provide passengers with a verbal briefing, or written briefing material, on the brace position for an emergency landing or ditching, even for aircraft without upper torso restraints fitted to all passenger seats.
Upper torso restraints (UTRs) were not required for all passenger seats for small aeroplanes manufactured before December 1986 and helicopters manufactured before September 1992, including for passenger transport operations. Although options for retrofitting UTRs are available for many models of small aircraft, many of these aircraft manufactured before the applicable dates that are being used for passenger transport have not yet been retrofitted.
There were a significant number and variety of problems associated with the operator’s activities that increased safety risk, and the operator’s chief pilot held all the key positions within the operator’s organisation and conducted most of the operator’s flights. Overall, there were no effective mechanisms in place to regularly and independently review the suitability of the operator’s activities, which enabled flight operations to deviate from relevant standards.
The operator’s pilots routinely conducted near-aerobatic manoeuvres during passenger charter flights. However, procedures for these manoeuvres were not specified in the operator’s Operations Manual, and there were limited controls in place to manage the risk of these manoeuvres.
Although the operator’s procedures required that baggage and cargo be secured during flight, this procedure was routinely not followed, and the aircraft were not equipped with cargo nets or other means for securing loads in the baggage compartment.