The reporter has raised a safety concern in relation to cabin service carts equipped with faulty and/or missing brakes.
The reporter states, the carts used for cabin service on [Operator] aircraft are unsafe as an unacceptably high number of them have faulty or missing brakes. In order to complete the expected cabin service in the time available on short sectors, the seatbelt sign is usually switched off early in the climb phase. The procedure states, cabin crew are to commence cabin service within five minutes of the seatbelt sign being switched off with the aircraft still climbing with the cabin on an incline. Heavy carts are prone to rolling down the aisle (runaway carts) or can bump into passengers as the brakes will not hold them in place. This is in comparison to the [operation] where the aircraft have usually reached cruise by the time they get the carts in the aisle and the cabin is level.
The reporter states that they have observed several carts loaded onto the aircraft with brake pedals completely missing. This issue has been occurring for over two years and the operator has failed to mitigate the risk despite constant reporting of the issue by cabin crew. (Photos supplied to the ATSB and CASA).
The reporter states, 'Today [date] I tagged another two carts as unserviceable (out of the [x] carts I had loaded today)'. The reporter supplied photos of unserviceability tags that were subsequently attached to the carts. The reporter further states, they have been advised by the catering drivers that the tags are often ripped off and ignored to avoid having to repair the carts.
The reporter is concerned for the safety of crew and passengers when using faulty carts loaded with heavy drinks and hot pots of tea and coffee.
Regarding the REPCON RA2024-00221, our response is as follows:
We have gathered data concerning the carts since receiving the REPCON. A keyword search in the [reporting program] was conducted for 'carts' and 'brakes' (including the misspelling 'breaks'), targeting the affected carrier and covering the date range from 01 July 2024 to 03 December 2024.
During this period, approximately [xxx] sectors were flown by [Aircraft A] aircraft. Out of these, there were 50 reports related to issues with the catering carts, resulting in a reported defective cart rate of 0.2 per cent.
However, we promptly issued an immediate notice to all cabin crew, instructing that any carts noted as unserviceable are to be tagged and offloaded, even if it means the flight will go uncatered. Please refer to the Safety Alert below for further details on this matter.
Furthermore, we conducted [audit] activities on the catering centre, and while the checks on the carts were found to be adequate, certain improvements were identified during the process. [Operator] is now working closely with [Catering] to enhance governance around the management of carts, monitoring, and resolution of reports that highlight defective carts.
REPCON outcomes - (extract from [Operator] [audit] report).
The main claims of the REPCON were tested against the evidence that has been gathered through this activity, with each claim and evidence highlighted below.
Claim 1: Several carts have been loaded with brake pedals missing. Carts are often loaded with the brake pedal missing.
Evidence: There has been one reported instance of a cart being loaded with a brake pedal missing or damaged in the period of 01 July 2024 to 03 December 2024. The claim that this has occurred more than once and is a frequent occurrence is not supported by the evidence.
Claim 2: Catering drivers advised that the tags are ripped off and ignored to avoid having to repair the carts.
Evidence: Drivers are not involved in the cart triage or washing process, so this claim is, at best, second hand hearsay (that is the reporter heard it from someone who had heard it from someone else).
Observations of processes at [Location 1] and [Location 2] kitchens did not indicate a need for this to occur, with sufficient serviceable carts available for the servicing of flights, a reserve of serviceable carts held ready for distribution, and triage of unserviceable tagged carts occurring consistently during the observation period.
Claim 3: This issue has been occurring for over two years and is constantly being reported by crew. The risk has not been managed by the operator.
Evidence:
A review of the last two years of safety reports was conducted. 108 reports were raised in this period (43 per cent within the last 6 months), representing an occurrence percentage of approximately 0.21 per cent of flights in the period.
Seventy per cent of these reports are attributable to two reporters. There is no evidence available to support the claim this is 'constantly being reported by crew' or is widespread across the operation, however observations indicate this may also be underreported, owing to varying interpretations of ‘serviceable’.
Risk has been mitigated through ongoing replacement program of the brake mechanisms when they are reported and tagged as faulty and ongoing [level] assurance of [service provider]'s operations by the [team].
Conclusion:
While the possibility of a cart being loaded with unserviceable brakes is not impossible, the extent of the issues claimed ('several carts without pedals, constantly reported, often loaded unserviceable') are not aligned with the quantitative evidence within the [safety system] and the observations conducted at the ramp and kitchen locations.
Key findings/recommendations - (extract from [Operator] [audit] report).
The following findings / recommendations are offered as an improvement and strengthening opportunity, in line with the [Operator]’s continuous improvement strategy.
Build understanding of downstream effect of poor brake serviceability checks.
- Frontline workers in cart cleaning and loading may not understand the implication of carts with ineffective brakes being loaded on aircraft.
Investigate viability of brake checks after carts have been loaded.
- Checks of brakes while empty may not fully demonstrate their capability to resist movement particularly on inclines, leaving identification of issues until after the carts have been delivered to the aircraft and tested by crew or discovered inflight.
Build data set to better understand issues being reported by crew.
- Information from safety reports does not identify what the carts were loaded with (for example drinks or food) when identified as unserviceable. This data may help understand whether these issues are tied to a particular cart load and its weight. Additionally, some crew indicated they are not currently reporting cart issues in [safety program].
Investigate cart design suitability for [Aircraft A] operation.
- As the carts are being used at a different phase of flight on the [Aircraft A] verse the [Aircraft B]/[Aircraft C] (climb verse cruise), further investigation on the suitability of the brake design may for sustained use at the inclines present during climb on [Aircraft A] operations is required.
Investigate return vs maintenance rate.
- Coordination with the cart maintenance provider to better understand the volume of carts that have been tagged out by crew that then arrive in the facility and are determined to not need repair would be beneficial to identify if this is a perception issue from crew.
Alignment of testing requirements and brake performance expectations.
- The requirement to conduct brake checks on a ramp should be incorporated into the [manual] to ensure all locations are conducting checks consistently. Additionally, clearer guidance on what constitutes serviceable should be provided to both [service provider] and cabin crew to set a common standard.
[Operator] - Safety Alert Notice
Title - Cart Brakes
Effective Date - [date]
Carts with missing brake pedals or brakes that do not engage securely to stop a cart must be offloaded.
If during the on-loading process of carts you discover that:
1. carts brakes are missing or
2. the brakes are such that on engaging them the cart does not stop.
This cart should be immediately red tagged as faulty. Ensure the catering team offloads the cart without delay and returns it to the catering facility for thorough inspection and necessary repairs. If no impact to the departure, alternate options can be explored with the catering team.
Should there be no satisfactory resolution the flight should depart without catering. Your prompt action on this matter is essential in maintaining our safety standards.
Please contact the [Manager] if you have concerns and on completion of duty, please submit a [report].
This action supplements guidance in [document].
CASA has reviewed the provided REPCON and the information provided in response. CASA considers a situation in which unserviceable equipment is used and/or inappropriately managed is a valid concern. Of note is that CASA acknowledges that [Operator] has gained insight from their reporting system and responded to the concerns raised by the reporter. CASA will include the information provided within the REPCON in its oversight approach for the identified operator.
On 12 September 2025, the operator provided the following update:
[Operator] has now embedded [Catering] as a standing agenda item in our monthly safety meeting, which ensures that we have regular oversight at an accountable manager level. During these meetings, the Head of [Catering] provides detailed updates covering key items, including incidents, product updates, regulatory updates, key risks, microbiological and pathogen testing results, and continuous improvement activities around catering. One of the key activities is a program of work on brake maintenance and refitting carts with a new designed brake plate. This will be rolled out to the stock over time as they come into shop for regular maintenance.