The reporter has raised a safety concern in relation to 5 passengers occupying a row of 3 seats in a [Operator] [aircraft].
The reporter states their family comprising 2 adults and 2 infants were travelling from [Location 1] to [Location 2] on [flight] on the [date] and were allocated seats [x] and [xx]. There was an adult passenger seated in the third seat of the row.
The reporter queries how a total of 5 passengers can be seated in a row of 3 seats when there would be only 4 oxygen masks available should they be required.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to REPCON RA2024-00178 in relation to the concerns of 5 passengers occupying a row of 3 seats. [Operator] acknowledges the concerns raised by the reporter and have confirmed the reported event and reviewed how this may have occurred.
[Operator] would like to highlight that this event occurred during a very busy time for the operation following the disruption caused by the global CrowdStrike IT outage. This led to the cancellation of a significant number of flights and the unfortunate disruption for a large number of our passengers and team members. The recovery of the network, passenger and crew took several days to complete.
The reporter queries how a total of 5 passengers can be seated in a row of 3 seats when there would be only 4 oxygen masks available should they be required. To better address this, it will be separated into two separate areas - off aircraft and on aircraft.
Summary of the event:
- Customers contacted the [Operator] call centre for a changed flight.
- The call centre can only work from the [booking] and allocated seating based on the original flight booked in line with their standard operating procedures.
- On the day of travel, the passengers have then checked-in via online check-in.
- [Operator] airport teams were still recovering passengers following disruption from the global IT outage (CrowdStrike).
- At the airport the kiosks were used to generate bag tags.
- The check in agent performed the task of accepting bags for infant items but did not check the seating assignment in the booking.
- The boarding agent received a warning for scanning the wrong boarding pass (only the adult boarding pass is to be scanned) but did not check the seating assignment.
- The customers were seated but the cabin crew did not identify 5 passengers in a row.
- While completing the landing preparation the issue was identified by the crew and corrected by reseating customers.
Operator Actions:
- [Operator] Call Centre standard operating procedures (SOPs) are being updated to reflect for adults with multiple infants.
- The airports check-in system is a ‘community product’ utilised by multiple carriers and is unable to have an engineering control that limits the number of people per row. This has been requested multiple times and each time [Operator] has been advised it is not an available option. Therefore, a reliance on our people to identify the issue and rectify remains.
- [Operator] is exploring other digital options to introduce an engineering control for this type of event.
- An [internal communication] was issued to all cabin crew on [date] reminding them of the of the maximum number of passengers per row (see below).
- Cabin crew procedures manual will be updated to reflect the following wording 'number of pax must not exceed the number of oxygen masks available'. The update will occur in September 2024.
[Internal communication number] [title/author/effective date] - UFN
A reminder to ALL crew to ensure that the maximum number of passengers seated in a row (including INFANTS) is not exceeded. Passengers must be seated accordingly to ensure that in the event of a loss of cabin pressure sufficient overhead passenger oxygen masks are available including INFANTS. On [aircraft] type, 4 masks are available from the PSU per seat block [seat identifiers].
Summary
[Operator] would like to thank the reporter for raising awareness of this event. [Operator] actively and continuously manage safety during all operations, whether in the air or on the ground. Such reports help us achieve this. [Operator] acknowledges errors were made on the day. Causal to this was likely the disrupt management following the CrowdStrike IT outage which led to a significant increase in workload across the weekend. [Operator] has taken steps to improve how we manage this type of situation in the future.
CASA received a briefing from [Operator] on [date] in regard to the operator’s corrective action plan as contained within the REPCON. The briefing was comprehensive allowing CASA full oversight of the actions that have been taken and are to be completed. In regard to the response to the REPCON, CASA is satisfied with the corrective action plans provided by [Operator] and will as part of national oversight have continued visibility of actions taken in the future in regard to this matter.