REPCON number
RA2024-00144
Date reported
Published date
Mode
Affected operation/industry
Concern subject type
Reporter's deidentified concern

The reporter has raised a safety concern in relation to aircraft separation in the vicinity of the GMH VFR approach point to the east of Moorabbin Airport.

The reporter states that all aircraft inbound to Moorabbin airport from the east should be at 1,500 ft by the time they are overhead 'GMH' which is the VFR approach point as displayed on the Melbourne Visual Terminal Chart (VTC). The reporter further states that aircraft will continue descent to 1,000 ft overhead 'Parkmore Shopping Centre' which is the boundary of Moorabbin Airport.

The reporter advises that aircraft have been witnessed departing Moorabbin to the east overflying Parkmore towards GMH anywhere between 1,000-1,500 ft placing these aircraft in direct conflict with inbound aircraft approaching GMH at times with only 'a few hundred feet' of vertical separation. The reporter further states, 'I have seen two aircraft on one occasion that passed each other at the same level, in short horizontal but not with vertical separation'.

The reporter queries if the following remarks are able to be included on the Melbourne VTC:

1. A note put on the VTC warning that Parkmore, Sandown and GMH are for inbound traffic. 

2. Outbound (eastbound traffic) track to the south of the subject inbound points (Parkmore and GMH) unless at 2,000 ft or higher.

The reporter states, 'The aspect of tracking outbound over the two approach points, Parkmore and GMH, I put down to a lack of a note on the VTC and secondly the level of instruction given by instructors for Moorabbin-based trainees. Perhaps there should also be a printed reminder to all Moorabbin-based flight schools about not flying outbound over inbound approach points and a note on the VTC'.

Named party's response

The REPCON report was presented at the Airport Safety Committee on 17/12/2024 which included Moorabbin Airport-based flight schools.

Feedback from those present was that for the situation reported to exist, operators would be contravening expected conventions. While this is possible, feedback was that it was not deemed to be common.

As discussed throughout this item being live, this is not an item that is within Moorabbin Airport Corporation’s control or influence. We have facilitated the sharing of the information simply because both Airservices Australia and CASA would not take carriage. Airspace management and safety is clearly the accountability of Airservices Australia and CASA. 

Should any further actions be required, we respectfully request that they are addressed with the relevant authority.

2nd named party's response

Safety risk at Moorabbin is very much an active issue for Airservices. We are considering the risk environment in a holistic manner (not individual conflicts) and have commenced the analysis below to inform a broader safety action plan.

Airservices is preparing a risk analysis of operations at Moorabbin tower. This will be a quantitative assessment to help determine key features relating to risk. This work uses the trajectory information for all flights which enables a deeper analysis of risk aspects than earlier work. It also includes computational analysis of occurrence text to extract additional relevant information. 

The key aspects will be:

  • trends since 2020 on movements, occurrence counts and rates
  • determination of key traffic flow features – and how they impact risk
  • quantifying the risk for each occurrence
  • classifying occurrences according to key risk features 
  • risk hot spots (location / times of day / operational modes / time of year).
Regulator's response

CASA has reviewed the REPCON. The details of the report would be best directed, by the proponent, through the Moorabbin Local Runway Safety Team, or other local aviation safety forums, to raise the subject with the appropriate local stakeholders, like Airservices and the airport operator, for resolution.