Many factors contribute to an airline's safety record, some external to the organisation and others internal. An important internal contribution comes from the manner in which the company's flight operations are managed. This study addresses the organisational factors impinging on an airline's safety outcome that are subject to influence by managers in their flight operations divisions. Particular attention is given to evidence of the concept known as 'institutional resilience'.
Twelve major airlines in Australasia and South East Asia participated in the study. The study used a mixed method approach, incorporating both qualitative data (interviews) and quantitative data (audit). The qualitative approach used in-depth interviews, conducted with 36 senior managers in the twelve airlines. The quantitative approach comprised a self-reported audit of organisational management arrangements within each airline. The audit was conducted by means of a questionnaire sent to one senior manager in each airline. Eleven questionnaires were returned.
This report deals with the analysis of results from the audit.
The scope of the audit was determined by both the framework adopted for the study and by information gained during the preceding 36 interviews. The framework of analysis has six-parts: human factors, culture, safety management systems, benchmarking, and theory of high reliability and institutional resilience.
The results show both significant similarities and important differences between the airlines. Attention is given to differences between domestic and overseas airlines. The similar outcomes are useful as a normative guideline on the way airlines should address their management of safety. The differences provide a guide to further development by both airlines and researchers. The findings are discussed in detail at Section 5 of this Report.
The study identifies three areas suitable for further research. The first relates to further development of reactive and proactive measures that can indicate the state of an airlines' 'safety health'. When used in an appropriate combination, such measures should indicate changes in intrinsic safety levels and facilitate the prioritisation of remedial action. The next area builds on the first by investigating the development of a checklist, similar to the Checklist for Assessing Institutional Resilience (CAIR). A suitable checklist must appeal to the airlines in terms of its practical application. The third area is development of a process to improve the reporting rate of flight crew error.