The reporter has raised a safety concern around the absence of training for staff involved in supporting helicopter aeromedical services at the [Healthcare Services Provider] Hospital.
The reporter states that they are routinely required to support aeromedical transfers from the hospital's helicopter landing site (HLS), including:
- radio communication to helicopters en route to the hospital
- clearing helicopters to approach and land at the HLS
- provision of information about local hazards (such as bird activity)
- assisting the transfer of patients from helicopters to the hospital.
The reporter also notes that they also have first responder duties in the event of a HLS emergency.
The reporter is concerned that they, and fellow staff-members, have not received or been required to undertake any training in the performance of these duties around the HLS and operating aircraft.
They report being unaware of any procedural information, guidelines or other materials related to safe conduct around the HLS, and do not know whether the hospital has a knowledgeable staff-member designated as a Helicopter Landing Officer.
Ultimately, as a result of this training issue, the reporter believes that staff at the [Hospital] involved with helicopter operations are not adequately knowledgeable as to the unique associated risks, nor prepared to properly manage those safety-critical risks.
Named party no 1 - Healthcare Services Provider
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the REPCON report RA2026-00004.
The [Healthcare Services Provider] takes aviation and heliport safety seriously and recognises the importance of ensuring that risks associated with helicopter operations in a hospital environment are appropriately identified, managed, and reviewed.
The [Healthcare Service Provider's] heliport is operated in accordance with applicable Civil Aviation Safety Regulations and a site-specific Heliport Operations Manual. The Manual delineates responsibilities across clinical, operational, and infrastructure functions and is supported by procedural guidance, role descriptions, and operational checklists. The Manual is reviewed on a scheduled basis with relevant stakeholders, with the most recent review completed in May 2025.
Operational heliport coordination and oversight functions are undertaken by designated [position title], who perform the role of Heliport Officers in accordance with the Operations Manual. These officers are responsible for heliport readiness, coordination with aeromedical services, and management of heliport activities during helicopter arrivals and departures. Role-specific training and orientation is provided to support these functions, including safe conduct around operating aircraft, communications protocols, and emergency response arrangements.
Heliport Officer duties include, where required, radio communications with inbound aircraft, confirmation of heliport readiness, awareness of local environmental factors, and coordination of safe patient transfer activities. These activities are supported by structured processes and documented checklists, including daily heliport serviceability inspections and pre-arrival / active mode inspections, which are completed and recorded to support safe and consistent operations.
First responder actions in the event of a heliport emergency are clearly outlined within the Operations Manual and associated procedures. Heliport Officers are supported through training, orientation, and emergency response frameworks aligned with broader hospital emergency management arrangements.
From a Facilities and Engineering perspective, responsibilities relate to the management and maintenance of the built environment, including ensuring the heliport is serviceable, taken in or out of service when required, and maintained in accordance with the Operations Manual. Facilities and Engineering staff access the heliport only for approved operational or maintenance purposes and through established permit and access control processes. They do not perform aviation operational or aircraft coordination functions.
Updates to heliport related protocols, manuals, and procedural materials are managed through established document control and governance processes, with updates communicated to relevant stakeholders as part of routine review cycles or where operational changes occur.
The [Healthcare Services Provider] acknowledges the value of REPCON as a safety feedback mechanism and, while established training frameworks and procedural supports are in place, remains committed to continuous improvement. As part of this commitment, the [Healthcare Services Provider] will undertake further review and reinforcement of heliport related training and awareness to ensure staff involved in heliport operations remain appropriately supported and informed, particularly in the context of evolving operational environments and workforce changes.
Named party no 2 - Aeromedical Services Provider
Although the [Aeromedical Services Provider] acknowledges the reporter’s concerns, ultimately it is the responsibility of the [Healthcare Services Provider] to train their staff if they are expected to perform any function on the HLS.
Additionally, the [Aeromedical Services Provider] has no oversight or obligations associated with the training of the [Healthcare Services Provider's] support staff who may be involved with the helicopter arrivals / departures.
As is the case with our operations, it remains the pilots' decision whether to land at the [Healthcare Services Provider's] HLS given the information they have at hand and in accordance with our CASR 133.170 compliant HLS Register.
We appreciate ATSB taking the time to examine HLS management more closely, as issues do tend to flare up too often.
The [Aeromedical Services Provider] is not in a position to audit HLS operators’ policies, procedures, or compliance requirements - particularly given the scale of our network, which includes more than [number] HLS sites across the regions we service.
That said, hospitals are generally open to receiving feedback from us regarding matters such as unserviceable lighting, overgrown vegetation, windsock issues, and similar concerns at HLS locations; however, our involvement typically does not extend beyond that.
Like many helicopter operators, we subscribe to SafeHelipads, which is a valuable resource for information on individual HLS conditions and serviceability, as reported by users of those sites. However, it operates independently of the HLS operators themselves, and few add value to that content.
Thank you for the opportunity to review the REPCON. CASA has reviewed the REPCON and the named party responses.
CASA does not currently regulate the training of personnel at helicopter landing sites (HLS) who are not members of the helicopter operator’s personnel. The education, training and safety of ground personnel is normally an OH&S responsibility of their employer, in this case who is also the HLS operator, and as identified in the named party response, procedures are documented in the relevant organisational policy documents for this purpose.
Regarding the comments raised about non-trained personnel 'supporting helicopter aeromedical services', CASR subregulation 119.170(5)(d) requires an operator, in this case a medical transport operator to have a training and checking system for their operational safety critical personnel, who are NOT flight crew or cabin crew. This is intended to capture any ground staff supporting operations at the HLS carrying out the named tasks in the REPCON and this should be confirmed with the author of the REPCON and any operator involved.
The concern may be also addressed by any medical transport operator involved in the operation described within the REPCON.
In the Australian civil aviation context, the management of safe operations at helicopter landing sites (HLS) falls to a collaboration between site users (in this case, the Aeromedical Service Provider) and the site operators (in this case, the Healthcare Service Provider).
Both parties have an intrinsic, shared responsibility to ensure that all personnel involved in the operation of services at HLS' are proficient in the safe conduct of those services and cognisant of the associated risks and their management.
Like aircrew, all ground-based personnel supporting HLS operations must receive training and instruction in accordance with approved procedures. Such personnel must be assessed and found competent in those procedures before being requested or permitted to undertake HLS duties.
Further, both parties have a collective responsibility to assess and assure the maintained and ongoing competency of staff under their respective organisational control.