The reporter has raised a safety concern in relation to a Part 121 operator bypassing mandatory inspections to prevent a delayed departure.
The reporter advised, on [date], the ground handling crew were conducting loading activities for [Operator] [flight number], an [aircraft type] preparing to depart [Location 1] for [Location 2]. [Operator] ground operations directed the ground handling crew to finalise the paperwork and clear the aircraft for departure despite being clearly advised that the mandatory cargo hold inspections had not yet been completed. The reporter further advised, [Operator] procedures stipulate that all cargo holds must be inspected to a) check they are loaded in accordance with the load instruction report (LIR) ensuring the aircraft is loaded within weight and balance limitations, and b) ensure the cargo holds are secure with the hold locks in the upright position preventing loads shifting within the hold. The mandatory inspections in this case did not occur.
The reporter states, the ground handling staff member who signs the LIR is ultimately responsible for the correct loading and security of the aircraft cargo holds. The reporter further states, that in this case, ground handling staff were pressured by [Operator] ground operations to bypass standard operating procedures to prevent a delay. If a delay is attributed to the ground handling company, the staff involved may be disciplined through a performance management process. The reporter is concerned that this is an example of [Operator] prioritising on-time performance over safety.
On [date], [Location] airport experienced exceptionally high wind conditions, with gusts in some instances exceeding 47 knots. Due to the severity of these conditions, it was deemed unsafe for personnel to operate the loader, load containers, or enter the aircraft hold to conduct lock checks or raise locks.
Consequently, a decision was made to operate [flight number] with both forward and aft cargo holds empty. A limited number of bags had been loaded into the bulk hold (non-containerised hold) prior to the escalation of weather conditions. The remaining baggage was scheduled for uplift once conditions improved later in the day. [Operator] notified the downline port of this operational adjustment. The outstanding baggage was subsequently transported on [flight number].
Under standard operating procedures, the Aircraft Loading Supervisor is required to inspect all holds and confirm that the load is secure, with all locks raised in nil-fit positions. However, in light of the safety risks posed by the extreme winds, including fall-from-height hazards, and given that all positions were nil-fit, that is - empty, the decision to proceed with departure was made under these non-normal circumstances.
[Flight number] was scheduled to depart at 1325 and departed at 1340. At no point did on-time performance influence the decision-making process. The decision was based solely on the safety and wellbeing of our operational teams.
Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that any threat of disciplinary action was made in relation to potential delays caused by ground operations. Ground Operations [Position title 1] are expected to uphold a professional standard that precludes placing undue pressure on teams or issuing threats of disciplinary measures in such contexts.
Extracts from the [Position title 2] and [Position title 1] shift reports, as well as the LIR for [flight number] dated [date], provide further context and documentation of the decisions made. (Extracts and LIR supplied to the ATSB and CASA).
CASA has reviewed the REPCON and operator response. CASA considers the matter contained within the REPCON to be a valid concern and will include the information provided in its oversight approach for the identified operator.
A copy of the final report was provided to the ground handling company along with an opportunity to provide comment however no response was received.