The reporter has raised a safety concern in relation to Flight Control Computer (FCC) faults not being recorded in the aircraft technical Log (TL).
The reporter states, there have been occurrences recently where [aircraft type] aircraft operated by [Operator] on behalf of [Operator 2] have sustained FCC failures on the ground.
The reporter advises that some flight crew may not have entered the defect into the TL and have been instructed by maintenance watch engineers to shut the aircraft down and restart in an attempt to clear the fault. There is no Minimum Equipment List (MEL) relief for this fault. The reporter further states, 'failing to enter a defect in the TL is in direct contravention of company SOPs and this form of clearing action is not approved pilot maintenance'.
The reporter provided an example whereby a crew declined the directions of the maintenance watch engineer. An engineer was subsequently flown into the location where the aircraft had become unserviceable (an outport not serviced by an engineering presence) to rectify the malfunction. The defect was entered into the TL in this instance. The engineer was unable to clear the fault despite several reset attempts, resulting in multiple defective parts being replaced.
The reporter states, the concern with this defect is that it can have potential safety ramifications in flight and the practice of clearing the fault and departing increases the threat of the system failing while airborne. Previous occurrences which may not have been recorded will have the effect of masking the fault history. The reporter provided a further example where the aircraft departed an outport and the fault had not been recorded in the TL. As there was no record of the fault, the problem was not investigated until after the fault reappeared.
Furthermore, crews may accept and fly the aircraft with no knowledge of the true status of the aircraft systems, in which case they will have no opportunity to reject the aircraft on grounds of its defect status.
The reporter further advised they are aware this practice has been reported to the [Operator] safety department via [incident reporting program].
On 26 September 2024, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) advised the [Operator] Head of Safety that the ATSB was in receipt of a REPCON report regarding operations at [Operator] which specifically referred to concerns regarding the management of Flight Control Computer (FCC) defects on the [aircraft type] fleet.
In response to the REPCON and to better understand the issues presented, [Operator] has undertaken a thorough review of the below documented systems and processes related to FCC faults and general defect management:
- documented defect reporting requirements for flight crew and engineers within the operator exposition
- [Aircraft manufacturer] documentation pertaining to FCC defects
- historic communications disseminated to operational workgroups regarding defect management
- operational (flight crew and engineering) reporting regarding defect management
- statistical review of historic [aircraft type] FCC defects and associated documentation (for example tech logs).
This report has been generated in response to the REPCON and to provide insight into the analysis of the above elements, further context on established controls within the System of Maintenance (SOM) and additional actions that [Operator] has taken to further educate operational personnel in the area of defect management.
Aircraft Defect Management - System Overview
[Operator 1] has clearly defined systems and processes in place within the operator exposition to guide operational personnel on the expectations regarding aircraft defect management. Familiarity with aircraft defect reporting requirements is maintained through initial and recurrent training programs, with all relevant personnel (including maintenance watch/engineering personnel and flight crew) well versed in how the system operates and the reporting associated requirements. This helps to facilitate the organisation’s ability to acquit its safety and regulatory obligations.
Extracts from controlled documents within the operator exposition are shown below which outline the over-arching system design and expected process flow when a defect is discovered on an [Operator] aircraft. These documents also include the reference to the systems utilised for ongoing monitoring of aircraft continuing airworthiness.
Furthermore, a copy of an internal memo to [Operator] flight crew has been provided (supplied to the ATSB and CASA), which has previously been issued to highlight pilot in command obligations regarding defect management, communications with maintenance watch and defect deferral/rectification processes.
- Technical Log policy and procedures (provided to the ATSB and CASA)
- Defect Management procedures (provided to the ATSB and CASA)
- Deferral of Defects procedures (provided to the ATSB and CASA)
- MEL Deferrals procedures (provided to the ATSB and CASA)
- Aircraft/Crew changeover procedures (provided to the ATSB and CASA)
- Management of Defects policy and procedures (provided to the ATSB and CASA)
Review - Reported Occurrences
On [date], [Operator] received an [incident reporting program] report from a flight crew member regarding an occurrence whereby the defect management process following a Flight Control Computer (FCC) fault was subject to a possible quality escape (see pilot report below).
The report demonstrated that, whilst ultimately the regulatory and safety obligations (that is the desired outcomes) were met through correct defect log entry and appropriate engineering actions to resolve the reported FCC fault, communications and directions to flight crew from maintenance watch were not consistent with the defect management requirements detailed in the operator exposition (specific to the fault message reported).
Following receipt of this report, [Operator] found that the actions of the flight crew were appropriate. Feedback was provided to the maintenance watch personnel regarding the use of non-approved pilot maintenance procedures for power-cycling the aircraft.
[Operator] is also aware of a separate recent incident where a flight crew member did not initially write up an aircraft defect (non-FCC related) in the technical log at the time that the defect was identified at an out-station. On this occasion, the flight crew member performed a power cycle of the aircraft which resulted in the fault self-clearing, and the aircraft was subsequently operated for another sector. The flight crew member did write up the fault as a ‘For Info’ message in the technical log on the return sector. This incident was identified by [Operator] at the time and is subject to an internal investigation.
[Operator] has also reviewed historic [aircraft type] FCC fault data and found that there has been a total of eight (8) FCC failure defects reported in 2024 (supplied to the ATSB and CASA). Of these reported occurrences, only one event was caused by a defective FCC unit.
Notwithstanding, [Operator] acknowledges the ability to ‘de-power’ and ‘re-power’ the aircraft for such a fault to support defect rectification is not prescribed in the operator exposition as an approved pilot maintenance procedure.
Next Steps
To further embed organisational systems and process effectiveness, and improve awareness of appropriate defect management requirements for operational personnel, [Operator] has issued Quality Notice [Operator]-[notice number] (supplied to the ATSB and CASA) reinforcing to the maintenance watch (MW) engineering teams the correct protocols when FCC failure messages (or indeed any other defect not covered by FCOM or other approved procedures) is reported; specifically, non-approved and/or non-documented aircraft system resets continue to be expressly prohibited and not requested of flight crew. Further to this, the engineering leadership team has undertaken toolbox sessions with all MW personnel to confirm understanding and intent of the [Operator] [aircraft type] defect management system requirements, thereby helping to ensure continued sound compliance and risk management in this area.
In line with the core values of [Operator 2], [Operator] remains committed to maintaining safety as the first priority.
- internal memo to flight crew - reporting of aircraft defects (supplied to the ATSB and CASA)
- [aircraft type] Fault Isolation Manual extracts (supplied to the ATSB and CASA).
Recent pilot report - FCC FAIL defect management
Incident report details (De-identified)
Date of incident: [date]
Title: Maintenance Watch
Detailed description: Following aircraft power up in [Location], ‘FCC failure’ alert was displayed. Given there is no engineer in [Location] and no MEL relief for this alert, maintenance watch was contacted to organise having the defect rectified. Advise from maintenance watch was to de-power and restart the aircraft as a way to clear the alert. The PIC communicated to the maintenance watch engineer that this is not an approved flight crew procedure. The duty pilot was contacted for guidance.
Aircraft registration: [registration]
Location: [Location]
Reporter's business unit: [Operator] Flight Operations
A review was conducted whilst completing a scheduled audit on the operator AOC and CAMO approval.
No further follow up is required with this matter.