The reporter has raised a safety concern in relation to the delay of the publishing of NOTAMs for TRA / TIBA airspace contingency.
The reporter states at approximately 0900 local, personnel at [Location 1] Centre became aware that contingency measures would be required during the afternoon and communicated this to several key people. Coincidentally, the [then] current CEO of Airservices Australia was in front of the Senate Estimate Committee in the morning. The CEO was released from Senate Estimates at 1244 local and NOTAMs declaring the contingency airspace were released subsequently.
The reporter states in the 15 minutes prior to the airspace becoming TIBA / TRA, a controller became aware that two aircraft had departed [Location 1] southbound, without authority to operate in the TRA and seemingly unaware that the airspace was subject to contingency measures. At approximately 1610 local a controller called [Location 1] Tower to request they stop departing aircraft into the TIBA / TRA airspace because no aircraft had been authorised to enter it and there was a serious safety concern due to workload created by the previous two aircraft needing to be vectored clear of the affected airspace (one onto a very long, unplanned diversion route over the ocean). This resulted in [Location 1] Tower cancelling the clearance for an aircraft at the holding point and requiring it to return to the bay, the cancellation of multiple pushback clearances, and the delay of other pushback clearances.
At 1612 local a controller contacted the Air Traffic Management Director and stressed that a ground stop was required for all aircraft departing [Location 1] via [IFR waypoint] due to the immediate safety issue. It then became apparent that the issue seemed to have been caused by an understanding that NOTAMs declaring contingency airspace activation were not to be published while the [then] CEO was in front of the Senate Estimates Committee that morning, and despite having Operational Command Authority for Australian Airspace, the Air Traffic Management Director required approval from multiple, non-operational senior managers before being permitted to publish contingency NOTAMs.
The reporter is concerned that should this be found to be true, it indicates that senior managers of Airservices Australia have risked the safety of the travelling public to help the CEO avoid embarrassment in front of the Senate Estimates Committee. It would also indicate a culture of operational decisions needing to be approved by non-operational managers which adds delay to disseminating this urgent, safety sensitive information to pilots in a timely manner through established process.
In this occurrence, the delay in publishing operational NOTAMs resulted in multiple aircraft being entirely unaware that the airspace was operating in a contingency mode. In one case an aircraft was forced to divert onto a significantly longer track, over the ocean, without being provided notice before the flight departed to plan for a significantly longer route, despite the contingency being known to Airservices many hours in advance. This unplanned, lengthy, short-notice diversion would have potentially resulted in a significantly higher workload for the operating crew, less fuel reserves, and potentially a reduction in safety of the flight that would have been avoided if prompt notification had been made and the aircrew notified in advance of becoming airborne.
The reporter also advised, 'this occurrence is not an isolated incident as far as delaying NOTAM publication until close to a contingency time due to the 'optics'. There have been many occasions this year concerning night shifts on [Location 2] TCU being known to be vacant for more than a week in advance (but NOTAMs only being permitted to be published on the day, typically the afternoon of the contingency). A similar delay in issuing NOTAMs for an East airspace contingency resulted in aircraft departing from the USA without notification the oceanic airspace would be contingent, despite Airservices knowing this many hours ahead of NOTAM publication'.
Airservices appreciates the opportunity to respond to the concerns raised in the REPCON. As part of pre-contingency processes, we must determine the level of Air Traffic Services (ATS) that can be provided, in consideration of factors including staffing levels, endorsements, experience levels, traffic volumes including military exercises, systems available and weather. Options are considered to avoid or minimise impact to the delivery of ATS services and consequently, impact to industry.
With regards to the specific contingency specified by the reporter, the initial priority for the Shift Managers (SM), Line Leaders (LL), Director Operations (DO), and the Air Traffic Management Directors (ATMD) involved was to try and avoid the need for a Temporary Restricted Area (TRA) and failing that, endeavour to limit the number of and length of the TRA periods as much as possible. Concurrent with that, all efforts were made to try and ensure that the TRA was implemented in a manner that managed any risk, noting that there was a military exercise occurring at the time in the area.
A review of the timeline of events was conducted and is provided for transparency:
At 1127 the SM advised the ATMD via e-mail that all options had been exhausted and they provided a plan for three TRA breaks throughout the afternoon.
At 1147 that plan was shared with the Head of Airspace, the Head of Networks and to the High-Density Services North (HDSN) DO. The Head of Airspace requested that the HDSN DO review the proposed plan with the SM to see if impact to ATS services and industry could be reduced. This was because it was identified that the sequencing of TRA periods could potentially be reduced. Specifically, one of the TRA periods proposed (to accommodate a controller break) finished at 1900 and the next TRA period proposed (to accommodate a break for the same controller) started at 1945.
Between 1216 and 1250 this plan was being worked through by the DO, the SM and the ATMD, and at 1256 the DO went to meet with the SM in the Operations Room to finalise the plan for the TRA periods. However, due to a handover between the morning and afternoon SM and an inflight emergency response being managed at the same time, the conversation did not occur immediately.
At 1335 the plan for the two TRA periods was agreed and communicated by the DO to the ATMD. The plan had incorporated the prior feedback, with one 30-minute break from 1615-1645 and one 60-minute break from 1900-2000. Prior to publication of the notice, approval was sought from the Head of Airspace, additionally some challenges were worked through associated with an ongoing military exercise occurring at the time and inability to publish contingency routing (which would normally occur). Publication occurred at approximately 1440.
While it is appreciated and understood that the time period for the pre-contingency processes was not ideal and did impact on the ability for industry to plan for the variation of service, the delay was due to a number of challenges and considerations that presented on the day, and not due to any other reasons as suggested in the REPCON.
CASA is aware of the NOTAM process applied by Airservices Australia to minimise risk to the safety of aviation through the declaration of TIBA and TRAs. This includes the timely notification of TIBA events after all efforts by Airservices to minimise the need and duration for such declarations. CASA understands that TIBA events as mentioned in the REPCON may have been disruptive for industry and ATC but there were no safety concerns identified by CASA.