The reporter has raised safety concerns in relation to the training and low level of experience among helicopter flight and [task specialist] crew.
The reporter states, new pilots to the organisation as well as inexperienced [task specialist] crew, are being rushed directly into [task 1] operations without having gained adequate experience in conducting [task 2].
The reporter expresses concern that due to commercial pressure, inexperienced crews are paired together conducting [task 1] operations leading to an elevated level of risk.
The reporter is also concerned that due to commercial pressure, there is a tendency within the organisation that leads to a reduction of training. Previously, there was a [training event] where the company shut down and all crew gathered together conducting online training, emergency briefs, drills and more. Currently, all training is done on the job in the customer’s time while operating in a [low-level environment] leading to a breakdown in situational awareness. The main focus while flying in a [low-level environment] should be on obstacle avoidance by both pilot and recorder. When training a new flight crew member 'on the job' and in a '[low level environment]', the main focus is now divided between observing the pilot under supervision and obstacle avoidance.
The reporter expressed further concerns regarding the air/roadworthiness of aircraft and rolling equipment in the field. The reporter states, previously there was a team of in-house engineers supporting the flight operation. However, in recent years that in-house team has reduced significantly to a level that the reporter deems inadequate to satisfy the current fleet demands. There has been a continuous and seemingly endless occurrence of small/large defects of aircraft and task equipment, rolling equipment and so on, leading to highly increased amounts of downtime. This subsequently results in highly elevated levels of frustration and dissatisfaction of crew in the field as they are not getting their allowances while sitting on the ground for days at a time.
The reporter finally states, the poor quality of accommodation in the field results in an elevated risk of fatigue. The reporter believes that commercial pressure has lowered the accommodation budget per night at the cost of comfort.
ATSB comment
The operator provided proactive safety actions in [year] to a previous investigation.
[Investigation], specifically references the supervision and review of newly authorised pilots in specialist tasks. The ATSB queries if the following safety actions apply to pilots progressing from [task 2] to [task 1] operations:
- Mandated and expanded In Command Under Supervision (ICUS) time requirements for pilots as part of initial task training for relevant specialist tasks.
- The introduction of consolidation flight checks at key points for pilots newly authorised in relevant specialist tasks in-line with the organisation's internal training and checking system for pilot authorisations.
The introduction of a requirement for pilots newly authorised in relevant specialist tasks to be rostered with an experienced pilot to act as a mentor for their first tasking as PIC on the specialist task.
Firstly, please see below responses in terms of process and application against the three points raised by the ATSB in the REPCON. [Operator] has reviewed our previous 12 months of operation in ascertaining answers to your queries.
1: Mandated ICUS
Process: yes, this is still our process.
Application: yes, all pilots trained have undergone required ICUS or more.
[Operator] has trained 8 pilots in the last 12 months. One of these for two tasks, so 9 training events have occurred.
2. Consolidation flight checks
Process: yes, this is still our process.
Application: yes, all pilots have undergone consolidation checks.
We have completed 22 consolidation checks in the last 12 months. All have been within the windows specified or within 3-5 hours thereof with the exception of one (final) check that was completed outside of the window. [Operator] has raised this in our internal quality system for review as to how this has occurred.
3. Rostering new pilots under mentorship
Process: yes, this is still our process.
Application: no deviation from our process in the last 12 months.
[Operator] operates on a fact-based approach in many respects and thus has taken the opportunity to measure ourselves against the claims raised in the aforementioned REPCON. Please see below a summary of the report broken down as best as we can into individual issues raised and the results of internal review conducted.
Inadequate and low level of experience among flight and [task specialist] crew
[Operator] has recently experienced an increase in demand for [task 1] work and thus the balance of our operation has shifted from predominately conducting [task 2] flying to predominately conducting [task 1] operations. It is no longer possible for us to always bring new pilots in at [task 2].
As a result of this, we have reviewed our training process and established a pathway to train pilots new to [Operator] in [task 1] upon commencement. This pathway maintains all of the key elements of our existing training pathways and increases minimum experience requirements and ICUS time for direct to [task 1] pathways. (Operations Manual excerpts supplied to the ATSB and CASA)
We have used consolidation checking to validate the direct to [task 1] pathways - there is no evidence of training outcomes being diminished for those pilots who have proceeded directly to [task 1].
Of the 8 pilots we have trained in the last 12 months, 6 of them went through a direct to [task 1] pathway. Three of these have successfully completed all training and consolidation checks, 2 are still under training or subject to consolidation checks, and 1 has been terminated.
No changes were deemed to be required in our [task specialist] training pathways. We have always had inputs direct to all tasks within our [task specialist] training process.
Inexperienced flight crew teamed with inexperienced [task specialist]s
[Operator] does not formally define any process for the partnering of crews - in terms of experience or otherwise. However, when rostering, [Operator] tactically monitors the experience levels of the crew members - especially for operations where there is only two crew members on board such as [task 1]. This said, no crew member is authorised to conduct a task without completing all requisite training and assessment and thus being deemed competent for the task.
[Operator] has reviewed our roster for the previous 12 months and finds one instance where a [task specialist] who had recently been signed out for [task 1] was partnered with a pilot who had completed initial training, sign out and an initial check but had yet to complete all remaining consolidation checks. However, this pilot was rostered during this tour for the first week (and their subsequent consolidation check) with an experienced training and checking [task 1] pilot who is also a Grade 1 flight instructor.
[Operator] has completed [dozens of] tours since January 2024, the above is the only instance identified where a [task specialist] scheduled on their first post-sign out tour has been paired with a pilot who was still undergoing consolidation checking without any other mentoring or supervision being in place.
Commercial pressure leading to a reduction in training
[Operator] conducts more training now than ever before. This is evidenced by the previous responses relating to pilot training but also in our training system where our field staff are subject to substantially more training requirements than historically has been the case.
Previous [training event]
[Operator] discontinued the previous [training event] format as a result of the intended outcomes not being satisfactorily met. We found that the [training event] was treated as a social event, that crews tended to focus less on the training and also engage in social activities outside of the scheduled training which impacted on their ability to participate appropriately.
[Operator] currently conducts training using a mixture of face-to-face, online, off-the-job and on-the-job formats. These formats are used among our induction, initial and recurrent training activities. We have no evidence that moving away from the [training event] format has diminished any training or recurrence outcomes.
[Operator] delivers more training now overall than we did during the time when we utilised the [training event] format.
Training on-the-job
This statement is incorrect. [Operator]'s task-based training packages include theory and flight checking which occur either prior to or in conjunction with on-the-job elements. Substantial theory is completed prior to any pilot progressing to line-based training.
Due to the nature of [Operator]'s operations, training on-the-job is necessary - there is no other environment available that replicates the requirements of the tasks.
Pilots under training are subject to direct supervision and where deficiencies are noted regarding their ability to conduct the specific tasks, training is amended or paused as required. This has been the case for 3 new pilots in the last 12 months.
One pilot demonstrated a lack of situational awareness while conducting the [specialist task] as a result of inexperience. This pilot was provided with in excess of 200 hours of ICUS to bring their experience up as they demonstrated good aptitude in all other areas.
Another pilot demonstrated good aptitude for the task and the environment, however the flight instructor conducting the on-the-job elements noted deficiencies in their aircraft handling and airmanship. This pilot received additional targeted training for these issues with a flight instructor prior to recommencing their task training.
The final pilot was found to be departing from trained procedures post-sign out and consolidation check despite demonstrating all competency requirements during initial training and a subsequent check. [Operator] sent a training and checking instructor to operate with this pilot under supervision, conduct an assessment on them and provide remedial training. Despite this, the pilot was deemed not able to conduct the task when unsupervised and therefore had their [task 1] approval revoked.
Training on-the-job / in the [low level] environment
Any pilot under training is directly supervised by a training pilot. Additionally, per previous responses, the best environment for training of [Operator] tasks is on-the-job and training pilots modify operational tempo and/or training pathways as required to suit the trainee.
Air/roadworthiness
[Operator] rejects the assertion that we field unairworthy aircraft or unroadworthy vehicles. Where relevant concerns are raised by crews or identified by engineers or mechanics, they are addressed appropriately. [Operator] has robust systems in place for capturing air/roadworthiness issues with our equipment.
In house engineers
This statement is incorrect. [Operator] currently directly employs 4 aircraft engineers and has in place various arrangements for third party and labour assistance throughout Australia. [Operator] is satisfied that current fleet maintenance demands are being adequately met.
Small / large defects – [aircraft] and role equipment
As above, where issues are identified with equipment, these are addressed appropriately and without delay. In instances, this means crews standing down in the field while these issues are being addressed. [Operator] will not allow crews to operate equipment that is not fit for purpose.
Analysis of our recent aircraft defects does not support the claim of a substantial increase in major [aircraft] defects.
Quality of accommodation
[Operator] rejects this claim. [Operator] has and maintains minimum accommodation standards for crews. This is in line with or exceeding Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 48 01. [Operator] maintains a register of accommodation facilities and notes where facilities are found to be inadequate. Whilst [Operator] cannot feasibly verify all new accommodation facilities prior to crews arriving, checks are carried out online prior to booking to ensure facilities advertise that they meet our standards. Where crews arrive and find accommodation not to be to standard, they are asked to report this immediately.
[Operator] has on record 3 instances of accommodation issues being reported in the last 12 months. For 2 of these, we moved entire crews to alternate accommodation and for the other, we delayed operations to allow for fatigue management and addressed the issue with the provider directly and immediately (a mattress).
Accommodation budget
[Operator] does not set an accommodation budget. While guidelines are in place by way of cost per night, these are not to impact on accommodation standards being met - all personnel involved in booking of accommodation understand this.
[Operator] thanks the ATSB for the opportunity to provide comment on these matters and welcomes any further dialogue or review.
There are no standards issues that CASA can identify and the matter has also been reported to CASA through other means. CASA will be looking into the issues referred to CASA.