Safety issues

On 27 August 2025, the Port Authority of New South Wales (Port Authority) advised that it partially agreed with the ATSB’s recommendation associated with this safety issue and that it had taken the following action.

‘Port Authority has commenced a review process of the relevant state response plans along with Transport for New South Wales to identify the inconsistencies across the various legislative instruments with a view to updating plans as necessary and addressing any ambiguity across the relevant plans and instruments. Both organisations have committed resources to this formal review process.’

The ATSB notes that the Port Authority partially agreed with the ATSB recommendation and the action that it has taken. As this action involves ongoing reviews of legislative instruments and plans, the ATSB will seek an update from the Port Authority in January 2026 on the progress of these initiatives.

On 19 January 2026, the Port Authority of New South Wales (Port Authority) provided documented records of updates made to its internal incident response checklists and procedures to address the safety recommendation. 

The documents included a copy of VTS [vessel traffic service] Operations Procedures 3.3-05, Vessel Grounding External/Emergency Checklist, Revision 11 of 8 April 2025, and its change record. The checklist provides instructions for Port Kembla VTS, and its immediate response section includes notification to AMSA JRCC [Australian Maritime Safety Authority Joint Rescue Coordination Centre].

A copy of the VTS Operations Procedure 2.1.1-04, Gathering and Recording Information, Internal/Routine, Revision 25 of 28 July 2025, was also provided. This procedure provides instructions for Port Kembla VTS to distribute incident reports based on incident levels. In the event of a ‘level 3 vessel safety incident’, the procedure requires telephone notification to AMSA and, if relevant, to JRCC. The procedure defines a level 3 vessel safety incident as one resulting in a fatality, major damage to infrastructure or vessel, or injuries that require hospitalisation.

The ATSB reviewed the amended procedures to assess if they could be effective for an incident similar to the July 2022 propulsion failure and near grounding of Portland Bay.

The ATSB found that the emergency checklist procedure 3.3-05 specifically applies to a grounding. It provides no instruction or guidance to ensure that, in a similar situation to that of Portland Bay (main engine failure about 7 miles off the coast and tug assistance requested), VTS would promptly notify the AMSA JRCC. Therefore, for such a notification to be made, the VTS operator would need to first assess that a grounding was imminent or otherwise be reported. However, without explicit instructions and/or clear guidance, making an objective assessment would be difficult or impossible and render the procedure ineffective. 

Similarly, the gathering and recording information procedure 2.1.1-04 requires that a level 3 incident (major infrastructure or vessel damage, fatality or serious injury) be reported to AMSA or JRCC. These level 3 incident criteria are not the same or similar to those reported by Portland Bay’s master to Port Kembla VTS. Therefore, in a similar situation, this procedure would not be effective. 

The ATSB concluded that the updated Port Kembla VTS procedures could not individually or jointly ensure that AMSA was notified in an incident similar to the Portland Bay incident. The ATSB will request further information from the Port Authority, including confirmation that the relevant VTS procedures apply to all its managed ports

On 24 July 2026, the Port Authority of New South Wales (Port Authority) advised that it had reviewed and updated its incident response procedures and notification arrangements. This included updating relevant vessel traffic services (VTS) procedures and associated checklists to strengthen notification requirements, including to the Australian Maritime Authority (AMSA).

The Port Authority provided copies of relevant emergency response checklists for VTS operations in Port Kembla, Newcastle and Sydney. The Port Kembla VTS checklists included one each for abandon ship, vessel not under command, vessel collision-allision, vessel aground and place of refuge. The immediate response in each of these five checklists includes notifying the harbour master and AMSA.

Newcastle VTS has a single vessel emergency checklist to be used in the event of a collision, capsize, grounding, fire, breakaway and vessel not under command. The checklist requires that the harbour master and AMSA, among others, be notified when such an emergency occurs and an emergency contact list is provided. Sydney VTS has a vessel not under command checklist that requires the harbour master and AMSA, among others, to be notified. A list of emergency contact numbers for notifiable agencies/parties is also provided.

The Port Authority advised that the actions taken to date directly address the procedural issues regarding notification and implementation of emergency response arrangements, and that it considers that the safety issue has been addressed.

The ATSB reviewed the amended VTS checklists and documents provided to assess if they could be effective for an incident similar to the propulsion failure and near grounding of Portland Bay.

The five Port Kembla VTS emergency response checklists cover a range of emergencies, including a disabled ship (not under command), and require immediate notifications to the harbour master, AMSA and others. The Newcastle VTS emergency response checklist covers various emergencies, including a ship not under command (disabled), and requires the harbour master, AMSA and others to be immediately notified. The Sydney VTS not under command checklist requires similar notifications.

If effectively implemented, these checklists can ensure that a Port Authority VTS would made immediate or early notifications to AMSA and other relevant parties when the VTS becomes aware of an emergency involving a disabled ship (as was the case with Portland Bay). Timely emergency notifications by VTS in future partially addresses the safety issue. However, this safety issue encompasses the Port Authority’s incident response under the NSW Coastal Waters Marine Pollution Plan, which remains the subject of discussions with NSW Maritime to resolve differing views with respect to their respective obligations under this plan. Therefore, the ATSB will continue to monitor this safety issue and seek further Port Authority safety action updates.