Safety issue
| Safety issue description |
QantasLink's radio procedure required crew to use communications panel radio 2 (COM 2) to broadcast and receive on local frequencies during operations at a non‑controlled aerodrome. This reduced the likelihood of the Dash 8 receiving the calls from other aircraft at either end of runway 05/23 at Wagga Wagga in certain circumstances. |
|---|---|
| Issue number | AO-2024-041-SI-02 |
| Issue owner | QantasLink |
| Transport function | Aviation: Air transport |
| Issue status | Open – Safety action pending |
| Date issue released | 13/11/2025 |
| Issue status justification |
The operator's radio procedure required crew to use communications panel radio 2 (COM 2) to broadcast and receive on local frequencies during operations at a non-towered aerodrome. This reduced the transmission strength and the likelihood of other aircraft receiving the calls from the Dash 8 in certain circumstances. |
Safety action
| Action type | Proactive action |
|---|---|
| Action number | AO-2024-041-PSA-02 |
| Organisation | CASA |
| Action description |
CASA advised the ATSB on 10 September 2025 that it has added new guidance and recommendations relating to the use of radios where the antenna is mounted on the underside of the aircraft fuselage to both Advisory Circular (AC) 91-10 version 1.3 (Operations in the vicinity of non-controlled aerodromes) and AC 91-14 version 1.6 (Pilots’ responsibility for collision avoidance). AC 91-10 added new Section 8.5 regarding radio communications for aircraft with fuselage underside antenna installations. Pilots operating aircraft with similar antenna placements are reminded that ground-based transmissions, when made using a radio with a fuselage underside antenna, are likely to have an increased risk of not being reliably received by other traffic. To enhance situational awareness and collision avoidance, especially at non-controlled aerodromes where radio-alerted see‑and‑avoid is critical, pilots are strongly recommended, whenever practicable, to use radios connected to antennas in unobstructed locations, such as an aircraft upper fuselage, for ground communications. AC 91-14 added a new Section 8.1, regarding radio communications for aircraft with underside antenna installations. |
| ATSB response |
This documentation from the regulator further highlights and advises operators of the limitations that can be encountered regrading radio installation and operation. Thus, supporting the ATSB‑identified safety issue. |
| Action status | Closed |
Safety action
| Action type | Proactive action |
|---|---|
| Action number | AO-2024-041-PSA-03 |
| Organisation | QantasLink |
| Action description |
QantasLink advised the ATSB that further assessment of the use of VHF COM 1 for ground-based communications at non-controlled aerodromes for Dash 8 aircraft was being progressed, but not yet finalised. |
| ATSB response |
ATSB is awaiting further information from QantasLink to assess the safety issue status. |
| Action status | Monitor |
Organisation response
| Date received | 04/05/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organisation | QantasLink |
| Response status | Monitor |
| Response text |
QantasLink advised on 4 May 2026: Regarding safety issue AO-2024-041-SI-02, released 13 November 2025, QantasLink previously advised the ATSB that further assessment of the use of VHF COM 1 for ground-based communications at non-controlled aerodromes for Dash 8 aircraft was being progressed. QantasLink provides the following by way of update. QantasLink has undertaken a substantial amount of work to understand the safety issue identified by the ATSB in AO-2024-041. In reviewing the safety issue, QantasLink incorporated recent industry feedback and best practise, updated regulatory recommendations, and guidance from the aircraft manufacturer into the risk assessment process. This led to a robust review of all non-controlled aerodromes that QantasLink regularly operates to. The review assessed traffic volume, VHF terrain shielding, crossrunway operation and ability to contact ATC on the ground, which enabled QantasLink to identify and monitor for aerodromes that have characteristics such as ground radio shielding and a visually obscured runway threshold and apply a special procedure to that port. Risk monitoring includes regular review of Flight Crew reports and updated industry and aerodrome information regarding facilities and environment. In addition to this work to identify and address aerodrome-specific risk, QantasLink has conducted a thorough risk assessment to scope the consequences of a proposed procedural change to primary radio frequency selection (VHF 2 to VHF 1) at all CTAF aerodromes. Two key goals of the procedural change is to: 1) reduce the risk that critical traffic information is not received by crew in the CTAF environment; and 2) ensure there is no adverse impact to crew workload in the terminal environment through increased complexity associated with a radio communication swap. The panel, consisting of subject matter experts from Flight Operations, Training and Safety, has concluded that current controls and proposed treatments for the procedural change, are sufficient for work to proceed on design and implementation. While impact assessment and initial risk assessment is now complete, the next step in the required change management is procedure design, simulator testing and training, before release and incorporation. Throughout the design and implementation phases of the procedural change, QantasLink will continue to monitor and assess risk and control effectiveness associated with the change. Should the risk levels change substantially, or new risks are identified, QantasLink may conduct further review of the procedure and reevaluate the introduction of this change. |
| ATSB response |
The ATSB acknowledges QantasLink's ongoing work to address this safety issue and continues to monitor progress |
| ATSB response date | 26/05/2026 |