REPCON number
RR2024-00024
Date reported
Published date
Mode
Affected operation/industry
Concern subject type
Reporter's deidentified concern

The reporter has raised a safety concern in relation to a known track fault near [Location 1] that could potentially result in passenger injury or a train derailment.

The defect is located near [signal no.] between [Location 1] and [Location 2] [State], at the top of a grade just before a left inside curve with a maximum allowable speed of 155 km/h.

The reporter states, the small section of track has a kink at a low spot which leads to high-speed passenger trains dipping and lurching violently. Passengers that are standing or walking may lose balance with the potential to cause injury. The reporter is further concerned of the increased risk of a derailment as the result of this track fault.

The reporter states, both passenger and freight trains use this section on a daily basis as it is on the main [direction] line from [Location 3] to [Location 4] in [State].

The reporter acknowledges the section of track is managed by [Rail Infrastructure Manager (RIM)] yet advises multiple hazard reports have been submitted and the concern has been raised with the train operator's regional management with nil result over the past [timeframe]. 

The reporter finally queries why a temporary speed restriction has not been implemented as a mitigation measure for trains travelling across the affected section of track.

Named party's response

Rolling Stock Operator response

[Operator] has reviewed the concern raised relating to track faults on the [Rail Infrastructure Manager (RIM)] network around [Location 1] raised in REPCON RR2024-00024.

The specific location fault around [signal no.] was raised by [Operator] onboard crews on [date]. This incident was logged within [Operator]’s incident reporting system.

The reporting process on the [RIM] network requires the driver to report to the [RIM] Control Centre via radio, where the issue is to be logged by the fault centre for review and assessment.

Additional actions by [Operator] to follow up were an onboard inspection by [Operator] track maintenance personnel which confirmed track geometry faults, and queried with the [RIM] fault centre for rectification.

[RIM] track maintenance confirmed one week later that spot repairs had been completed and that production surfacing was planned for the following month. In addition, following site inspection, a Temporary Speed Restriction (TSR) was applied from [time] on [date], 3 days after the spot repairs were completed, of 80 km/h between [rail kilometrage span] on the [direction] line due to poor track geometry causing rough ride issues on [Operator] trains. The boundary with [Operator] controlled track is located at [signal no.].

[Operator] has reviewed reports made of rough riding on the [RIM] sections of track on the [direction] corridor. From January 2023, there are 22 reports logged in various locations between [Location 1] and [Location 5].

Additional reports may have been made directly by [Operator] train crews to [RIM]. The reports have details of follow-up actions undertaken, which include confirming lodgement with the [RIM] fault centre.

Reports dating back as far as approximately one year have referenced the production surfacing task planned for the section in Q3 2024 as the overall rectification, in addition to interim spot repairs.

Rail Infrastructure Manager (RIM) response

[RIM] has reviewed the concern raised relating to the recent rough ride on the [RIM] network around [Location 1] raised in REPCON RR2024-00024.

The report came in from the [RIM] fault centre regarding a rough ride report on Thursday [month/year]. [Maintenance team] then arranged for a team to complete a front of cab inspection on the [direction] line. On the following day, the track division arranged for a team to complete a front of cab inspection through the reported section of track. An assessment was made after the inspection by the team leader that a Train Speed Restriction (TSR) was not warranted at the time but suggested that a front of cab inspection also be completed in a [Type 1] locomotive due to different varying factors (weight, potential speed difference, how the train rides and so on.). 

Following this, the [Position title] advised the track team to attend site on the Saturday to complete the front of cab inspection within a [Type 1] locomotive, and also had planned to complete track maintenance work with the night shift track team on the Sunday. On Saturday, the track team completed a front of cab inspection on both the [Type 2] and the [Type 1] locomotive. Whilst they did notice a variance in the ride quality, they believe it did not warrant a TSR at the time. On Sunday, the planned track maintenance works were cancelled after there were Safeworking access issues during the night. 

On Monday, an 80 km/h TSR was implemented on the [direction] line between [RIM] end of boundary and [Location 1]. This was implemented following the review of the weekend reports and the cancellation of the planned track maintenance works. Finally, and importantly after it was made aware to [RIM] via an ex [Operator]-employee, there was a known manufacturing defect with the full depth fast clip sleepers in this section which is causing tight gauge issues throughout the section. 

It is important to note that the TSR was implemented to cover track geometry throughout the area, but we believe the lateral sway or ‘hunting’ of the rollingstock that was being experienced is due to the incorrectly manufactured concrete sleepers that result in tight gauge.

Planned production tamping this weekend across this section of track will be looking to remove the TSR. We will continue to monitor the area for ride quality and investigate the concerns we have with the sleeper assets in the area.

The track has been continuously maintained in line with [RIM]s [Maintenance Plan].

Regulator's response

ONRSR confirms receipt of ATSB REPCON report number RR2024-00024, regarding a track fault. ONRSR has reviewed the reporter’s concerns and the responses from the rolling stock operator and the rail infrastructure manager. ONRSR met with the rail infrastructure manager to seek additional information and is satisfied the issue at the location has been rectified, the temporary speed restriction has been removed and the rail infrastructure manager will continue to monitor the situation.