What happened
On 14 January 2026 at Brisbane Airport, Queensland, a Fokker 70 aircraft was being pushed back onto the surface movement area by a third party ground handling agent prior to its scheduled departure. The flight crew later reported this to be a typical pushback.
While the aircraft was being pushed back, the ground handling agent supervisor operating the tug vehicle observed what was initially believed to be a small piece of rubber flick up from the main landing gear. The pushback was completed and the supervisor notified aerodrome airside safety operations of potential foreign object debris (FOD). Sometime later, the airside safety officer arrived and confirmed that FOD had been discovered, which was then handed to the aircraft operator’s engineers. The flight crew was not informed of the FOD by the tug operator during pushback which was contrary to published company procedures. The aircraft subsequently departed normally.
During climb, ATC notified the flight crew that the operator’s engineers had requested the aircraft return immediately. It was reported to the ATSB that the crew then contacted company operations, who advised that they were not aware of an incident and were unable to provide further information at that time. The crew then contacted the ground handling agent who advised that a piece of rubber had potentially departed the aircraft during the pushback phase of flight.
Shortly thereafter, company operations contacted the crew to advise that engineers had determined the FOD to be 2 pieces of brake rotor disk, originating from the right main landing gear’s inboard brake assembly (Figure 1). The crew were instructed to conduct a return to Brisbane, and a briefing by the flight crew was conducted to set out expectations for the landing. The briefing involved a discussion about the observed braking effectiveness during taxi out, with the crew stating the brakes felt slightly weaker but did not consider it to be abnormal. The crew elected not to use the brakes during the high-speed portion of the landing roll, applying reverse thrust only.
The aircraft landed safely approximately 50 minutes after the initial departure and proceeded to taxi to the bay without further incident.
Figure 1: Brake rotor FOD
Source: Operator
Safety message
Communication between different representatives of operational organisations is a key component of aviation safety. When new information arises, it is important to promptly communicate to the parties that may be directly affected. In this occurrence, the flight crew were not advised of potential FOD departing the aircraft prior to take‑off. This removed the crew’s ability to make an effective decision on the ground about whether the flight should continue to depart. Although the tug operator notified airside operations, the delay in the flight crew being notified led to the aircraft departing with a compromised braking system, increasing the risk of an abnormal landing. Flight crew should be made aware as soon as practically possible about abnormal situations that may increase risk, no matter the perceived severity.
About this report
Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.