Multiple reporters have approached the ATSB to raise a safety concern relating to a change to Railway Emergency Call and Train Emergency Call procedures.
Until recently, Train Controllers had the ability to listen live to all Railway Emergency Calls and Train Emergency Calls which would enable them to make appropriate safety critical decisions for the rest of the network. In recent days, an instruction has been issued by [Operator 1] that prohibits Train Controllers from listening in to Railway Emergency Calls and Train Emergency Calls received by radio operators.
[Operator 1] indicated the following reasons for this change to procedure;
- Team wellbeing - these calls can sometimes involve traumatic or distressing situations. Restricting exposure helps minimise the emotional impact on those not required to handle these calls.
- Driver privacy - Railway Emergency Calls often contain sensitive information, and limiting access ensures we protect the privacy and confidentiality of the driver.
A reporter states, 'Within the [Operator 1] network, Railway Emergency Calls (REC) are broadcast on an open channel to multiple cells in the affected and surrounding areas, encompassing all DTRS equipped trains and Signallers within that region. Due to the radio systems design, the Digital Train Radio System (DTRS) operates as a standalone network and does not extend to [Operator 2], Heritage or Freight trains in the affected area. Conversely, Train Emergency Calls (TEC) within the [Operator 1] network are high-priority, closed-channel calls directed exclusively to the Radio Operator. The reporter further states, 'A significant concern arises from this directive. Train Controllers, who are responsible for the affected area, are no longer permitted to monitor live emergency calls and initiate immediate train stoppages. This could result in delays of several minutes and potentially prevent a train from being halted before an obstruction. For instance, a [Operator 2] train would not receive an emergency call regarding a trespasser on the track, and the Train Controller would be unable to hear the live emergency call to arrange for the trains immediate stoppage'. The reporter further states, 'This scenario could potentially lead to a trespasser being struck due to the ensuing delay. Additionally, it is recognised standard practice and documented in the [train driver guidance document], that all other Train Controllers hearing the Railway Emergency Call or Train Emergency Call will latch in and listen live, so they can make appropriate decisions for the rest of the network'.
Another reporter advises, live listening to emergency calls is a work practice that has existed for over 15 years in the control room and is used by Train Controllers to get information as it unfolds in order to respond to a potentially life-threatening situation in a timely manner. There have been many emergency scenarios where early actions were taken purely due to the information received by latching into the emergency call. If there had been a delay in that information getting to the Train Controller in a number of scenarios, there would not have been time to act resulting in trains entering safety critical situations or into section for extended periods placing a greater risk on drivers and passengers and the network as a whole. The reporter provided a further example whereby there have been several occasions during a stressful situation, the train driver has been confused and given an incorrect location, which did not match with the panel or the graph. This was able to be corrected as the Train Controller was listening in to the call and have the Radio Operator prompt for the correct location. The reporter is further concerned about the added pressure on the Radio Operator and states, 'It is very easy to miss key information in the heat of the moment and having other people listening can validate the information being received. The added time it takes for the Radio Operator to take the initial call then pass the information to the Train Controller, who will then begin the decision-making process based on information received (at least second hand by now). The reporter advised, as this is the sole source of information to the Train Controller, this time pressure is also inviting mistakes.
A reporter finally states, 'As it stands the idea of taking an essential safety critical tool away to protect safety is counter intuitive and I suspect ONRSR would share our concerns'.
The practice of latching into a REC call (Railway emergency Call) is only required for the relevant Train Controller which the Radio Operator will identify. [Operator 1] services will stop once a REC is initiated.
Although silent within the Digital Train Radio (DTRS) standard operating procedure (SOP) (supplied to the ATSB and ONRSR) the process is clearly defined for the Radio Operator to engage the correct Train Controller.
The Radio Operator must loop the relevant Train Controller in once all relevant details have been supplied, usually within 3-5 seconds (DTRS SOP), the Senior Network Controller has no restriction and will support the response via latching in and co-ordinating response and recovery.
Upon receiving the information, the Radio Operator must advise the affected Train Controller who must take all necessary steps to stop trains from reaching a point of danger which is captured within the 1994 Book of Rules and operating procedures (Train Controllers/Signallers/Drivers) and the Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) Standard.
Non [Operator 1] services for example [Operator 2] don’t have DTRS radios fitted, however this does not impact the response times of 3‑5 seconds and will also be captured by signallers within the cell coverage.
Due to recent lost time injuries (LTI)’s and past long-term impacts, the unofficial work practice of latching in by non-relevant Train Controllers (up to a total of [xx]) was requested to cease, and health and safety representatives (HSR)’s were consulted at the time of implementation - (communication documents supplied to the ATSB and ONRSR). This mitigated immediate LTI risk and since then we are working on a broader risk assessment which is scheduled for next week. The risk assessment will explore the risk for non [Operator 1] services with a delayed response of 3-5 seconds and the psychological impacts.
ONRSR confirms receipt of ATSB REPCON report number RR2025-00085, dated 24 November 2025, regarding changes to railway emergency call procedures. ONRSR has reviewed the reporter’s concerns and operator’s response including additional supporting documentation provided by the operator.
ONRSR understands the reasons for the changes being made and will continue to monitor notifiable occurrence reports and other regulatory sources of information regarding communication protocols during emergencies on the operator’s network. ONRSR will consider the contents of this report in the planning of future regulatory activities.
A reporter provided feedback to the final report which was passed to the operator (and ONRSR) who provided a further response.
Reporter feedback
A reporter advised the operator's response overlooks the known reliability issues with the DTRS which may affect the time taken to stop a train when a REC is activated. The reporter further disputes the operators claim that the information is passed on to the Train Controller within 3‑5 seconds. That this is impossible if the Radio Operator is to gain all the required information.
The reporter also states, 'The suggestion that Signallers will be able to intervene in the meantime and stop [Operator 2] trains is disputable with long sections of uncontrolled signals preventing this in addition to numerous signal boxes unable to contact non DTRS fitted trains (works and heritage trains) and other boxes who only have a local train radio which cannot initiate a closed channel point to point call.
Operators' further response
A recent engineering change (supplied to the ATSB and ONRSR) was communicated after a risk assessment was conducted (which included HSR attendance) has supplied assurances where Train Controllers not required to latch in are unable to.
The Radio operator will latch in the respective Controller/Controllers who will require the adequate information immediately upon receiving the call.
Regarding loss of DTRS radio, degraded mode train running process would not change nor matter if there was ability to latch in to the DTRS as all conversations would be required via PABX. Non fitted trains have a different train radio system which supplies access for Driver/ Train Controller to speak.