REPCON number
RR2025-00137
Date reported
Published date
Mode
Affected operation/industry
Concern subject type
Reporter's deidentified concern

The reporter has raised a safety concern around the functionality of the operator's rostering and sign-on systems.

The reporter advised that at times, rail safety workers can be rostered with less than the 12 hours between shifts required by Schedule 2, Part 2 of the Rail Safety National Regulations.

Further, the reporter advised that the operator's electronic sign-on systems would not automatically alert the worker if they had consequently signed on with less than the required break time.

Named party's response

Thank you for your REPCON No: RR2025-00137 dated 21 November 2025. [Operator] acknowledges the reporter’s concerns and provides a response on each element below.

[Operator]’s Shift Rostering System

[Operator] has in place a robust shift rostering system for the rostering of Rail Traffic Crew (RTC), utilising the [system 1] system for our [State 1] and [State 2] operations. [System 1]’s rostering function is designed to reflect the agreed principles and minimum requirements in place for rostering, including (but not limited to) Schedule 2, Part 2 of the Rail Safety National Regulations, [Operator]’s Fatigue Risk Management Framework, and the relevant Enterprise Agreement(s) applicable to each workgroup within [Operator].

Forecast Rosters

[System 1] prevents publication of forecast rosters, where the roster does not comply with these minimum requirements. An example of this would be if RTC are rostered to commence work with less than a 12-hour break between shifts. [System 1] will show a red ‘frown face’ icon against any forecast shift that is not compliant and prevents the roster being published until all issues are acknowledged and resolved.

Day of Operations Rostering

During day of operations, adjustments to start and finish times are made based on operational requirements, on-time service running and may incorporate lift up or lay back as required, while ensuring that workers are allocated a minimum 12-hour break in the [system 1] system.

Day of operations changes to rosters are not automatic. Changes must be made manually in the [system 1] system, by [Operator]’s [Coordinators] or Operations Supervisors, when on shift. As with forecast rosters, changes to day of operations rosters cannot be published to the live [system 1] system if the changes do not comply with the rostering minimum requirements. This includes, but is not limited to, RTC being rostered to commence work with less than a 12-hour break between shifts.

[Operator] is aware that during day of operations changes, [system 1] does not automatically update roster start times where RTC finish their previous shift after their rostered finish time. Adjustments to lay back RTC start times for their next shift is done manually by [Coordinator]. Identification of the need to adjust start times requires the [Coordinator] to identify the later than rostered finish, and RTC to notify either the [Coordinator] directly or their Supervisor if they finish work later than their rostered shift. This is a shared responsibility between [Operator] and our workers and is documented as an expectation on both parties in our Safety Management System (SMS) and respective Enterprise Agreements. As this is not an automatic system change, it is possible that the need to push back a shift start time to accommodate the minimum 12-hour break requirement may be missed. Given the expectations and requirements in place, [Operator] considers this to be a low risk, however it is considering opportunities for continuous improvement following a recent event, described below.

An event occurred in our [area] [State 1] operations on [date], where a driver signed on 11 hours and 28 minutes after their previous shift finished. While the breach of the minimum 12-hour break was identified, the driver is reported to have performed [xx] minutes of safety critical work before being relieved from duties.

[Operator] has completed an event learning into this occurrence, in line with [Operator]’s event learning framework, and actions are being implemented to prevent a reoccurrence. Actions included both immediate and longer-term activities, as follows:

  • Event learning share issued to all [State 2] & [State 1] operations reinforcing the requirement for all RTC to have a minimum 12-hour break between shifts when signing on at their home depot.
  • Leader conversations and communications with RTC confirming that any uncertainty around finish times / start times affecting RTC’s ability to commence their next shift, must be raised with their Supervisor or [Coordinator] before signing on their next shift.
  • Investigating opportunities to improve [Operator]’s [system 2] system to prevent RTC signing on before their 12-hour break is completed and/or triggers/alerts when attempting to commence work before their 12-hour break is completed.

To date, [Operator] has not recorded any further events of this nature, however, we acknowledge the opportunity to continuously improve our systems to enable the safety of our people and our operations. We are continuing to work with [both] systems to identify possible system improvements to mitigate the risk of the need to push back a shift start time being missed due to the current manual identification and execution of lay backs.

Regulator's response

ONRSR confirms receipt of ATSB REPCON report number RR2025-00137 regarding the functionality of an operator's rostering and sign-on systems. ONRSR has reviewed the reporter’s concerns and operator’s response.

ONRSR has examined the operator’s rostering process as part of a continued focus on fatigue risk management and will continue to do so as part of the ONRSR National Work Program. ONRSR is satisfied with the operator’s response.