The reporter has raised a safety concern in relation to the Operator's incident investigation and reporting processes.
The reporter states a serious incident occurred on [date] at the [Operator] depot at [Location]. A company [position title] attempted to throw an extension lead from a locomotive to the platform which subsequently landed across the 25 kV overhead line equipment cutting power to multiple yards in the area. The reporter further states the station platform has a large amount of pedestrian traffic (employees and the public) and is concerned this incident had the potential for fatal injuries to occur.
The reporter is also concerned that the severity of the incident has been significantly 'downplayed'. The reporter advises, the post incident safety notice not only waters down important facts however also fails to address the extremities of the incident. This incident could have led to a fatality on the platform from the cord hitting and electrocuting someone, as well as damage to infrastructure.
Employees are seeking further clarity of the severity of this incident. The reporter questioned if a thorough and transparent investigation has taken place taking into account the following points:
- Did the employee have an adequate fatigue break prior to the incident?
- Was [Operator] network and the electrical department management informed of the details?
- Had the employee signed on for duty?
- Were there employees in the crib room located at the site of the incident?
- Isolation of the incident location for the safety of the workforce?
- Was there another employee in the locomotive cab at the time of the incident?
In addition to the points above, the reporter queried if the employee underwent drug and alcohol testing and whether or not they were sent straight home or continued working.
The reporter finally queried if the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator was provided a full summary of these details, including a potential fatality in the workplace.
Thank you for your notice (RR2025-00001) dated advising of this Repcon.
[Operator] acknowledges the reporter’s concerns and provides a response on each element below.
In summary, [Operator] is aware of the rail safety event at the [Location] station on [date] at [time]. The incident was reported and an investigation completed in compliance with [Operator]’s Safety Management System (SMS). The investigation was undertaken by the [position title] for train operations, the [safety title], and the [position title] leader.
Further to the above, [Operator] provides the below responses to the points raised in the Repcon in relation to the investigation:
Did the employee have an adequate fatigue break prior to the incident?
The employee involved works a fixed roster pattern ([time frame]) with the potential for call-outs outside of those hours. The employee had an adequate break between shifts to allow for rest.
Was [Operator] network and the electrical department management informed of the details?
The event was reported to [Operator] Network Control as required by [Operator]’s SMS. Network Control reported the event to the Electrical Safety Office [State] as per the requirements of the Electrical Safety Act 2002 and [Operator]’s Safety Health and Environment (SHE) [reporting guideline].
Had the employee signed on for duty?
The employee signed on for this call out at [time].
Were there employees in the crib room located at the site of the incident?
It is unknown whether there were employees in the crib room. However, the crib room electrical Residual Current Device (RCD) did not trip.
Isolation of the incident location for the safety of the workforce?
After reporting the incident to Network Control, the crew assessed the event with the Electric Control Operator and the overhead equipment was isolated to ensure the electrical safety of the site. Once site safety assessments were completed, the overhead equipment was re-energised.
Was there another employee in the locomotive cab at the time of the incident?
There was a second employee in the locomotive at the time of the event.
These matters have been considered in the course of [Operator]’s management of the event.
[Operator] also responds to the following additional points raised in the Repcon:
In addition to the points above, the reporter queried if the employee underwent drug and alcohol testing and whether or not they were sent straight home or continued working?
The employee completed the pre-shift [alcohol] measure testing required at [Operator] operational sites. No further testing was conducted post-incident. The employee ceased safety critical duties post incident.
Finaly, the reporter queried if the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator was provided a full summary of these details?
The event was not reported to the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator. [Operator] formed the view following the event that the event was not required to be notified under the Rail Safety National Law. As referred to above, [Operator] did make the assessment of a Dangerous Electrical Event, reportable to the Electrical Safety Office [State].
ONRSR confirms receipt of ATSB REPCON report number RR2025-0001 regarding concerns with an operator’s incident investigation and reporting process. ONRSR has reviewed the reporter’s concerns and operator’s response.
ONRSR contacted the operator involved through our enquiry process and requested further information which was provided. ONRSR understands that further information will be provided by the operator soon, pending final document approvals. That information will be reviewed once received to determine if any further action is required.
Further information on ONRSR enquiries and how ONRSR regulates is available in the publication The ONRSR Way, available on ONRSR’s website.