Rail safety and live run workers exceeding maximum allowable shift length rules

Response to ATSB REPCON - Concern in relation to the operator permitting rail safety and live run workers to exceed maximum allowable shift length rules.

As per previous correspondence with the ATSB towards the end of [year], an even time roster was implemented as part of the [year] Enterprise Agreement (EA) negotiations. Running prior to, and concurrently with the EA, work was undertaken to improve the way [Operator] manages the risks associated with fatigue for its entire workforce including its rail safety workers.

After consultation with our workforce, and following change management requirements stipulated in [Operator]'s safety management system, a change implementation plan was developed, enacted, and monitored for effectiveness for the implementation of the updated fatigue risk management system. A communication plan supported this implementation with implementation completed on [date].

The reporter states the operator is implementing a new fatigue policy and has provided limited information and training for staff.

As part of the approved change management plan, all rail safety workers, live run team members, and various other staff have undertaken fatigue risk management training. As of [date], [Operator] has delivered fatigue risk management training to around [x] workers, with only [xx] members of the Operations team having not completed the training program due to leave and other constraints. There is a plan in place to capture these remaining team members.

[Operator] management has also consulted with and considered feedback from the [Union 1] ([State 1] branch), [Union 1] ([State 2] branch), and [Union 2].

The reporter advised the FAID fatigue management system is no longer being used and states the operator is permitting casual staff to work more than that permitted under the rail health and safety act which allows 12 consecutive day shifts and 3 consecutive night shifts.

As documented in the fatigue risk management procedure, FAID is a biomathematical model, used when creating master rosters and work schedules. FAID is also utilised as an identifier, as part of auditing planned versus actual hours worked. Management of the risks associated with day of operations, is undertaken using [Operator]'s fatigue risk profile [form].

Casual staff are managed and monitored in the same way and are constrained by the same limits as employees detailed in the fatigue risk management procedure in line with the National Rail Safety Law, National Regulations. [Operator] does not allow any rail safety worker (internal or casually employed) to work 12 consecutive day shifts.

The reporter advised there is a perceived pressure from management for rail safety and live run workers to work extended shifts. The reporter provided an example of a staff member working nearly 24 hours straight and others that have worked 8 hours followed by 4 hours rest before returning to conduct a 12-hour night shift.

[Operator] rejects any suggestion regarding pressure on employees (internal or casual) to take on any unnecessary risk including working outside of the times prescribed in the fatigue risk management procedure. As part of the fatigue risk management system, and the change management plan, there is an auditing program in place to supplement the change. This also records planned versus actual hours worked.

On review of this information, [Operator] was unable to identify any worker (casual or employed) undertaking these suggested hours of work. Recently [Operator]'s safety team, and operations management received an unofficial notification that casuals were permitted to work excess hours, and it was suggested they are not subject to the same constraints as internal employees. While [Operator] were not able to identify any periods of casuals working outside the legislated times, [Operator] took the opportunity to reinforce to the live run team, constraints for causal workers as well as use of the fatigue form when work is required outside of the master roster.

The reporter is further concerned that most safe working shift breaches that exceed 12 hours are not being reported to the regulator.

[Operator] considers notification, reporting, and investigation as a critical tool to the reduction of risk, and an enabler to implementation of effective controls to reduce harm. [Operator] has a daily [meeting], and part of this involves the monitoring, escalation, and control of any rail safety risk, including fatigue.

This is in line with changes to the way the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR) receives and manages reports and information. [Operator] has also improved the way in which it captures, escalates, manages, and where required, externally notifies events that occur. [Operator] reports all breaches of its fatigue risk management procedure as required by Rail Safety National Law National Regulations and outlined in guidance from ONRSR.