Date:
Issue number
Safety issue title
Processes for the monitoring of the exciter unit insulation resistance
Safety Issue Description

The processes for monitoring the condition of the brushless exciter units’ electrical insulation were ineffective in detecting deterioration prior to unit failure.

Issue Owner
Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd (NCLH) and ABB Industry Oy (ABB)
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Issue Status
Closed – Adequately addressed
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Steering gear planned maintenance instructions
Safety Issue Description

Bow Singapore’s planned maintenance system for the steering gear did not include or contain any schedules for detailed inspections or parts replacement.

Issue Owner
Odfjell Management
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Mooring at Station Pier
Safety Issue Description

While TT-Line Company’s standard mooring line pattern for ships at Station Pier had been successfully used for many years, the breakaway indicated the risk could have been further reduced to better prepare for such unusual circumstances.

Issue Owner
TT-Line Company
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Melbourne vessel traffic service procedures
Safety Issue Description

The Port of Melbourne vessel traffic service (VTS) procedures for adverse weather were not comprehensive and, hence, its response on 13 January was only partially effective. One important consequence was that VTS’s advance warning of storm force winds did not reach all relevant parties, including Spirit of Tasmania II’s master.

Issue Owner
Victorian Ports Corporation (Melbourne)
Transport Function
Marine: Shore-based operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
TT-Line Company procedures
Safety Issue Description

The adverse weather procedures for TT-Line Company ships when alongside did not take into account all the necessary factors to provide effective defences against significant, short-term weather events such as thunderstorms and squalls.

Issue Owner
TT-Line Company
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Open stern offshore support vessels
Safety Issue Description

Skandi Pacific’s managers had not adequately assessed the risks associated with working on the aft deck of vessels with open sterns, including consideration of engineering controls to minimise water being shipped on the aft deck.

Issue Owner
DOF Management, Norway
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Cargo securing procedures
Safety Issue Description

Skandi Pacific’s safety management system (SMS) procedures for cargo securing were inadequate. There was no guidance for methods of securing cargo in adverse weather conditions.

Issue Owner
DOF Management, Norway
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Cargo handling procedures
Safety Issue Description

Skandi Pacific’s safety management system (SMS) procedures for cargo handling in adverse weather conditions were inadequate. Clearly defined weather limits when cargo handling operations could be undertaken and trigger points for suspending operations were not defined, including limits for excessive water on deck.

Issue Owner
DOF Management, Norway (DOF Management)
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Towage procedures
Safety Issue Description

Procedures for harbour tugs to meet inbound ships and for their co-ordinated movement in the Fremantle pilotage area were not clearly defined. On 28 February, inadequate co-ordination of the tugs and ineffective communication between Maersk Garonne’s pilot and the tug masters resulted in both tugs, the second one in particular, being significantly delayed from when they could reasonably have been expected to be on station. 

Issue Owner
Svitzer Australia; Fremantle Ports; Fremantle Pilots
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Contingency planning
Safety Issue Description

Fremantle Pilots’ procedures did not include any contingency plans, including abort points, for risks identified for the pilotage. 

Issue Owner
Fremantle Pilots
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Passage plan
Safety Issue Description

Fremantle Pilots’ publicly available information to assist ships' masters with preparing a berth to berth passage plan was inadequate and ineffectively implemented. The information provided consisted essentially of a list of waypoints, which was routinely not followed.  

Issue Owner
Fremantle Pilots
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Bridge resource management
Safety Issue Description

Bridge resource management (BRM) was not effectively implemented on board Maersk Garonne. The ship’s passage plan for the pilotage was inadequate, its bridge team members were not actively engaged in the pilotage and they did not effectively monitor the ship’s passage.

Issue Owner
Maersk Line Ship Management, Singapore
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Forecast terminology
Safety Issue Description

Fremantle Ports’ staff did not understand the significance of some wind and weather terminology used in the BoM forecast. Consequently, port procedures triggered by a BoM ‘gale’ or ‘severe weather’ warning such as preparing the tugs and calling the harbour master were not followed.

Issue Owner
Fremantle Port Authority (Fremantle Ports)
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Weather event management
Safety Issue Description

Fremantle Ports’ procedures for adverse weather were not adequate for weather that could reasonably be expected to occur. Some procedures could not be reasonably implemented and other were not monitored for compliance.

Issue Owner
Fremantle Port Authority (Fremantle Ports)
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Bureau of Meteorology weather warnings
Safety Issue Description

The Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) marine forecast title of ‘strong wind warning’ understated the ‘damaging winds’ expected during the ‘severe thunderstorm’. The forecast did not use recognised marine weather terms for wind speed, such as ‘gale force’.

Issue Owner
Bureau of Meteorology (BoM)
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Fremantle Ports’ risk assessment
Safety Issue Description

Fremantle Ports’ assessment of risks associated with a ship contacting the Fremantle Rail Bridge as a result of a breakaway, particularly from berths 11 and 12, was limited. Preventing a breakaway from berths where the wind was likely to be on a ship’s beam had not been considered. Similarly, the impediments to assisting a ship near Wongara Shoal after a breakaway had not been assessed.

Issue Owner
Fremantle Port Authority (Fremantle Ports)
Transport Function
Marine: Shipboard operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Ship firefighting cache
Safety Issue Description

The large size and weight of the ship firefighting cache made it difficult for the duty Port Hedland volunteer firefighter to transport it to the wharf. 

Issue Owner
Department of Fire and Emergency Services (DFES)
Transport Function
Marine: Shore-based operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Professional firefighters in Port Hedland
Safety Issue Description

The limited professional firefighting capability in Port Hedland restricted the ability to launch an effective response to the fire on board Marigold. 

 

Issue Owner
Department of Fire and Emergency Services (DFES)
Transport Function
Marine: Shore-based operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Access control
Safety Issue Description

Suitable atmospheric testing equipment was not available in Port Hedland to ensure safe entry to fire-affected spaces on board Marigold. Access to these areas was not controlled until 53 hours after the fire.

 

Issue Owner
DFES
Transport Function
Marine: Shore-based operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine
Issue number
Safety issue title
Incident control
Safety Issue Description

The emergency response plans for a ship fire in Port Hedland did not clearly define transfer of control procedures for successive incident controllers from different organisations or contain standard checklists for their use. 

Issue Owner
BHP Billiton, Pilbara Ports Authority and Department of Fire and Emergency Services (DFES)
Transport Function
Marine: Shore-based operations
Date issue released
Mode of Transport
Marine