What happened

On 11 January 2026, a pilot, and sole occupant of a Van’s RV-7, was conducting a private flight from South East Queensland to Scone Airport, New South Wales, under the visual flight rules (VFR).[1]

The aircraft departed in the mid-afternoon and the pilot reported that they initially landed at Armidale Airport for a break and to review the weather for the remainder of the flight. They advised that satellite imagery for the area indicated areas of cloud south of Armidale, breaking up to the west and further to the south, over Scone. As a consequence, the pilot elected to initially fly west towards Gunnedah before turning south (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Aircraft flight path 

Source: Google Earth, annotated by the ATSB

After departing Armidale in the early evening, the pilot advised that the weather deteriorated behind them and so returning to the departure airport was no longer an option. As the flight progressed, after the pilot turned to fly southbound, they commenced a gradual climb to remain above the cloud layer. As they climbed above 10,000 ft, they commenced using supplemental oxygen.  

Approaching Scone, the aircraft inadvertently entered the Tamworth Control Area (CTA) without a clearance. The pilot had intended to remain below the 15,500 ft CTA step, but climbed above 16,000 ft to remain clear of cloud. 

At around 2008 local time, due to the aircraft’s altitude, air traffic control (ATC) questioned the pilot about their intentions. The pilot advised that they were flying above overcast cloud. As the pilot also advised ATC that they were not instrument rated[2] and did not have a night VFR rating,[3] the controller commenced an emergency response and contacted other aircraft in the area to get an appreciation of the weather. They then contacted Scone Airport to request that the runway lights be turned on. They also established that last light at Scone was 2034. 

Approaching Scone, the pilot conducted a visual descent through broken cloud, however at around 7,500 ft they encountered an extensive, unbroken layer of cloud. At approximately 2025, with limited daylight remaining, the pilot elected to descend through the cloud rather than diverting to an alternate aerodrome at night in deteriorating weather. The aircraft exited cloud at approximately 3,000 ft above ground level and the pilot manoeuvred to join the downwind leg for runway 11 at Scone Airport. The aircraft landed at 2031. 

The pilot later reported that there were several things that contributed to their decision‑making, including:

• complacency
• inexperience
• a desire to be at Scone in time for work the next morning
• a reluctance to leave the aircraft tied down outside at Armidale
• fatigue.

Safety message

Early decisions prevent last-minute emergencies. VFR pilots should avoid continuing flight into areas of deteriorating weather as pressing on in marginal conditions reduces available options and significantly increases the likelihood of entering IMC. Early and conservative decision‑making – such as diverting or turning back – is an effective defence. 

As identified in a recent ATSB investigation concerning VFR into IMC (AO-2025-040), between 2015 and 2025 there were 116 VFR into IMC occurrences reported to the ATSB. Of these, 13 were fatal accidents resulting in 24 fatalities. Based on these figures, approximately 1 in every 9 reported VFR into IMC occurrences results in a fatality.

The ATSB booklet Accidents involving Visual Flight Rules pilots in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (AR-2011-050, revised 2019) provides guidance on avoiding adverse weather during VFR flights.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

What happened

On 17 January 2026, the pilot and sole occupant of a Robinson R22 Beta II helicopter was conducting contracted stock mustering operations at a station, about 140 km north of Tennant Creek, Northern Territory. At about 0900 local time, the pilot refuelled the helicopter, filling the tanks to their capacity. Shortly after, they became airborne to continue with the mustering operation. 

At about 0910, the pilot reported that while moving cattle through a gate, they conducted a right turn at about 35 kt and 120 ft above ground level. About 3 seconds after completing the turn, the pilot recalled hearing an unusual noise and suspected a possible bird strike with the tail rotor, perceiving no response to their anti-torque pedal inputs.

The pilot recalled that the low rotor RPM horn then sounded and the helicopter began to lose height. They reacted by lowering the collective in an attempt to regain the rotor RPM and attempted to gain forward airspeed. As the helicopter approached the ground the pilot flared and raised the collective[1] to reduce the rate of descent but the helicopter collided heavily with the terrain (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Occurrence helicopter

Source: Operator

On contact with the ground, the helicopter’s main rotor blades flexed and contacted the tail boom causing it to separate. The tail boom, attached tail rotor gearbox and tail rotor were located about 30 m from the main wreckage (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Occurrence aircraft tail boom, and tail assembly

Source: Operator

The pilot wore a flight helmet and was restrained with a 3-point lap and sash harness and was able to free themselves from the wreckage uninjured. However, the helicopter was substantially damaged.

The operator conducted a post-accident engineering analysis of the wreckage and reported there were no indications of pre-impact defects or damage to the tail rotor flight control system that would have resulted in a loss of tail rotor control.

The operator advised that impact marks on the ground indicated that the helicopter was travelling in a west‑north-west direction when it impacted the ground and reported the wind direction at the time of the occurrence was 10–15 kt from the south-east, indicating that the helicopter was likely operating downwind when it impacted the terrain.

Following discussions with the pilot, the operator reported that additional weight after refuelling, combined with a loss of airspeed when turning downwind, likely led to the helicopter being overpitched. The operator considered that this likely caused a reduction in rotor RPM that was not immediately identified by the pilot. The loss of rotor RPM caused the helicopter to descend from a low height and the pilot was unable to recover the low rotor RPM or arrest the rate of descent prior to impacting the ground. 

Additionally, the operator reported that the pilot had been listening to music during the low level operation, and identified that this may have reduced the pilot’s ability to aurally detect a reduction of the engine and rotor RPM prior to the low rotor RPM horn sounding. This may have reduced the pilot’s reaction and recovery time for a low rotor RPM condition. Robinson Helicopter’s Safety Notice 10 provides guidance on the recovery technique for low rotor RPM.

Safety action

The operator reported the following safety recommendations for company pilots:

• not to turn the helicopter downwind while at low altitude
• the importance of throttle control and to be aware of manually overriding the engine governor
• awareness of the helicopters engine RPM and listening for audible cues
• fuel load management and consideration given to all-up weight when conducting low-level flight.

Additionally, the operator advised that a notice was sent to all company pilots advising that listening to music while flying was not permitted, reiterating the importance of audible cues from the helicopter engine.

Safety message

The ATSB SafetyWatch highlights the broad safety concerns that come out of our investigation findings and from the occurrence data reported to us by industry. One of the safety concerns is Reducing the severity of injuries in accidents involving small aircraft | ATSB

The operator’s safe work method statements required company pilots to wear flight helmets when conducting mustering operations. The use of flight helmets reduces the risk and severity of head injuries, especially important when conducting low-level and other higher risk flight operations.

Flight at low level is a necessity during mustering operations and often involves abrupt manoeuvres with frequent power changes. Although the R22 engine is equipped with a governor to maintain constant engine RPM, large abrupt power changes can cause the governor to lag, reducing engine RPM and therefore rotor RPM. Pilots, especially during periods of high workload, have been known to grip the throttle control tightly, overriding the governor and preventing the governor from maintaining a constant engine RPM. Operators who routinely conduct low level flight are encouraged to review their training and checking regarding engine RPM management as well as the recovery techniques from a low rotor RPM condition.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

Source: Operator

What happened

On 30 January 2026 at about 1205 local time, the pilot and sole occupant of a Cessna U206F departed from an Emu Point aircraft landing area, Northern Territory, en route to Darwin Airport. 

Prior to departure the pilot conducted a pre-flight inspection and reported that the aircraft departed with 190 L of fuel. No abnormalities were observed during the take-off or the initial climb. The aircraft levelled off at about 2,000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL) and the pilot conducted the cruise checklist, with no issues identified. Shortly after this, the pilot observed an engine RPM overspeed. The pilot reduced the propellor pitch lever, but this had no effect, so they reduced the throttle to maintain an appropriate RPM. 

Shortly after this, the engine began running rough, accompanied by increasing vibration and a reduction in engine power. Almost immediately, smoke began entering the cockpit via the cabin air vents, which the pilot closed. The engine performance continued to degrade to the extent that the aircraft was unable to maintain straight and level flight. The pilot observed smoke and oil spraying onto the airframe and windscreen, reducing forward visibility. They reported that the engine vibrations increased violently, to the point that the entire airframe was shaking. 

The pilot selected an area of open grassland interspersed with trees and termite mounds beyond a heavily wooded area and prepared to conduct a forced landing. 

Figure 1: Aircraft wreckage

Source: Operator, annotated by the ATSB

Prior to landing, the pilot conducted final checks, unlatched their door and maintained what power was available to assist in clearing the tree line. However, prior to touchdown, the aircraft collided with several trees before rotating left, impacting the ground heavily and coming to a stop (Figure 1).

The pilot reported a brief period of unconsciousness and after ‘coming to’, turned off the ignition and checked that the ELT[1] had activated. The pilot exited through the shattered cockpit windscreen and moved to a safe distance from the wreckage, returning briefly to retrieve a handheld VHF radio and a personal mobile phone. The pilot’s initial attempts to coordinate emergency assistance were unsuccessful. Shortly after, they established radio contact with another aircraft that relayed a MAYDAY call. A rescue aircraft with an emergency response team arrived about one hour later.

The pilot was medically assessed and later admitted to hospital with minor abrasions and a broken collarbone requiring surgery. 

The aircraft was significantly damaged and, at the time of publishing, the remote location, terrain and weather conditions have prevented aircraft recovery. Consequently, the likely cause of the reported engine failure remains undetermined.

Safety message

In-flight engine failures and partial power loss in single-engine aircraft require pilots to exercise effective and timely decision-making to reduce the severity of injuries and damage. These events often result in the pilot experiencing high workload and time pressure, where preparedness is critical. Deciding on responses to a partial engine power loss before the flight will reduce your workload during the event and assist you in taking some form of considered action. 

When experiencing a rough running engine, pilots should focus on flying the aircraft and continually assess landing options. The ‘aviate, navigate and communicate’ framework establishes a clear hierarchy of priorities, particularly during emergencies. Acting in the appropriate order of priority improves situation awareness and supports coordinated responses in a dynamic environment.

Guidance from ATSB publication

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

What happened

On the afternoon of 5 January 2026 at Parafield Airport, a student was conducting a series of check flights and assessments with an instructor in a Cessna 172. After completing 2 dual training check flights, the instructor approved the student to conduct a solo circuit flight. 

Prior to sending the student on the solo flight, the instructor assessed the student’s adherence to standardised approach criteria from the aircraft’s POH.[1] The instructor also assessed the student’s general and situational emergency competency.

On the day of the occurrence, the student was required to complete 1.0 hours of touch‑and‑go[2] training at the aerodrome in accordance with the flight training syllabus. 

The student departed and flew a standard circuit. During landing, the aircraft bounced on the runway and the student applied full power to conduct a missed approach. The aircraft was at a low speed, and at approximately 10 ft above the runway, the student retracted 10° of flap and the left wing stalled. The aircraft entered a further developed left wing drop stall and collided with terrain to the left of the runway.

The student exited the aircraft with no injuries, and the engine cowling caught fire which ignited the surrounding grass. The aircraft was subsequently destroyed by the fire (Figure 1). 

Figure 1: Aircraft wreckage 

Source: Aerodrome operator, annotated by the ATSB

Safety action

The operator has conducted a thorough audit of internal training records and an organisational review of flight training. Changes have been implemented to the instructor standardisation proficiency reviews and the overall training syllabus (pending CASA approval). Some of these changes include:

• The operator’s current CASA Part 141 flight training approval contains an existing advanced stall training lesson which was approved and implemented by the company syllabus, to be conducted after the first solo; this is consistent with industry standard flight training. The operator has requested approval from CASA to reposition advanced stall training lessons to earlier in the syllabus. If approved, advanced stall training will be completed prior to the first solo check, ensuring fundamentals are better understood. Additionally, the operator will conduct a circuit emergencies lesson prior to the first solo check.
• Recovery from a missed approach and missed landing has been added to circuit consolidation lessons, in addition to the standard lessons within the existing CASA Part 141 flight training syllabus.
• Emergency procedures have been added to the internal student study guide and reinforced through structured briefings, in-flight practice, and post-flight debriefs.
• Standardisation and proficiency checks for flight instructors are mandatory, ensuring compliance with CASA Part 91. Following this occurrence, the operator has required all instructors to undergo immediate additional checks with an added focus on non‑technical skills, threat and error management, stall identification and recovery including advanced stalling. Further focus has been placed on instructors to be vigilant in assessing their students’ overall competency (particularly regarding recovery from missed approaches and emergency procedures). 

Safety message

Pilots must ensure that they are continually assessing the aircraft’s airspeed throughout the landing and take-off phases of flight. If the aircraft does not meet the rotation speed outlined in the POH, the take-off roll should be continued until the appropriate rotation speed is reached. Equally, should the aircraft become unstable during approach, a missed approach should be conducted. 

A supportive and encouraging environment is recommended for flight schools, especially during the early stages of training. Should students feel inadequate or not confident (despite their proven level of competency), flight instructors are reminded to promote a safety culture that enables self-assessment.

This occurrence also highlights the importance of monitoring and assessing students’ stall understanding and recovery ability prior to any solo flights being authorised and conducted. A thorough understanding of the missed approach procedure is also encouraged. 

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.