An aerobridge at Brisbane Airport’s international terminal collided with parked Boeing 737s on two occasions last year, an ATSB investigation final report details.

In the first incident, on 18 June 2025, the Gate 82 aerobridge shattered the right windshield of a Qantas 737-800. Glass fragments landed on the first officer, but there were no injuries.

Just over a month later, on 26 July, the same aerobridge also shattered the left windshield of a Fiji Airways 737-8 MAX. Glass and the corner of the aerobridge entered the cockpit, but the captain was able to move out of their seat before impact, and there were no injuries.

In each incident the aircraft was correctly positioned at the gate, and the aerobridge operator was an employee of the respective airline.

“The ATSB’s investigation identified safety factors common to both occurrences, finding that both aerobridge operators could not see the parked aircraft when they began to extend the aerobridge,” ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell said.

The investigation report notes Gate 82 catered for both wide-body and narrow-body aircraft, and that the parking position for a 737 was to the far right of the aerobridge home position, meaning the aerobridge operator had restricted visibility of the aircraft from the aerobridge home position. 

“Narrow-body aircraft, such as the 737, sit lower to the ground than wide-body aircraft,” Mr Mitchell explained.

“As a result, to minimise the slope of the passenger tunnel, at Gate 82 they park further from the aerobridge home position than would be the case for wide-body aircraft, or at a gate designed only for narrow-body aircraft, such as many domestic terminal gates.”

This meant the Gate 82 aerobridge had to extend much further, and almost parallel to a narrow-body aircraft, in order to attach to it.

“In addition, this aerobridge lacked side viewing windows, as installed in some other aerobridges at the airport, limiting the visibility of narrow‑body aircraft along the docking path,” he said.

The investigation found it was accepted practice for operators to extend the aerobridge without first being able to see the aircraft, with an expectation it would come into view during the extension. 

“This expectation was reinforced by successful operations in the past,” Mr Mitchell noted.

“But during the collision events, each aerobridge operator moved the joystick to a 3 o’clock position after rotating the cab left, unaware that this orientation would change the aerobridge’s direction of travel.”

Consequently, as it extended, the aerobridge moved diagonally towards the aircraft, rather than parallel to it, while the aerobridge operator did not have visual reference.

The ATSB identified aerobridge training and in-cab instructions did not direct operators to gain and maintain visibility of the aircraft before moving the aerobridge.

Brisbane Airport Corporation has subsequently disseminated information to all operators emphasising the requirement to rotate the cab towards the aircraft, and to maintain positive line-of-sight during aerobridge operations.

It has also reviewed operator training manuals and identified gaps and opportunities to be more specific in the process to safely attach aerobridges to aircraft.

The airport has also created a new quality assurance role focused on airside performance of assets and operators.

“Aerobridges should be designed with visibility of aircraft in mind, and training should reinforce the importance of maintaining visual reference while operating an aerobridge,” Mr Mitchell said.

Brisbane Airport says a program to replace eight aerobridges, including Gate 82, will include a review of safety features and narrow-body aircraft visibility.

Read the final report: Aerobridge collision with parked aircraft events, Brisbane Airport, Queensland, on 18 June and 26 July 2025

Video and audio from separate CCTV cameras will be analysed as part of the evidence gathered during the ATSB’s ongoing investigation of a light aircraft accident near Heck Field in South East Queensland.

Both the pilot and passenger were fatally injured when the amateur-built Van’s RV-8A collided with terrain soon after take-off in the early morning of 27 January 2026, a preliminary report details.

The preliminary report notes that earlier on the morning of the accident, the pilot lodged a plan for a private flight to Barraba, in Northern NSW.

“CCTV from the airfield showed the aircraft accelerating for take-off on runway 28,” ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell said.

“After lifting off, it can be seen initially flying just above the runway, before sinking briefly and then climbing with wings level.”

As the aircraft travelled beyond the end of the runway, it stopped climbing and began to descend, before its right wing dropped, and it impacted the ground.

“The aircraft wreckage was found in line with the runway, 360 m beyond its end, inverted and facing in the opposite direction to the flight path,” Mr Mitchell explained.

“An immediate, fuel‑fed, post‑impact fire had destroyed the aircraft, limiting the extent to which it could be examined, but all major components were accounted for at the site.”

Damage to the propeller blades indicated the engine was operating at impact, and an examination of the engine – which was extensively damaged by the fire – found no obvious sign of malfunction.

The preliminary report notes the aircraft’s engine was a 4‑cylinder, horizontally opposed Subaru EJ25 engine modified for aircraft use.

An earwitness at Heck Field during the accident flight reported their attention being drawn to what they described as abnormal engine noises developing during the aircraft’s take‑off run.

“Airfield CCTV did not have audio, but the ATSB has been provided footage from another nearby camera which caught audio of the accident flight off camera,” Mr Mitchell said.

“The engine could be heard for around 40 seconds of that audio and indicated engine RPM fluctuating periodically for that time.”

Mr Mitchell noted the preliminary report outlines evidence gathered to date during the investigation, but does not contain analysis or findings, which will be outlined in a final report to be released at the conclusion of the investigation.

“Further video and audio analysis will be conducted as the investigation progresses,” he said.

“Investigators will also review aircraft maintenance and pilot documentation, other recorded data, and the post‑mortem information and survivability factors.”

Read the preliminary report: Collision with terrain involving Van's RV-8A, VH-MKX, near Heck Field aeroplane landing area, Queensland, on 27 January 2026

A Robinson R44 helicopter pilot’s timely actions in conducting a forced landing after a connecting rod separated from the crankshaft while in flight near Tindal in the Northern Territory ensured a safe outcome, an ATSB investigation report highlights.

The R44 sustained minor damage during the 11 June 2025 incident, after its pilot encountered severe airframe vibrations during a personal transport flight from Daly Waters to Wally’s Airstrip. Fortunately, both pilot and passenger were uninjured in the hard forced landing into an area of open farmland.

The ATSB’s investigation established that the engine’s number 4 connecting rod had separated from the crankshaft after the nuts connecting it loosened while the helicopter was in use.

While several scenarios for this in-service loosening were considered, including abnormal loading or vibration, variation in thread condition and lubrication, improper or defective parts, microscopic deformation, and inadequate installation torque, the specific cause could not be determined.

The investigation did find that during the most recent overhaul of the engine, the independent inspection of the relevant section did not involve a physical torque check of the connecting rod nuts – although there was no indication that this contributed to the engine failure. 

“While such a check was not a regulatory requirement, this did represent a missed opportunity to positively verify the installation torque,” ATSB Director of Transport Safety Dr Stuart Godley said.

Separately, the engine examination identified the helicopter’s maintenance provider had not used new gaskets when refitting the spark plugs, as required by the engine and spark plug manufacturer.

“While not found to have contributed to this incident, this observation led to the discovery of an inconsistency in Civil Aviation Safety Authority guidance,” Dr Godley said.

CASA’s airworthiness bulletin for spark plug care, AWB 20-001, stated annealed gaskets could be used during spark plug fitment, while an airworthiness bulletin specific to piston engine spark plug insulator cracking, AWB 85-023, stated new gaskets must be used in all circumstances.

“This inconsistency could have led to incorrect procedures being performed which were not in accordance with spark plug maintenance requirements,” Dr Godley said.

CASA has advised that AWB 20-001 will be cancelled, and AWB 85-023 will be amended to reflect current recommendations.

In addition, the helicopter maintainer advised new spark plug gaskets are now fitted each time spark plugs are reinstalled.

Dr Godley said the successful outcome after the unexpected engine failure event highlighted the importance of managing inflight anomalies through a comprehensive understanding of systems, and the correct application of emergency procedures.

“The pilot’s timely actions following the onset of the vibrations ensured a safe outcome,” he said.

“The incident also emphasises the importance of independent inspection of completed work to provide additional assurance that manufacturer requirements have been adhered to when installing aircraft components.”

Read the final report: Engine failure and forced landing involving Robinson R44, VH-OOE, 13 km south of Tindal Airport, Northern Territory, on 11 June 2025

Expectation bias and a lack of effective risk controls contributed to a passenger train travelling through a turnout near Blacktown Station at four times faster than the posted speed limit, a transport safety investigation report details.

On 21 April 2024, the driver of a Sydney Trains Waratah passenger train was thrown from their driving position when the train travelled at 101 km/h through a turnout with a posted speed limit of 25 km/h.

Fortunately, the train did not derail, no passenger injuries were reported, and the driver was able to safely stop the train at Blacktown Station.

The serious incident was investigated by the Office of Transport Safety Investigations (OTSI), which investigates rail occurrences in NSW under a collaboration agreement with the ATSB.

The investigation found the driver, who had been based at Blacktown Depot for around seven years, did not react to and slow the train in response to signals ahead of the turnout. 

“The driver was familiar with taking a different route and did not expect to go through a turnout,” OTSI Chief Investigator Jim Modrouvanos said.

“This turnout was among several identified four years earlier by Transport for NSW as representing a ‘not tolerable’ risk of overspeed and derailment,” he said.

A project to incorporate Automatic Train Protection (ATP) technology at these locations was downgraded in scope, the investigation found. 

Sydney Trains therefore did not have effective controls for overspeed where high risk turnouts had been identified.

After the incident, Sydney Trains lowered speed limits at high-risk turnout locations, including at this turnout, and developed a plan to implement ATP at these locations.

Sydney Trains also developed a response procedure for this type of overspeed incident, after it was identified that the train was not stopped for inspection after the occurrence.

“Overspeed carries a high risk of train rollover and the potential for multiple fatalities,” Mr Modrouvanos said.

“So, the overspeed risk controls should be reviewed regularly to make sure they are still effective, and to see if there are any practical ways to further reduce or eliminate risk.

“Near-miss events like this one present an opportunity to revisit safety controls and make safety changes to further protect the travelling public.”

Read the final report: Train overspeed by run 805K, through BN 318 turnout, Blacktown, New South Wales, on 21 April 2024

The pilot of a Piper PA-28 that flew into the path of two F-35 fighter jets while approaching to land at RAAF Base Tindal, in the Northern Territory, was unable to communicate with air traffic control due to a loss of electrical power, and entered controlled airspace without a clearance.

An ATSB final report into the 28 August 2025 occurrence details that the single-engined Piper, with a pilot and passenger on board, was participating in the Outback Air Race.

Earlier on the day of the incident, when preparing the aircraft for the Daly Waters to Tindal race leg, the pilot detected a tripped circuit breaker.

The pilot requested assistance from a licensed aircraft maintenance engineer (LAME) who found the alternator was unserviceable – meaning the battery could not be charged by the engine. The LAME advised they could not fix it at Daly Waters, but further maintenance could be provided at Tindal.

“The LAME subsequently charged the aircraft’s battery and encouraged the pilot to conduct the flight, without assessing the time the battery could supply the aircraft with electrical power,” ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell said.

“Further, despite the heightened potential for a loss of electrical power, the pilot did not conduct contingency planning prior to taking off for Tindal,” Mr Mitchell added.

En route to Tindal, the aircraft lost electrical power and the pilot was unable to communicate using the aircraft’s radio. In addition, the aircraft’s transponder ceased transmitting, and could no longer be detected by air traffic control.

The pilot and passenger also reported being unable to call air traffic control on a mobile phone, due to noise levels in the cockpit, however they were in communication with members of an air race group chat using a mobile device.

The report details communications on the group chat, and how other members made contact with Tindal air traffic control, which advised it was unsafe for the PA-28 to land at Tindal due to the level of traffic, and that the PA-28 should hold outside controlled airspace or land at the nearby Homebush Park airfield.

However, the PA-28 occupants responded in the group chat that they were not landing at Homebush Park and instead were tracking direct to Tindal.

In a subsequent exchange on the group chat, a different member of the chat asked if the PA-28 occupants wanted them to declare a PAN, to which the PA-28 responded that they did. The PA‑28 pilot later advised that as they considered that a PAN had been declared on their behalf, they thought that other traffic would be cleared from their planned flight path.

However, none of the Tindal air traffic controllers recalled a PAN being declared on behalf of the PA-28.

“The investigation found that the pilot did not divert to the closest airport or follow advice to remain outside controlled airspace, and instead the aircraft was climbed into controlled airspace without the required clearance, and continued to land at Tindal,” Mr Mitchell said.

As the PA-28 was approaching Tindal, two RAAF F-35 jets were returning to Tindal in formation, with their pilots unaware of the PA-28.

“When the second F-35 turned onto final approach, the PA-28 also joined final in close proximity, with separation between the 2 aircraft reducing to 72 m laterally and 25 ft – about 7.6 metres – vertically.” 

The PA-28 pilot then manoeuvred their aircraft to the right to increase separation, while continuing towards the runway. Both aircraft landed without further incident.

“This incident serves to highlight the importance of pilots conduct contingency planning prior to flight if there is an increased risk of an abnormal event and, in the case of such an event, to follow published emergency procedures to ensure their actions align with air traffic control expectations,” Mr Mitchell said.

The investigation report also stresses the importance of clear communication between maintenance personnel and pilots – and noted the LAME had not recorded the alternator issue or maintenance activity on the aircraft’s maintenance release.

“Recording of defects and subsequent maintenance actions on the maintenance release is central to ensure all parties share a common understanding of identified faults, the possible or anticipated in-flight effects, and their impact on the overall airworthiness of the aircraft,” Mr Mitchell said.

Read the final report: Near collision involving Piper PA-28, VH-TKX, and a Lockheed Martin F‑35 Lightning II, Royal Australian Air Force Base Tindal, Northern Territory, on 28 August 2025