Collision with terrain involving Robinson R22 helicopter, 38 km south-west of Tindal Airport, Northern Territory, on 4 January 2018

Brief

Occurrence Briefs are concise reports that detail the facts surrounding a transport safety occurrence, as received in the initial notification and any follow-up enquiries. They provide an opportunity to share safety messages in the absence of an investigation.

What happened

On 4 January 2018, at about 0900 Central Daylight-saving Time (CDT), a Robinson R22 helicopter departed from a private property in Katherine, Northern Territory. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, was conducting a private flight to obtain GPS coordinates of structures on a property 38 km south-west of Tindal, NT.

The pilot landed the helicopter alongside a fence line in long grass. The pilot remained in the helicopter, with the engine running and obtained coordinates as required. The pilot then manoeuvred the helicopter into a low hover and with the breeze coming from the north-east, commenced to move out of the hover and felt the helicopter move to translational lift.[1] The pilot lifted the power to maximum take-off while easing the cyclic[2] forward to take advantage of the headwind.

As the helicopter straightened, about 3 ft above ground level (AGL), it dipped suddenly, pivoting on the front left-hand skid. The pilot attempted to pull the cyclic back but the helicopter rolled to the left and the main rotor blades contacted the ground at full power, almost severing them at the blade roots. The main rotor blades cut the tail boom into three pieces, lodging the tail rotor and assembly into the ground about 5 m in front of the fuselage. The fuselage came to rest on the left side.

Although hanging from his seatbelt, the pilot was able to shut off the master; however, was unable to reach the fuel shut off valve. The pilot’s seat base dislodged and fell off once the pilot released himself from the seatbelt.

Post-accident observation

The pilot observed two old barbed wires leading from the fence line at a 45-degree angle One wire appeared to have broken with impact and the other wire was entangled around the front left-hand skid.

The wires were half buried in the ground and below the grass top level, making them invisible.

Figure 1: Accident site showing fence wire

Figure 1: Accident site showing fence wire

Source: Operator

Safety action

As a result of this occurrence, the pilot has advised the ATSB that they are taking the following safety actions:

  • avoid landing in grass any higher than skid tube height
  • conduct a thorough visual inspection when lifting off around fences.

Safety message

This incident provides a reminder to pilots to conduct a thorough visual inspection to confirm wire locations and other hazards.

This accident highlights the value of restraints and safety helmets for pilots to prevent more serious injury.

ATSB report AO-2014-058 provides an account of a serious head injury to an R22 pilot who was not wearing a helmet. In a later ATSB report, AO-2015-134, the operator commented that the pilot of an R22 accident would have sustained more serious head injuries if he was not wearing a helmet.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

__________

  1. Translational lift occurs when clear, undisturbed air, flows through the rotor system from wind or forward speed.
  2. Cyclic: a primary helicopter flight control that is similar to an aircraft control column. Cyclic input tilts the main rotor disc, varying the attitude of the helicopter and hence the lateral direction.

Occurrence summary

Mode of transport Aviation
Occurrence ID AB-2018-001
Occurrence date 04/01/2018
Location 38 km SW Tindal
State Northern Territory
Occurrence class Accident
Aviation occurrence category Collision with terrain
Highest injury level None
Brief release date 28/03/2018

Aircraft details

Manufacturer Robinson Helicopter Co
Model R22
Sector Helicopter
Damage Substantial

Separation issue involving Aerospatiale AS350, and Robinson R66, 22 km south-west of Aldinga (ALA), South Australia, on 7 January 2018

Brief

Occurrence Briefs are concise reports that detail the facts surrounding a transport safety occurrence, as received in the initial notification and any follow-up enquiries. They provide an opportunity to share safety messages in the absence of an investigation.

What happened

On 7 January 2018, a Robinson R66 helicopter departed the north coast of Kangaroo Island on a private flight to Aldinga Airport, South Australia. Upon reaching the mainland, the pilot observed what appeared to be sea fog from the north; however, the pilot then realised it was smoke from a grass fire at Carrickalinga, SA. The pilot advised he was listening on the area frequency and did not hear any notifications regarding a grass fire in the area so continued towards Aldinga at 2,000 ft.

About 10 NM SW of Aldinga Airport as shown in Figure 1, the crew of the Aerospatiale AS350 was conducting and directing fire control services at Carrickalinga and providing periodic transmissions on the Aldinga common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). The transmissions were for inbound and outbound aircraft in order for them to keep clear of the aircraft conducting fire control below 2,500 ft.

At approximately 1400 Central Daylight-saving Time (CDT), the crew of the AS350 observed the Robinson R66 pass below on an opposite track. The crew of the AS350 turned left and climbed to increase separation. Information from both pilots estimated the distances between the aircraft to be of different clearance heights. The pilot of the R66 advised they were visual with the AS350 at all times. As the R66 passed Carrickalinga, the crew changed to the Aldinga CTAF to provide their 10 NM inbound call, and were notified by the crew of the AS350 of the fire exclusion zone.

Figure 1: Distance from Carrickalinga, SA to Aldinga Airport, SA

Figure 1: Distance from Carrickalinga SA to Aldinga Airport SA

Source: Google Earth, annotated by ATSB.

Airspace

Class G airspace

Class G airspace is non-controlled airspace. IFR and VFR traffic are permitted without a clearance and there is no separation service provided by air traffic control. Aldinga Airport is a non-controlled aerodrome with a discrete CTAF, which is a different frequency from the surrounding Class G airspace area frequency.

Safety action

As a result of this occurrence, the pilot of the AS350 has advised the ATSB that the incident has been shared among their company to highlight the importance of area frequency scans even when monitoring the local CTAF.

Safety message

This incident highlights the importance of monitoring the area frequency and local CTAF when operating nearby the 10 NM radius to successful identify any potential traffic conflict. As bushfire season has commenced in Australia for 2018 this incident has put attention to when bushfires are observed to try and avoid the area if possible or to ask ATC on the area frequency if there is an exclusion zone in place for fire control operations. Further information is available from ATSB research report: Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Principle.

The ATSB SafetyWatch highlights the broad safety concerns that come out of our investigation findings and from the occurrence data reported to us by industry. One of the safety concerns relates to safety around non-controlled aerodromes.

The ATSB SafetyWatch highlights the broad safety concerns that come out of our investigation findings and from the occurrence data reported to us by industry. One of the safety concerns relates to safety around non-controlled aerodromes.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

Occurrence summary

Mode of transport Aviation
Occurrence ID AB-2018-002
Occurrence date 07/01/2018
Location 22 km SW of Aldinga
State South Australia
Occurrence class Incident
Highest injury level None
Brief release date 28/03/2018

Aircraft details

Manufacturer Robinson Helicopter Co
Model R66
Sector Helicopter
Operation type Private
Damage Nil

Aircraft details

Manufacturer Aerospatiale Industries
Model AS350
Sector Helicopter
Operation type Aerial Work
Damage Nil

R22 engine intake valve damage

Key points:

  • R22 pilot conducted forced landing after sudden loss of engine power during low-level mustering operations
  • Examination found damage to the engine’s number-four cylinder intake valve led to reduced engine performance
  • Occurrence illustrates the potential seriousness of unexpected yaw and reduced engine performance during flight

A Robinson R22 helicopter pilot had to conduct a forced landing after a sudden loss of engine power due to damage to an engine cylinder intake valve, an Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation has found.

On 11 January 2022, R22 VH-VHE was being used to conduct mustering operations south-west of Mitchell, in Queensland’s central south.

“During the second mustering flight of the day, the pilot reported hearing a pop and a crack, and experiencing significant uncommanded yaw, and abnormal vibration, resulting in a forced landing,” ATSB Director Transport Safety Stuart Macleod said.

Examination of the engine by a maintenance organisation, and further examination at the ATSB’s technical facilities in Canberra, confirmed that damage to the engine’s number-four cylinder intake valve had allowed the fuel and air mixture, and exhaust gases, into the air induction system.

“This resulted in the degraded engine performance and forced landing of the helicopter,” Mr Macleod said.

Notably, prior to the incident, neither the pilot nor the maintenance organisation observed any indications of the progressing damage to the intake valve, including during a successful compression test 17.6 flight hours prior to the incident.

“While not required, a borescope inspection may increase the likelihood of detecting valve damage that can lead to degraded engine performance,” Mr Macleod noted.

VH-VHE’s engine had been overhauled in August 2021 – six months prior to the incident – and the pilot stated that the engine seemed underpowered following the overhaul.

“In piston engine helicopters, unexpected yaw and reduced engine performance may be symptomatic of developing engine intake valve damage,” Mr Macleod said.

“If this condition remains unattended, it can lead to an increased risk of induction backfire events and significant loss of engine power.”

Mr Macleod added there is an opportunity to improve understanding of engine issues with better quality data.

“Maintenance organisations are therefore encouraged to follow the Civil Aviation Safety Authority recommendation for borescope inspections of valves and report any defects, or nil-defect findings.”

The ATSB’s report also notes that, for reasons that could not be determined, the tail rotor drive shaft fractured as a result of torsional overstress during the incident.

In addition, an unapproved modification was present on the leading edge of the tail rotor blades, although this probably had no influence on the occurrence.

Read the final report: Engine power loss and forced landing involving Robinson R22 Beta, VH-VHE, 130 km south-west of Mitchell, Queensland, on 11 January 2022

Queensland rail investigations funding agreement

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau and Queensland’s Department of Transport and Main Roads have renewed their agreement that sees the ATSB conduct no blame transport safety investigations into rail accidents and incidents in Australia’s second largest state.

ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell and TMR Director-General Neil Scales signed a new two-year funding agreement at TMR’s Brisbane headquarters recently, extending the partnership between Queensland and the national rail transport safety investigator through to 30 June 2024.

“ATSB investigations of accidents and incidents on state rail networks is funded by state governments,” Mr Mitchell said.

“The extension of this agreement means the ATSB can continue performing its vital work, which improves safety for Queensland’s rail transport workers and travelling public.”

“The safety of rail safety workers, rail passengers and the general public is paramount. The ongoing relationship with the ATSB demonstrates the importance placed on rail safety in Queensland,” agreed Mr Scales.

Under the current agreement, which began in 2017, the ATSB has conducted over two dozen investigations into rail incidents in Queensland, many of which have identified safety issues for consideration.

ATSB investigations are purely aimed at determining factors which led to an accident or incident so that safety lessons can be learned, and do not lay blame, which encourages the free flow of information during the investigation process, Mr Mitchell explained.

“The identification of safety issues as part of ATSB investigations allows operators and relevant parties to take safety action to address them to help prevent similar accidents and incidents in the future,” Mr Mitchell said.

“I am confident, thanks to this on-going funding arrangement with the State Government, that ATSB investigations will continue to lead to improved rail transport safety for Queenslanders.”

Bird carcass located near LongRanger helicopter accident site

Key points:

  • Preliminary report - the investigation into the accident is continuing
  • A wedge-tailed eagle bird carcass was located near the accident site
  • No pre-accident defects were identified with flight controls, aircraft structure or the engine

A wedge-tailed eagle bird carcass was located near the accident site of Bell LongRanger helicopter which experienced an in-flight break-up near Maroota, New South Wales on 9 July 2022, according to an Australian Transport Safety Bureau preliminary report.

The report details factual information from the early evidence collection phase of the investigation into the accident, and does not contain analysis or findings, which will be detailed in the investigation’s final report.

The Bell 206L1 LongRanger, registered VH-ZMF, had departed a private helipad in Cattai. The helicopter then climbed to about 700 ft above mean sea level and tracked north towards the planned destination in St Albans.

A witness to the south of Dargle Ridge recalled seeing a helicopter moments before the accident, flying straight and level towards the north, and that weather conditions were good, with clear skies and light winds.

“Several witnesses described then seeing the helicopter enter a rapid banking turn to the right while pitching up,” ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell said.

“They heard several rotor beats change tone before a final louder noise.”

Witnesses then recalled the helicopter pitching and rolling while descending, with one witness describing separation of the main rotor blades from the helicopter.

Smoke was then observed rising from the area where the helicopter descended. The helicopter was subsequently found to have been destroyed by a post-impact fire, with the pilot sustaining fatal injuries.

“Site and wreckage examination undertaken by the ATSB determined that the vertical stabiliser, aft section of the tail boom, tail rotor and tail rotor gearbox were severed in flight and found separate to the main wreckage,” Mr Mitchell explained.

“No pre-accident defects were identified with flight controls, aircraft structure or the engine.”

A bird carcass was found to the south-west of the main wreckage site, near a section of rotor tip.

The carcass, the main rotor blade tip and a section of impacted tail boom were recovered from the site for further analysis.

“Testing on the bird carcass and biological residue found on external helicopter surfaces at the main wreckage site identified both as Aquila audax – commonly known as a wedge-tailed eagle,” Mr Mitchell said.

The ATSB’s investigation into the accident is continuing.

“With this evidence indicating a bird strike occurred prior to an in-flight break-up, the investigation moving forward will aim to determine the full sequence of events, and potential safety learnings from this accident,” Mr Mitchell said.

A final report, which will include analysis and findings, will be released at the conclusion of the investigation.

“However, should a critical safety issue be identified during the course of the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify relevant parties so appropriate and timely safety action can be taken,” Mr Mitchell said.

Read the preliminary report: In-flight break-up involving a Bell 206L-1 LongRanger, registered VH-ZMF, near Maroota, NSW, on 9 July 2022

Streamlined reporting

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau anticipates amendments to the Transport Safety Investigations Regulations (TSI Regulations), which detail the requirements for reporting transport accidents and incidents to the ATSB, will take effect on 1 January 2023. 

“The TSI Regulations set out the ATSB’s safety occurrence reporting scheme and prescribes what occurrences must be reported to the ATSB, the ‘responsible persons’ who are required to make a report, and the particulars to be included in a report,” said ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell. 

For the marine industry, changes to the Regulations primarily relate to the new requirement that marine pilotage providers and vessel traffic service authorities are prescribed as “responsible persons” who will now be required to report transport safety occurrences. 

“This is to cover occurrences which would otherwise not be reported because a ship leaves port and no other relevant entity with knowledge of the occurrence would be in a position to report to the ATSB,” Mr Mitchell explained.  

For the marine industry – AMSA is a nominated official to receive occurrence reports from responsible persons, which are then transmitted to the ATSB. 

“Capturing additional reporting from pilotage providers and vessel traffic service authorities will establish a more accurate dataset for safety analysis conducted by the ATSB.”  

In consultations with industry and AMSA, some pilotage providers and vessel traffic service authorities already voluntarily submit reporting to AMSA.  

The amendments have now been approved by the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development & Local Government, and have been proposed to the Executive Council for endorsement in coming weeks. The amended Regulations and new reporting requirements would take effect from 1 January 2023.  

“Reporting is a simple and quick process,” Mr Mitchell concluded.  

“Nonetheless we do recognise the marine industry has been through a period of considerable change and disruption in recent years and do stress that our approach to implementing these amended regulations is to focus on education and encouraging better reporting practices over an extended period, with less emphasis placed on compliance particularly for industry participants who may not be fully across the new requirements. 

“Ultimately all of industry benefits from an open and trusted and marine occurrence reporting framework.” 

Click here for more information.

Streamlining accident and incident reporting requirements

Amendments to the Transport Safety Investigations Regulations (TSI Regulations), which detail the requirements for reporting transport accidents and incidents to the ATSB, will take effect on 1 January 2023. 

“The TSI Regulations set out the ATSB’s safety occurrence reporting scheme and prescribes what occurrences must be reported to the ATSB, the ‘responsible persons’ who are required to make a report, and the particulars to be included in a report,” said ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell. 

The changes predominantly relate to the aviation industry. 

“For aviation there are two key changes being introduced in the amended regulations – the creation of four categories of aircraft operations, each with different reporting requirements, and new requirements for sport aviation bodies to report accidents and incidents to the ATSB,” Mr Mitchell explained. 

The four categories comprise Category A (passenger transport), Category B (commercial non-passenger, including medium to large RPA), Category C (non-commercial) aircraft operation, and Category D (small non-excluded RPA and certain uncrewed balloons) aircraft operation.  

“Higher categories, in particular passenger-carrying and commercial operations, will have a greater reporting focus due to the greater public safety benefit that could be derived,” said Mr Mitchell.  

“Non-commercial aircraft operations and uncrewed RPA and balloons will have lower reporting requirements.” 

The Regulations define occurrences that must be reported to the ATSB as “immediately reportable”, which must be reported by telephone as soon as reasonably practical, and “routine reportable” matters, which can be notified to the ATSB by a written report within 72 hours. 

“Changes to the regulations ensure immediately reportable matters are those more likely to be considered for investigation by the ATSB, while reducing the reporting requirements on industry for those matters the ATSB is less likely to consider for investigation,” Mr Mitchell explained. 

Other changes to the Regulations include aligning aircraft operation categories and definitions with CASA flight operations rules introduced in December 2021, and aligning definitions of aircraft accident, serious aircraft incident, aircraft incident, fatal injury and serious injury with International Civil Aviation Organization definitions 

“Changes to the regulations also simplify reporting requirements for industry by removing prescriptive lists of individual kinds of occurrences and defining these concepts more broadly.”  

Reporting will be based on more general concepts including accidents, serious incidents, incidents, loss of separation and declaration of emergency. Guidance on the ATSB website and to be provided in the Aeronautical Information Publication details comprehensive examples of type of occurrences that fit into each. 

The ATSB consulted extensively with industry on the proposed changes over a five-week timeframe between January and March 2022. Feedback received during that process was largely positive, and helped shape the final Regulations package. 

The amended Regulations and new reporting requirements will take effect from 1 January 2023.  

“Reporting to the ATSB is a simple and quick process,” Mr Mitchell concluded.  

The ATSB is also updating the reporting forms on the ATSB website to make reporting even easier. 

“Nonetheless we do recognise the aviation industry has been through a period of considerable change and disruption in recent years and do stress that our approach to implementing these amended regulations is focusing on education and encouraging better reporting practices over an extended period, with less emphasis placed on compliance particularly for industry participants who may not be fully across the new requirements.” 

Aside from being the basis for starting safety investigations, all occurrences reported to the ATSB are maintained in Australia’s official aviation occurrence database and used for safety research and analysis.  

“Ultimately all of aviation benefits from an open and trusted aviation occurrence reporting framework.” 

Click here for more information.

World Maritime Day

A United Nations Day of Significance, World Maritime Day 2022 is calling on the maritime community to have a conversation about the transition of the sector to a greener and more sustainable future.  

This World Maritime Day(Opens in a new tab/window), the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is highlighting the importance of safe and effective container stowage planning to prevent container loss at sea and ocean pollution.  

“The ATSB is an advocate for the safe carriage of containers and for the prevention of their loss at sea through operator compliance of their ship’s Cargo Securing Manual,” ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell said. 

“In addition to posing a navigational hazard, lost shipping containers are a significant environmental hazard in the marine environment.” 

A single empty container lost at sea can release iron oxide as it rusts, as well as synthetic polymers and heavy metals from the breakdown of its insulation foam and protective paints. 

The ATSB conducts ‘no blame’ safety investigations into selected maritime incidents and accidents in Australian waters, carried out in conformity with international treaties and instruments to improve maritime safety for all seafarers. 

In 2018, the ATSB conducted an investigation into the loss of containers overboard involving the Liberian-flagged cargo ship YM Efficiency, which occurred 16 NM east-south-east of Newcastle, New South Wales.  

YM Efficiencywas en route to Sydney, steaming slowly into strong gale force winds and very rough seas off Newcastle when it rolled suddenly. The ship lost 81 containers overboard and sustained structural damage to its lashing bridges, superstructure, and accommodation ladder.

Over 1,000 tonnes of pollution, including plastics, furniture, tyres, and paper products washed up along 400 kilometres of shoreline with more than 720 tonnes of waste recovered from the waters off the Hunter Coast as a result of the incident.  

The investigation found that the forces generated during the sudden, heavy rolling placed excessive stresses on containers stowed aft of the ship’s accommodation resulting in the structural failure of containers and components of the lashing system, leading to the loss of the containers.  

The investigation also found the weights and distribution of containers in the affected bays meant that the calculated forces exceeded the allowable force limits as defined in the ship’s Cargo Securing Manual (CSM). 

“The ship’s cargo-planning process ashore did not allow for the checking of the proposed container stowage plan’s compliance with the stowage and lashing forces requirements of the ship's CMS,” Mr Mitchell said.  

“This left limited time for the ship’s crew to make amendments without unduly impacting commercial operations and created a reliance on shipboard checks during a late stage of the loading operation.”  

Mr Mitchell noted that despite the checking of stowage plans for compliance with a ship's CMS – now often achieved with loading computer systems that provide some process efficiencies – the scale and pace of modern container ship operations often means ships officers are asked to check, amend or approve proposed stowage plans at late stages in a loading operation. 

“This operational reality reinforces that the planning process ashore is the best opportunity to take all practical measures to ensure that the proposed stowage plan presented to ships officers complies with the CSM and is as safe as reasonably practicable. 

“Weather forecasting, routing and good navigational practices in adverse weather all play a part in minimising the risk of injuries to crew and damage to ship, cargo and environment.  

“However, safe and effective container stowage planning remains the primary control measure in managing the risks involved in carrying containers by sea.” 

Read the ATSB investigation report: MO-2018-008 Loss of containers overboard involving YM Efficiency, 16 NM east-south-east of Newcastle, New South Wales, on 1 June 2018 

Read more about World Maritime Day(Opens in a new tab/window)  

Beechcraft Baron heater fuel supply line inspection

Safety Advisory Notice

To Beechcraft Baron operators

Beechcraft Baron heater fuel supply line inspection

The ATSB is encouraging Baron operators to inspect the heater fuel supply line and nearby wiring in the aircraft cockpit to reduce the risk of an in-flight fire.

What happened

At approximately 0835 on the morning of 16 April 2022, the pilot of a Beechcraft B58 Baron registered VH-NPT commenced an approach to Runway 12 at the East Kimberley Regional Airport near Kununurra. Upon selection of the landing gear to the down position the pilot reported multiple unusual indications, the gear failed to extend and smoke started to emerge from forward of the pilots side circuit breaker panel. By the time the pilot had declared a PAN, flame was emerging from the same location as the smoke. The pilot expended the aircraft’s fire extinguisher but the fire returned. Smoke and flame continued to effect the pilot until the aircraft collided with terrain where it was consumed by a significant post impact fire. The pilot sustained serious injuries and the single passenger onboard was fatally injured.

Related Occurrence

During the initial phase of the investigation the ATSB identified a similar occurrence that had been investigated in 2014 (

AO-2014-040 (155.2 KB)

). The investigation of the in-flight cockpit fire found that electrical wiring had chaffed through the heater fuel supply line causing it to arc and burn a hole in the fuel line. This provided an ignition source and accelerant for the fire.

Why did it happen

Both the heater fuel line and the aircraft wiring of NPT were consumed by the post impact fire, and an examination was not possible. However, the location, initiation and severity of the fire is similar to the incident detailed in AO‑2014‑040. As such, while the specific circumstances of the fire initiation and acceleration remain under investigation, in the interest of transport safety, the ATSB has issued this safety advisory notice.

Manufacturer Response

In response to the advanced release of this ATSB SAN the manufacturer advised that there is a potential for chafing of wiring across several Beechcraft models including the Baron. Model Communiqué 116 references wire chafing reports in the Beechcraft Bonanza but the communiqué states that the protection of wires from chafing damage is applicable to all Beechcraft models.

Safety advisory notice

AO-2022-026-SAN-001: The ATSB encourages operators of Beechcraft Baron aircraft to conduct a detailed inspection of the heater fuel supply line and wiring in its vicinity. The examination should focus specifically on the area below the pilot’s circuit breaker panel and areas forward of this under the instrument panel. Any identified issues should be reported to CASA (via the defect reporting system) and the manufacturer.

The ATSB encourages Baron operators to review the Electrical Wire Chafing Protection section in Model Communiqué 116 (See attachment A) put out by Beechcraft in June of 2008, which is applicable to all Beechcraft models.

The ATSB further encourages operators to review the anti-chafing provisions within the relevant aircraft maintenance manual (see 20-04-00-001 – Electrical Wiring – Description and Operation) to ensure serviceability of anti-chafing materials and replace or fit, as necessary. Specific consideration should be given to wiring in the vicinity of lines carrying flammable liquids.

ATSB comment

The ATSB notes similarities in several Beechcraft models, that utilise fuel lines running through the cockpit. While a review of ATSB data does not support the broadening of the SAN to include other aircraft models,  chafe protection should be applied to wiring as per the manufacturers' requirements and particular care should be taken when wiring is in the proximity of lines carrying flammable liquids.

Area of concern in an exemplar aircraft showing the location of the fuel line and wiring looms. Inspection should encompass any areas along the fuel line where it may contact wiring looms.

Area of concern in an exemplar Baron B58 showing the location of the fuel line and wiring looms. Inspection should encompass any areas along the fuel line where it may contact wiring looms.

Source: Operator

Read more about this ATSB investigation: Collision with terrain involving Beechcraft Baron 58, VH-NPT, near Kununurra Airport, Western Australia, 16 April 2022

Publication details

Investigation number AO-2022-026
Publication type Safety Advisory Notice
Publication mode Aviation
Publication date 21/09/2022