On 8 May 2008, the pilot of an American Champion Aircraft (ACA) 'Citabria', model 7GCBC (registered VH-MWY), was returning to Camden Aerodrome, NSW, after a local area flight, when the upper elevator control cable fractured. The pilot was able to maintain control of the aircraft's pitch attitude using wing flaps, and subsequently landed the aircraft safely, with only minor damage to the propeller.

Laboratory examination of the failed cable found the failure (and an adjacent area of significant damage) to have developed from the progressive fatigue cracking of individual cable wires in locations where the cable passed over guide sheaves. The examination also determined that the cable had not been manufactured to conform with the requirements of the accepted standard for aircraft control cables (MIL-DTL-83420).

From 2005, the aircraft manufacturer changed its internal procedures to require that only cable manufactured and certified to MIL-DTL-83420 be used for new aircraft production. Following the cable failure, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) published an Airworthiness Bulletin (AWB), highlighting the issues associated with the use of non-MIL standard cables in aircraft control applications, and recommended that owners and maintainers of American Champion Aircraft ensure that periodic inspections are conducted with appropriate veracity.

On 9 May 2008, a Boeing Company 737-8CX aircraft, registered PK-GEF, was being operated on a scheduled passenger service between Denpasar, Republic of Indonesia and Perth, WA. On board were two flight crew, six cabin crew and 76 passengers.

The flight crew reported that, once established in the cruise, they reviewed their briefing material and noted that the threshold for runway 21 at Perth was displaced due to runway works.

On approach to land at Perth, the aerodrome controller issued the flight crew with the landing clearance, '... runway 21 displaced threshold, cleared to land'. When the aircraft was about 15 seconds from touchdown, the flight crew questioned the presence of cars on the runway and conducted a go-around.

On the second approach, the flight crew were again issued the landing clearance '... runway 21, displaced threshold, cleared to land'. The aerodrome controller recalled observing the aircraft on what appeared to be an approach to land on the closed section of the runway and instructed the flight crew to go around. The go-around instruction also included information to assist the flight crew in identifying where the aircraft was to be landed. That additional information, together with the high workload being experienced by the flight crew at that time, may have momentarily confused them, with the effect that they did not assimilate and act on the instruction to go around.

As a result of this incident, the airport operator undertook a number of safety actions. Those actions included: the review of its dispatch of Method of Works Plans (MWOP) to relevant stakeholders; the implementation of a more robust MWOP receipt and acknowledge system; and the establishment of a project safety group in support of all critical airside works.

Interim factual report released 25 July 2008

On 9 April 2008, a Fairchild Industries Metro III aircraft departing Sydney, NSW was observed on radar to be turning contrary to air traffic control instructions. The pilot reported that he had a '...slight technical fault...'. Recorded radar data showed the aircraft then completed a turn to the left before turning back to the right and disappearing from radar at an altitude of 3,900 ft. Searchers later discovered a small amount of aircraft wreckage floating in the ocean, south of the last recorded radar position. The pilot was fatally injured, and the aircraft was destroyed.

On 1 May 2008 at about 2216 Eastern Standard Time, an Airbus Industrie A320 aircraft, registered VH-VQS, was conducting the runway 32L (left) instrument landing system missed approach procedure at Launceston Aerodrome, Tasmania. During the climb, the A320 came into close proximity with a Boeing Company 737 that was manoeuvring at 3,100 ft above mean sea level about 5 NM (9 km) to the north-west of the aerodrome. The lateral separation between the aircraft reduced to within 3 NM (5 km) and zero vertical separation as the A320 climbed through 3,100 ft. No Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System alerts were generated during the occurrence.

Both aircraft were operating scheduled passenger services from Melbourne, Victoria and had arrived at Launceston outside the normal operating hours of the Launceston air traffic control tower. Separation between the aircraft was therefore the responsibility of the respective flight crews. In this instance, a breakdown in the communication and interpretation of the respective flight crews' separation planning contributed to the proximity event.

On 9 April 2008, the crew of a McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company MD369ER helicopter registered VH-PLU, experienced a substantial loss of engine power while conducting low-level powerline stringing operations. The helicopter impacted the ground and was seriously damaged. The two occupants were seriously injured.

The investigation determined that the pilot in command was operating the helicopter with a fuel tank quantity that did not guarantee continuous operation of the engine at the flight attitudes experienced during the powerline stringing operation.

As a result of the accident, the operator revised its fuel management procedures for powerline stringing operations.

On 3 April 2008, a Piper PA-32-300 Cherokee Six aircraft, registered VH-ZMP, lost engine power shortly after take-off from Brampton Island, Qld and ditched into the sea. The pilot and the four passengers evacuated the aircraft before it sank and were later recovered by rescue helicopter. The engine power loss was consistent with fuel starvation.

Following the event, the aircraft operator amended Cherokee Six fuel procedures to require a minimum of 30 L of fuel in the selected fuel tank for any take off.

There were 52 fatalities throughout Australia as a result of wirestrike accidents in the period 1994 to 2006. During that period, there was an average of just under 11 reported wirestrike accidents each year and the average number of fatalities was four per annum.

Despite the application of risk strategies to mitigate the consequences of a wirestrike, those consequences can often be expected to be catastrophic. In that case, a large investment is made by operators, pilots and other parties involved in low-level operations to minimise the likelihood of a wirestrike. That includes by ensuring awareness of all known low-level hazards, including powerlines and tall structures, before commencing, and during the conduct of low-level operations.

During a series of recent ATSB investigations into fatal and other wirestrike accidents, a number of different sources of information on the location of known powerlines and tall structures was identified. However, despite the apparent utility and safety benefits inherent in the availability to pilots, operators and low-level campaign managers of a single source or database of the location of known powerlines and tall structures, initial discussions with aviation authorities on the potential development of such a resource were non-productive.

However, Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) investigators commenced initial discussions with Geoscience Australia (GA) and the Energy Networks Association (ENA) to examine the feasibility of the establishment of such a database. Those discussions determined that GA was amenable to working with other relevant agencies in order to promulgate that data for use by pilots and other parties. ENA indicated that the proposal to establish a national database would be considered as part of its 2008 priority issues.

The ATSB will advise of further developments in its discussions with GA and ENA on its website at 6-monthly intervals.

Preliminary report released 16 May 2008

On 18 March 2008, at approximately 1115 Eastern Daylight-saving Time (EDT), a Pitts S-2A aircraft struck two trees before impacting the ground beside the Northern Road, 7 km NE of Camden, NSW, fatally injuring the occupant of the rear cockpit.

On 26 February 2008, at about 1655 Western Daylight-saving Time, the pilot of a Gippsland Aeronautics Pty Ltd GA-8 Airvan, registered VH-KUZ, with two passengers on board, commenced take-off at Kalumburu Aerodrome, WA. Witnesses reported that the aircraft started to drift to the left of the runway prior to becoming briefly airborne. The aircraft settled back onto the runway strip, veering further left across the runway strip. The aircraft subsequently ran up an embankment, through low scrub, and then through small trees beyond the runway strip. The impact with the trees flipped the aircraft onto its back, where it came to rest, facing the opposite way to the direction of take-off. The aircraft was seriously damaged, and the pilot and two passengers received minor injuries.

On 12 March 2008, an Airbus A320-200 aircraft, registered VH-VQY, was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Launceston, Tas. to Sydney, NSW. While the crew were preparing for the flight, the control tower closed, and the airport lighting switched over to a pilot activated lighting system. The aircraft subsequently departed without the airport lighting being turned on. A number of situational factors were probably associated with the crew not activating the airport lights before the departure. Several similar incidents have previously occurred in Australia and overseas.