Collision between Freight Train 4MP5 and XPT Passenger Train 8622

Executive summary

At approximately 1956 Eastern Summer Time on Wednesday 19 January 2005, wagons of a Pacific National (PN) operated freight train collided with a RailCorp operated Express Passenger Train (XPT) passenger train at South Dynon, Melbourne, about 2.3 km from Spencer Street Station. The wagons were being marshalled to form train 4MP5 on sidings in the South Dynon yard when the two leading wagons were propelled at a speed of 9 km/h into the side of the passenger train running on the main line at a speed of about 13 km/h.

There was damage to three XPT cars and minor damage to two freight wagons but no reports of injury to the 220 passengers, the crew on board the XPT or to the PN crew.

The wagons were being marshalled to form a train of 1415.4 metres in length. This involved joining two separate strings of wagons from two adjacent sidings. The rear portion of 697 metres was being propelled by a PN yard locomotive (pilot locomotive) from one siding to another at the eastern end of the yard. The front portion of the train was then to be drawn forward from an adjacent siding and attached to the rear portion.

There were three employees engaged in the propelling movement: a locomotive driver, a terminal operator riding on the pilot locomotive and a trainee terminal operator (trainee), located at the eastern end of the rear portion. Other employees were working elsewhere but were not required for the propelling movement.

With the pilot locomotive propelling the rear portion, the intention was for the trainee to guide the shunting movement and to stop the wagons short of a signal protecting the main line. The trainee did not fully understand his role. He went to the rear of the train before the movement started and remained there instead of guiding the leading wagon. As a result, the leading wagon passed the signal and although catch-points derailed three bogies on the two leading wagons, the wagons were propelled into the side of the passing XPT.

The investigation found that the trainee’s task had not been clearly specified. The accident sequence had developed because of a lack of defined procedures covering the marshalling of long trains, the breakdown in communication between terminal operations employees and the lack of structure in the task. In addition, although the catch-points derailed the leading wagons, they were not effective in deflecting the wagons away from the main line.

As a result of the investigation, the ATSB has issued recommendations with particular focus on:

• revision of the safety management system particular to the marshalling of trains in South Dynon yard.
• revision of the safety management system to incorporate the need for a supervisory structure in relation to trainees in terminal operator teams.
• consideration of the level of performance of the catch-points.
• a revision of the safety management system to include a documented standard or policy to define the requirements and function of catch-points.
• consideration of the development of specifications for catch-points and similar devices for inclusion in the Code of Practice for the Defined Interstate Rail Network.

Safety Actions

Actions Taken

As a result of the occurrence, the ATSB consulted with Pacific National and the Australian Rail Track Corporation in relation to safety issues that had become apparent during the initial stages of the investigation and issued interim recommendations. The interim recommendations are contained in 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.