Abstract

At about 0310 on 25 August 2007, while the research ship Geosounder was about 185 miles northeast of Cairns, Australia, en route from New Zealand to Singapore, an off-duty integrated rating (IR) who was skylarking on deck while under the influence of alcohol fell overboard. The crew immediately threw lifebuoys into the water, stopped the ship and launched the fast rescue craft (FRC) but the IR could not be located. While launching the FRC to search for the missing man, another IR broke his ankle.

After a search involving two ships and an aircraft, both lifebuoys were recovered but no sign of the missing seaman was found. In consultation with RCC, the master called off the search at 1835 when it became too dark to continue. The master's decisions to call off the search and take the injured crew member to Cairns for treatment were reasonable considering the very low probability of finding the missing man alive if the search was resumed on 26 August.

The ATSB found that while the Geoshipping safety management system included a 'no alcohol' policy, it was not consistently and effectively implemented on board the ship. The ATSB also found that the haste of the crew to launch the fast rescue craft to locate the missing man overboard resulted in the master and crew performing tasks that they had not regularly practiced, and they did not plan or execute their tasks effectively. Consequently, the chief mate drove the fast rescue craft ahead before it had been released from its hoisting wire.

The ATSB has been advised that safety actions have been taken by DOF Subsea and DOF Management (formerly Geoshipping) to address the safety issues identified in the report. The report issues no recommendations or safety advisory notices.

Executive summary

On 14 August 2007, the Antigua and Barbuda registered general cargo ship BBC Islander anchored off Dampier, Western Australia. One of the tasks the crew was to complete while the ship was at anchor was the removal of steel brackets that had been welded to the hatch covers.

In the process of removing the brackets with oxy-acetylene cutting equipment, a hole was inadvertently cut in the aft cargo hold hatch cover. As a result, sparks and molten metal fell into the cargo hold and onto the pallets of cargo stowed below.

At about 1340, smoke was noticed coming from the aft cargo hold.

The general alarm was sounded and the master decided to use the ship's fixed fire extinguishing system to flood the cargo hold with carbon dioxide.

The harbour master was notified and he arranged for the ship to be brought alongside the wharf.

By 1312 on 16 August, BBC Islander was all fast alongside the wharf and the local fire fighting authorities took control of the response. Initially, they tried flooding the cargo hold with more carbon dioxide.

They then attempted to remove the cargo in order to reach the seat of the fire and extinguish it with the use of fire hoses. Eventually, the hold was filled with high expansion foam. However, none of these actions extinguished the fire.

On 18 August, the fire was finally extinguished when an offshore supply vessel's fire monitor was used to flood BBC Islander's aft cargo hold with about 700 tonnes of seawater.

The ATSB has issued two recommendations and three safety advisory notices to address the identified safety issues.

At about 1640 on 8 August 2007, an able seaman died on board the bulk carrier Oceanic Angel as a result of a fall from the forward ladder in the ship's number three cargo hold. The seaman had been part of a team preparing the hold for an upcoming cargo and had just finished work for the day.

Executive summary

At about 0230 on 16 May 2007, the bulk carrier Ormiston sailed from Melbourne, Victoria, bound for Thevenard, South Australia. At about 0512, the ship rounded the Hovell Pile beacon and entered the South Channel in Port Phillip. At about 0521, Ormiston entered 'The Cut', the narrowest part of the channel, from the east making good about 15 knots.

At about 0230, the second mate on board the roll-on/roll-off general cargo ship Searoad Mersey contacted Point Lonsdale vessel traffic service (VTS) to provide an estimated time of arrival at the entrance to Port Phillip and was advised of the traffic movements within the port. At about 0420, Searoad Mersey's master, who also held a pilotage exemption for Port Phillip and had conducted over 1300 transits of the port, contacted VTS and received updated traffic information, including Ormiston's estimated movements.

At about 0435, Searoad Mersey passed Point Lonsdale lighthouse and entered Port Phillip. At about 0521, when the ship entered 'The Cut' from the west making good about 15 knots, the master had forgotten that Ormiston was approaching and did not see the approaching ship until immediately before the two ships passed. At about 0523, Searoad Mersey and Ormiston passed within 20 metres of each other in 'The Cut' at a combined speed of about 30 knots.

The ATSB investigation found that Searoad Mersey's bridge team members had not effectively implemented bridge resource management principles, were not keeping an adequate lookout and had lost situational awareness. The investigation also found that the ships did not communicate with each other until after the incident and that the Point Lonsdale VTS was not aware of the incident until after it had occurred.

The ATSB has issued four recommendations and one safety advisory notice to address the safety issues identified in the report.

Abstract

On 23 May 2007, the Panamanian registered bulk carrier Pasha Bulker anchored 2.4 miles off the coast near Newcastle, New South Wales. The ship had sufficient water ballast on board for the good weather at the time, and was not expected to load its coal cargo for about three weeks.

At midday on 7 June, Pasha Bulker's master veered more anchor cable after a gale warning was issued. The weather deteriorated and shortly after midnight, the wind had reached gale force.

At 0500 on 8 June, the wind had increased to strong gale force and the weather was severe. At 0625, Pasha Bulker started to drag its anchor. The master decided to put to sea and at 0748, the anchor was aweigh. The ship was now 1.2 miles from the shore and, with the southeast wind fine on the starboard bow, it made good a north-easterly course. At 0906, the master altered the ship's course to starboard to put the wind on the port bow in an attempt to make good a southerly course on a south-southeasterly heading. However, its heading became south-westerly and, with the wind on the port beam, the ship started to rapidly approach the coast.

At 0931, with Nobbys Beach 0.8 of a mile away, the master attempted a starboard turn. The manoeuvre did not succeed and at 0946, with grounding imminent, he requested assistance from authorities ashore. At 0951, Pasha Bulker grounded on Nobbys Beach and the ship's momentum carried it further onto the beach. The crew were evacuated by helicopter during the afternoon.

On 2 July, Pasha Bulker was successfully refloated. The ship was temporarily repaired in Newcastle and on 26 July, taken in tow to Vietnam to undergo permanent repairs.

The report identifies a number of safety issues and issues recommendations or safety advisory notices to address them.

Executive summary

On the morning of 23 April, the Australian fishing vessel Peter Crombie was at anchor about 30 miles south of Robe, South Australia and the vessel's three crew members were below decks sleeping. The Panamanian registered bulk carrier Silky Ocean had sailed from Port Kembla, New South Wales, on 21 April and was in ballast and en-route to Ardrossan, South Australia.

The weather was fine with good visibility. There was a swell of about one metre from the east-southeast and a sea of about 1.5 m. The wind was from the east-southeast at 12 to 18 knots.

At about 1150, Silky Ocean collided with Peter Crombie. Silky Ocean's bridge watchkeeper had not detected Peter Crombie either visually or by radar.

After the collision, Peter Crombie's skipper tried to contact the ship using his vessel's very high frequency radio. However, Silky Ocean's bridge watchkeeper did not acknowledge the call and made no attempt to communicate with the fishing vessel.

While Silky Ocean had sustained no damage as a result of the collision, Peter Crombie's hull had been damaged and the vessel was taking on water. Fortunately, the fishing vessel's bilge pumps were able to keep up with the ingress of water.

Peter Crombie's skipper notified the vessel's owners of the collision and then set a course for Robe and, by 1700, the vessel was all fast alongside the wharf in Robe.

The report identifies a number of safety issues and issues recommendations and safety advisory notices with the aim of preventing similar events.

Executive summary

At about 1045 on 10 May 2007, the bulk carrier Enterprise grounded briefly as it was being manoeuvred in the confined waters of Grassy Harbour, King Island, Tasmania. The ship was under the conduct of the pilot, who was following the pilotage plan he usually used for the ship when it called at the port.

Prior to the ship's entry to the port, its after draught had been reduced to 5.0 m so that a minimum under keel clearance of 0.5 m could be maintained alongside the berth. At that draught, the ship's controllable pitch propeller was not fully submerged. However, neither the pilot nor the master adequately considered the effect that the reduced draught would have on the efficiency of the propeller and therefore, the ship's manoeuvrability.

While manoeuvring off the berth, the pilot was forced to maintain astern pitch for longer than he had planned. As a result, the ship was subjected to the effects of the propeller's transverse thrust on its stern for longer. The transverse thrust combined with the starboard thrust of the bow thruster, which was being used to maintain the ship's heading, resulted in the ship moving bodily to starboard and grounding on rocks at the southern end of the main breakwater. The ship's propeller was damaged, but Enterprise was not disabled. No pollution resulted from the grounding.

The ATSB has issued one recommendation to address a safety issue identified in the report.

Executive summary

On the morning of 2 April 2007, the bulk carrier Shirane was off Newcastle, New South Wales.

The ship's third engineer had been assigned the task of replacing the auxiliary boiler burner with a clean spare unit. When he had finished the job, he attempted to fire the burner to check its operation but it failed to ignite. A few moments later, at 1013, while he was removing the burner to inspect it, there was an explosion (flashback) from the boiler furnace.

The third engineer ran into engine control room and, as it was clear to the chief engineer and the first engineer that he had been burned, he was taken to the ship's hospital for first aid treatment.

The master was informed and, shortly after 1015, he telephoned the ship's agent in Newcastle and requested a medical evacuation.

After purging the boiler furnace for about an hour, the chief engineer and the second engineer removed the burner to inspect it. A few moments later, there was another flashback from the boiler furnace. The chief engineer, the second engineer and a fitter were burned by the flashback.

The flashback had also caused a small fire on the deck, which was quickly extinguished. The three men then went to the ship's hospital for first aid treatment.

By 1324, a rescue helicopter had evacuated the second engineer, the third engineer and the fitter from the ship and, at 1729, it returned for the chief engineer.

As a result of the investigation, the boiler manufacturer and the ship's management company have taken a number of safety actions. The ATSB has also issued three safety advisory notices to address the safety issues identified.

At about 0945 on 10 April 2007, MSC Sonia's boatswain and ordinary seaman were on the top platform of the ship's funnel casing, painting the starboard main engine exhaust pipe, when steam unexpectedly exhausted from the nearby boiler safety valve vent pipe. The ordinary seaman was seriously burned by the steam.

Safety summary

What happened

At about 0610 on 18 March 2007, in near total darkness, the recreational fishing boat Norma Jean departed the Carnarvon boat harbour. About 15 minutes later, Norma Jean collided with Seatow 61, a barge that was anchored off the port. Norma Jean sank almost immediately and all four of its occupants died as a result of the collision.

The ATSB initiated a safety investigation into the collision and, in May 2008, the ATSB’s final investigation report (Marine Occurrence Investigation Report No. 237) was released.

In 2010, a coronial inquest into the deaths of the four persons on board Norma Jean was held in Carnarvon. During the inquest, evidence that was not provided to the ATSB at the time of the initial investigation was put before the Coroner.

As a result of this information, the ATSB re-opened its investigation into the accident for the purpose of correcting the public record that was contained in the initial safety investigation report. This report is the result of the re-opened investigation and examines all of the available evidence, including that provided at the time of the coronial inquest.

What the ATSB found

The ATSB found that Seatow 61’s navigation lights were probably not illuminated at the time of the collision. Furthermore, the intended use of only the barge’s navigation lights, not supplemented by illuminating its deck flood lights had not appropriately taken into account its location outside the harbour and the recreational boating activities in the area.

The investigation also determined that Norma Jean’s skipper did not identify the barge in time to avoid the collision and that the boat’s occupants were not wearing personal flotation devices.

What has been done as a result

The operators of Sea-Tow 61 have applied luminous ‘GlowMax’ paint in strips on all their barges and fitted them with bulwark mounted solar powered lights. They have also added a ‘Barge Anchoring Procedure’ and ‘Barge Anchoring Flow Chart’ to their safety management system.

The Western Australia Department of Transport has reviewed its operational procedures as a result of this accident, operational experience and ongoing auditing processes.

Safety message

All seafarers should take appropriate action to ensure that their anchored vessels are clearly identifiable at night. Such action should, at times, include the use of lighting that is above the minimum required by the collision regulations.