Fire contributes to aircraft accidents and many fatalities. The growing use of polymer composite materials in aircraft has the potential to increase the fire hazard due to the flammable nature of the organic matrix.

The polymer composite most often used in the external structures of aircraft is carbon/epoxy, which is a flammable material that easily ignites and burns when exposed to fire. A large percentage of the cabin interior of wide-bodied passenger aircraft is made using composite materials, mostly glass/phenolic. Phenolic composites have good flammability, but newer materials are being developed that offer the promise of increasing the fire safety of aircraft cabins. In fact, a large number of new composite materials are being developed for cabins and external structures that have the potential to increase the fire safety of aircraft, but a detailed analysis of the fire performance of these materials against conventional materials now used in aircraft has not been performed. Such an evaluation will provide a clear indication of the potential improvements in fire safety by using new fire-resistant composites in aircraft.

This report assesses the fire hazard of current and next-generation polymer composites for aircraft and identifies those materials with improved flammability resistance. A comprehensive review of the scientific literature was performed to develop a database on the fire properties of a large number of polymer composite materials. For both aircraft cabin materials and aircraft structural materials the following fire properties were considered in the determination of fire safety: time-to-ignition, limiting oxygen index, peak heat release rate, average heat release rate, total heat release, flame spread rate, smoke, and combustion gases. The data is presented as performance tables which rank the composite materials in order from best to worst.

The composite most often used in pressurised aircraft cabins is glass/phenolic, and the database shows that this material has excellent fire reaction performance¹ and that very few next-generation composites display superior properties. The most used structural composite is carbon/epoxy, and this material has poor fire resistance and can pose a serious fire hazard. A number of advanced structural composites with superior fire properties are identified, including materials with high temperature thermoset polymer, thermoplastic or inorganic polymer matrices.

1. Fire reaction performance is a measure of a material's resistance to combustion as determined by a range of parameters such as time-to-ignition, heat release rates, limiting oxygen index, etc.

The ATSB Annual Review 2001 documents ATSB's achievements and safety activities from 1 July 2000 to 30 June 2001 and outlines its business planning for 2001-2002.

Producing the annual review is in line with a recommendation of the McGrath report into the former Bureau of Air Safety Investigation released in August 1999 to improve the transparency and accountability of the Bureau.

Creation of the ATSB on 1 July 1999 brought together the safety investigation, statistical analysis, research and safety program management of the Commonwealth's transport safety role in one multi-modal agency within the Department of Transport and Regional Services. ATSB intends to prepare an annual review to provide all stakeholders with an overview of its activities and safety in each transport mode. This first review covers a range of topics including:

• ATSB's safety mission, values, organisational structure, operational environment and internal management;
• key ATSB safety results by transport mode;
• a statistical overview of safety in the transport modes of road, rail, aviation and marine;
• ATSB participation in Parliamentary inquiries; and
• ATSB's performance against the measures in the 1999-2000 Portfolio Budget Statements.

We presently know very little about how fatigue is being managed in the New Zealand aviation industry. The present study aimed to gather information on how New Zealand aviation organisations are managing fatigue, the different strategies being used, the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches, the barriers companies are facing in managing fatigue, and the resources used or required to help organisations better manage fatigue.

Methods

All New Zealand-based aviation companies holding a Part 119 air operator certificate were invited to participate in the study (a Part 119 certificate is required to conduct air operations that involve carrying passengers or goods for hire or reward). Three questionnaires were sent to each organisation: one to an individual in a management position; another to a person in a rostering position; and the third to a line pilot.

With assistance from industry representatives a questionnaire was designed that included questions on: the structure of an organisation and the type of operations conducted; the use of fatigue management strategies in the organisation; how flight and duty time limits were met within the organisation; how well the organisation was managing fatigue; and how issues around fatigue management worked in the organisation.

Results

Responses from organisations were categorised according to the rule they operated under (Part 121 large aircraft operators; Part 125 medium aircraft operators; and Part 135 helicopter and small aircraft operators). One hundred and fifty three questionnaires were returned (out of 480), which included responses from 10 Part 121, 10 Part 125 organisations and 77 Part 135 organisations. This represents 55% of the companies questionnaires were sent to. The distribution of company responses is considered representative of the makeup of the New Zealand industry.

As expected, organisations operating under Part 121 were, on average, large organisations, operating similar aircraft in a relatively controlled environment. At the other end of the continuum, and also as expected, organisations operating under Part 135 were generally small, and operated single piston-engine aircraft and helicopters. These organisations were far more diverse in the type of work conducted and the conditions under which this work was done (e.g. all types of airspace and from all types of aerodromes). Part 125 organisations fell very much in the middle of the other two categories.

When asked about the use of 10 different fatigue management strategies in their organisation, 60% of both Part 121 and Part 125 organisations reported having 8 or more fatigue management strategies in place, while only 28% of Part 135 operators reported this number. Monitoring the flight and duty times of pilots, and monitoring pilot workload were the most frequently used strategies. Fewer organisations report educating their rostering staff or reviewing company processes for managing fatigue.

Examples of how these strategies were implemented in companies varied widely. Some companies had excellent ideas, such as including education on fatigue in Crew Resource Management courses. On the other hand, although many Part 135 respondents indicated that they educated their pilots, management and rostering staff, they stated this was done by detailing what the flight and duty time limits or company policies were and/or that these were to be followed. These discrepancies existed in the examples given for most fatigue management strategies.

There was a wide range of additional fatigue management strategies reported by organisations, including promoting an environment in which pilots could easily indicate when they were fatigued, raising awareness of fatigue within the company, and the use of internal communication.

The majority of Part 125 and Part 135 organisations adhere to the flight and duty time limits specified in AC 119-2 (Advisory Circular 'Air Operations - Fatigue of Flight Crew'), with 10% having some minor dispensation to these limits. In contrast, most Part 121 organisations stated they had either a Fatigue Management Scheme or another company-specific accredited scheme.

Where two or more questionnaires were received from a company, and where one participant identified as a line pilot, and a second participant identified as having a management role, responses were compared (34 companies). Significantly more management staff than line pilots considered that their company educated their pilots and management staff. Management personnel were also more likely to indicate that their organisation: monitored pilot workload; identified and managed fatigued personnel and; reviewed company processes for managing fatigue.

Ratings by line pilots and management personnel of how well their organisation managed fatigued pilots were also compared. Line pilots from Part 121 or 125 organisations rated their organisation's management of fatigue as below average, and tended to give lower ratings than line pilots from Part 135 organisations, or management personnel from Part 121 and 125 organisations, who all rated fatigue as being moderately well managed.

Comparisons were also made between organisations that complied with the prescriptive limits specified in AC 119-2 and those that indicated their company had a Fatigue Management Scheme or some other flight and duty time scheme accredited by the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority. Ratings of how well fatigue was managed, the number of fatigue management strategies an organisation had in place, and the frequency of use of each of the ten different fatigue management strategies did not differ between these two groups.

Replies to open-ended questions indicated that most respondents did not think that seeking information on fatigue management was necessary, or that they needed further help, advice or resources on better managing fatigue. Those respondents who did report seeking information on fatigue primarily indicated industry sources (industry publications, regulatory authority, and other industry groups). Further information was also commonly mentioned as a resource which would assist in fatigue management.

Safety, and improved staff performance, productivity and mood were seen as the primary advantages of an organisation's approach to fatigue management. Reduced flexibility was seen as a negative outcome, and the financial cost and staffing were the main barriers to fatigue management.

Discussion

There are certainly air transport operators in New Zealand who are taking a comprehensive approach to fatigue management, with some companies having systems in place that make them international industry leaders in this area. However, in general, findings suggest that fatigue is not particularly well understood or managed by many operators. What is somewhat concerning is that many management individuals seem to believe they are managing fatigue well, but when asked specifically how this is being done, a large proportion of the examples indicate otherwise. This possibly signifies not only a lack of understanding of fatigue, but also what is involved in its management. This is further supported by the number of operators who indicate for various reasons that fatigue is not an issue for them, or that the use of 'common sense' is all that is required for managing fatigue.

The findings of this study strongly suggest that there is a need to raise industry awareness of the causes and consequences of fatigue, and processes for its management. It is suggested that the regulatory authority, industry bodies, and Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) representatives consider who is responsible for doing this, and what educational material and supporting resources need to be developed and made available to operators.

It is also suggested that the regulator carefully considers what supporting information it provides to operators and the fatigue management processes it requires operators to have in place. This is considered of particular importance for those organisations which have approval to operate under company-specific or accredited flight and duty time schemes where greater flexibility is possible.

The findings of this work may also have relevance to the Australian aviation industry.

Approximately 1.5 to 2 billion passengers fly on the world's civil aircraft each year. As the population ages, the number of air travellers increases and longer routes are flown by bigger aircraft, the number of medical events involving passengers is anticipated to increase.

The purpose of this study was to determine the prevalence, nature, type and extent of medical problems and injuries occurring in passengers on board civil registered aircraft. The aim, in particular, was to determine the most common in-flight medical problems in passengers, and what proportion of these events result in an aircraft diversion.

A search of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau's accident and incident database was conducted for medical conditions and injuries in passengers between 1 January 1975 and 31 March 2006. There were 284 passenger medical events and injuries (defined as 15 accidents, one serious incident and 268 incidents). These events accounted for only 0.18 of a percentage point of all the occurrences listed on the Australian Transport Safety Bureau's database. In-flight deaths accounted for only 3 per cent of the total passenger injury events.

The most common cause of in-flight death, at 44 per cent, was heart attack. Serious injuries accounted for slightly more than a third of reported occurrences. Minor injuries accounted for the majority of cases, at 53 per cent. The most common medical event in passengers was minor musculoskeletal injury (26 per cent of cases). Ninety-five flights were diverted (33 per cent). Of the known medical conditions, heart attack was the most common reason for an aircraft diversion (33 cases out of 95), followed by a fitting episode (in six cases).

The results of this study are consistent with other published international experience. There is a low risk of passengers sustaining either an injury or a medical event as a consequence of travel on a civil aircraft.

Drug and alcohol use in pilots can have a detrimental impact on aviation safety. Important cognitive and psychomotor functions necessary for safe operation of an aircraft can be significantly impaired by drugs and alcohol. The purpose of this study was to determine the prevalence and nature of drug and alcohol-related accidents and incidents in Australian civil aviation. A search of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau's accident and incident database was conducted for all occurrences in which drugs or alcohol were recorded between 1 January 1975 and 31 March 2006. There were 36 drug and alcohol-related events (31 accidents and five incidents). The majority of these occurrences were related to alcohol (22 occurrences). The drugs identified included prescription drugs, over-the-counter medications and illegal drugs (including heroin and cannabis).

Drug and alcohol events accounted for only 0.02 per cent of all the occurrences listed on the Australian Transport Safety Bureau's database. Drug and alcohol-related accidents accounted for 0.4 per cent of all accidents. Furthermore, 89 per cent of drug and alcohol occurrences resulted in an accident, with the proportion of these 32 occurrences that resulted in an accident quite high, at 86.5 per cent. Fatal accidents accounted for 67 per cent of all drug and alcohol occurrences. The results of this study show that the prevalence of drug and alcohol-related accidents and incidents in Australian civil aviation is very low, but that the related accident and fatality rates are high. The planned introduction of a mandatory drug and alcohol testing program into the Australian civil aviation industry will provide a more prescriptive approach to the issue of drug and alcohol use in pilots. Education and training remain important elements of an overall approach to reducing the significant impact of drug and alcohol use on flight safety.

Commercial air travel remains the safest mode of transport available in OECD countries. Commercial airlines in Australia do not require infants under the age of 24 months to occupy their own seats during flight. However, the children carried in the arms of adult passengers must be restrained during taxi, take-off, landing and turbulence.

The aims of this project were to review the developments in safe transport of children in aircraft and to conduct a test program based on current Australian child restraint systems (CRS). This initial program was later extended to include the assessment of infant carrier systems (commonly referred to as baby slings) for use as infant restraints in aircraft.

A US Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) study found that lap-held restraint systems allowed excessive forward body excursion of the test dummies, resulting in severe head impact with the seat back directly in front. The tests showed how a lap-held infant could be crushed between the forward seat back and the accompanying adult during impact (Gowdy & De Weese 1994). Following the CAMI study, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) banned the use of booster seats and all lap-held restraint devices in aircraft during take-off, landing and taxi. This has resulted in lap-held children travelling wholly unrestrained in aircraft.

The travelling public is likely to expect that the level of safety offered to child passengers in commercial aircraft is equivalent to that of adult passengers restrained by lap belts. The use of an appropriate child restraint system can offer the highest level of safety for young children travelling in aircraft, both in turbulence and in crash situations. However, the compatibility of current Australian automotive CRS with aircraft seating has not been investigated and their performance in aircraft emergency situations is unknown.

There are very few preventable child deaths in aircraft crashes. Newman, Johnston and Grossman (2003) found that the use of CRS would prevent 0.4 child air-crash deaths per year. They concluded that making infant air-seats compulsory would raise air travel costs which could result in a net increase in deaths and injuries as families opt for automobile travel - a higher-risk mode of transport per kilometre of travel.

Child restraint testing

A selection of automotive CRS available in Australia was chosen for testing in this study to cover the range of common child restraint types. The DME Corporation Plane Seat, certified for use in both motor vehicles and aircraft in the United States, was also examined. The testing was completed in three stages:

1. Fit test
   The CRS were fitted to an economy class aircraft seat row to check for compatibility. Twenty Australian standard CRS were fitted to the aircraft seat according to the manufacturer's instructions. Fourteen of the CRS models had problems in this test. Either they did not fit within the 31-inch seat pitch, or they were difficult to fit due to interference with the latching mechanism of the aircraft seat lap belt. One restraint was designed for use only with a top tether strap requiring an anchorage system not available in commercial aircraft.
2. Turbulence (inversion) test
   The CRS were subjected to the FAA seat inversion test for turbulence. This test caused no difficulty for the Australian CRS, which have 6-point harnesses for the child. Booster seats were not tested in this series.

3. Dynamic sled test
   The Australian automotive CRS were subjected to the requirements of the dynamic FAA aircraft seat test, without the top tether normally required in motor vehicle installation. The CRS were installed on a single aircraft seat row by the lap belt and subjected to a 16G longitudinal test with a velocity change of more than 45 km/h. Forty-two sled tests were conducted involving 11 models of Australian CRS together with tests where dummies were restrained only by the aircraft seat lap belt. The average sled deceleration for the tests was 18.9G and the mean entry velocity was 47.6 km/h.

   The dummies were retained in the CRS in all sled tests. However, all the CRS exhibited significant forward motion, rotation, and rebound motion. This less controlled movement, in comparison with typical automotive testing of CRS, was due to the following:

   • the upper tether could not be installed;
   • the more vertical geometry of the aircraft seat lap belt;
   • the poor compatibility of the aircraft seat lap belt design and the CRS belt paths;
   • the poor interaction of the CRS with the aircraft seat base cushion and frame;
   • a rebound phase that was poorly controlled due to the more extensive forward motion of the CRS.

In tests where the child dummies were restrained only by the aircraft seat lap belt, excessive forward motion of the dummy head and torso occurred due to the lack of upper body restraint and the folding over of the aircraft seat back. This motion is likely to result in impact with the forward seat back.

Infant carrier testing

Four commercially available infant carriers were chosen as representative and were tested to evaluate their performance with respect to retention of the child, forward excursion, and crushing by the adult. Two samples of the standard 'supplementary loop belts' (or belly belts) were included for comparative testing. The testing was conducted in two stages:

1. Turbulence (inversion) test
   The infant carriers were subjected to an inversion test to simulate turbulent conditions. An infant dummy was placed in the carrier and fitted to an adult dummy restrained by a lap belt in an aircraft seat. The tests demonstrated that infants could be adequately restrained when exposed to 1G of vertical acceleration provided the carrier was securely fastened.
2. Sled test
   A lap-belt restrained adult dummy in an aircraft seat, with an infant dummy in a carrier, was subjected to a 9G dynamic sled test. The severity of the pulse was based on the results of a static load test. The commercially available infant carriers tested were not able to restrain infants under crash situations.

The infant carriers could be redesigned to ensure that the infant was restrained in dynamic loads equivalent to the test pulse. If this was done, then an infant carrier would form an alternative to the supplementary loop belt.

Suggested actions

The following suggestions are made based on the findings of this study and the principle that infants and young children are entitled to the same level of protection, both in flight and during emergency landing situations, that is afforded to adults.

1. The use of CRS by infants and young children on flights in Australia is to be encouraged. The CRS used could be either designed specifically for use in aircraft, or, Australian automotive CRS approved for use in aircraft as per suggestion number 3.
2. Testing should be conducted of the system of an upper tether strap for Australian automotive CRS with a non-breakover aircraft seat back, as currently used by Qantas.
3. An approval system should be established to ensure that any Australian automotive CRS to be used in aircraft fits in the aircraft seat and is compatible with the aircraft lap belt. The approval could be in the form of an extra test added to the existing motor vehicle requirements similar to the FAA approval system.
4. Improvements in the crash performance of Australian automotive CRS in aircraft could be achieved by making changes to the seating systems in the aircraft to minimise forward excursion of the CRS in the seat. In order of priority, these suggested improvements are:
   1. Supply a properly mounted upper tether, either as used by Qantas should testing show that this is effective or, by supplying attachment points in the aircraft for CRS use. This could be achieved by restricting CRS use to the seats forward of a bulkhead and by requiring a modified bulkhead design with appropriate attachment points built in for the tether.
   2. Change lap belt geometry (angled at 45 to 60 degrees instead of vertical) for use with a CRS to reduce the initial forward excursion of the base. However, such seat belt geometry may not be appropriate for other users of the belt.
   3. Make changes to the seat base cushion to ensure its retention under CRS dynamic loads.
5. Improvements in the crash protection offered in aircraft to an infant seated on the lap of an adult could be achieved if some seats were fitted with lap sash or harness type seat belts for use by parents holding infants. These seats, possibly adjacent to a bulkhead could be forward- or rearward-facing. Controlling the upper torso motion of the adult has the potential to reduce crash loading to an infant seated on the lap of an adult.
6. If suggestion 5 was implemented, then an approval system for infant carriers (slings) for use in aircraft should be put in place. A sling system could be designed and developed as a replacement for the belly belt. This type of infant carrier could offer improved retention and comfort in turbulent conditions; in conjunction with appropriate seating fitted with a lap/sash or harness for the parent, it could offer improved safety for the infant in a crash.
7. The changes resulting from the incorporation of ISO rigid anchorage systems (ISO-fix or latch systems), which are becoming mandatory worldwide, need to be studied and accommodated for use in aircraft.

Commercial aircraft involved in high altitude operations are generally pressurised to protect the occupants from the adverse effects of hypoxia, decompression illness and hypothermia. Failure of the pressurisation system is a potential threat to flight safety. The purpose of this study was to determine the prevalence and consequences of aircraft decompression events in Australian civil aviation. The aim was to document the prevalence, nature, type, degree and extent of decompression events in Australian civil aviation, as well as the consequences of such events, especially hypoxia and pressure-related medical effects. A search of all incidents and accidents on the ATSB database was made for pressurisation failure events between 1 January 1975 and 31 March 2006. A total of 517 pressurisation failure events were found (two accidents, eight serious incidents and 507 incidents). Only one pressurisation failure event was fatal (0.2 per cent of the total events). Hypoxia was reported in four of the events, and ear barotrauma was also reported in four events, due to the subsequent emergency descent. A total of 10 events involved death, hypoxia or minor injury. Mechanical factors were responsible for the majority of pressurisation system failures (73 per cent). The average rate of cabin pressure change was 1,700 feet per minute, and the average maximum cabin altitude reached was 10,978 feet. In general, the results of this study show that there is a high chance of surviving a pressurisation system failure, provided that the failure is recognised and the corresponding emergency procedures are carried out expeditiously. Aircrew should maintain a high level of vigilance with respect to the potential hazards of cabin pressurisation system failure.

This information paper seeks to provide people without an in-depth knowledge of the practice of 'Human Factors' a general plain English explanation of what Human Factors is, how it has evolved, and how it is applied to aircraft accident and incident safety investigations. The paper also gives a brief explanation of international agreements and Australian law as they apply to aircraft accident and incident investigations. Human Factors, which includes 'Ergonomics' as it is called in some industries, is the practice of applying scientific knowledge from varied, mostly human science disciplines such as Psychology, Medicine, Anthropometrics and Physiology to designing, building, maintaining and managing systems and products. In general use, the application of human science knowledge to systems and products is to provide the best match between the characteristics of people, with the operation of the systems and products they use. The purpose of applied Human Factors is to build better and safer products and systems. In aircraft accident and incident investigation, the specific purpose of Human Factors is to understand in detail how and why people make errors (including slips and lapses) or commit violations that lead to accidents. In the development of aviation, the scope of Human Factors has evolved from focusing predominantly on the interface between the pilot and the aircraft to the broader application of considering all the human activities of the system that is involved in the placing and supporting the pilot in the operation of the aircraft. This broader focus considers not only the actions of the pilot, but also, the cabin crew, the maintenance crews, air traffic controllers, and the management of the organisation that controls the activities of the aircraft. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) must, with as much certainty as possible, be able to determine not only what happened in any given accidents, but more importantly, why it happened. This information is critical to the ATSB role in making safety recommendations aimed at improving transport safety. The role of the ATSB is clearly defined in the Australian Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act) which reflects Australian agreement to the international standards and practices for aircraft accident investigation. Both the TSI Act and international agreements state that the investigation of aircraft accidents by safety agencies such as the ATSB is not an activity for apportioning blame or liability, but rather for the purposes of maintaining or improving safety.

This research paper examined the number and rate of fatal accidents in Australia, Queensland and Far North Queensland involving aircraft with a maximum take-off weight of 11,000 kg or less between 1990 and 2005. The latest year available for exposure data (number of landings, flying hours) was 2004. The purpose of this paper was to examine fatal accidents in Queensland, and specifically Far North Queensland, and provide a context in which to view the results. However, the examination of fatal aircraft accidents from a regional or state perspective raised issues that limited the conclusions that could be drawn from the results. These issues included the generally independent relationship between a fatal accidents contributory factors and the accident location, the availability of suitable activity data and the low number of fatal accidents and fatalities in Australia. Hence, the results described below indicate what happened in a particular area of Australia as opposed to the level of aviation safety. The inter-state analyses showed that between 1990 and 2005, the majority of the 318 fatal accidents involving aircraft with a MTOW of 11,000 kg or less occurred in Queensland (n = 102), NSW/ACT (n = 102) and Victoria (n = 37). In terms of fatalities, the highest number occurred in Queensland, where 225 of the 647 fatalities in Australia occurred. There were 0.9 fatal accidents and 1.9 fatalities per 100,000 landings in Queensland between 1990 and 2004, compared with the national rates of 0.7 and 1.3 respectively. Tasmania recorded the highest fatal accident and fatality rates of 1.8 and 4.1 respectively. However, the significance of these rates should be interpreted with caution due to the low number of fatal accidents and activity in Tasmania. Across Queensland, almost half the 102 fatal accidents occurred in the South region of the state with the remaining fatal accidents almost evenly distributed across the Central (n = 19), North (n = 19) and Far North regions (n = 17). The South region of Queensland recorded the lowest fatal accident rate of all the regions, with 0.7 fatal accidents per 100,000 landings between 1990 and 2004. The Central and North regions both recorded 1.2 fatal accidents per 100,000 landings and Far North Queensland recorded a rate of 1.0. Of the 225 fatalities in Queensland, South Queensland (83) recorded the highest number of fatalities followed by the Far North (64), North (42) and Central (36) regions between 1990 and 2005. However, South Queensland recorded the lowest fatality rate with 1.3 fatalities per 100,000 landings between 1990 and 2004. The Central, North and Far North regions recorded 2.3, 2.6 and 3.0 fatalities per 100,000 landings respectively. The Far North Queensland rate does not include the 15 fatalities that occurred in the Lockhart River accident in 2005, which would further increase the North Queensland fatality rate. A fluctuation in fatality numbers, such as that arising from the Lockhart River accident, highlights the influence a single aircraft accident can have when fatal accident and fatality numbers are relatively low.

How does Australia's aviation safety record compare with that of other Western countries? To answer this, fatal accident and fatality rates for Australia were compared with similar rates for the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, between 1995 and 2004 (the latest year for which comparable data was available). The ATSB aviation accident and incident database was searched to identify all fatal accidents involving Australian civil registered aircraft during this period. The dataset was then matched with comparable datasets for the overseas countries, taking into consideration the variation in operational definitions between the countries. In the period studied, Australia had no high-capacity regular public transport fatal accidents and one low-capacity regular public transport fatal accident. The key findings indicated that the fatal accident rate for Australian air carrier operations, which includes all regular public transport and commercial charter operations, was slightly higher than the rate for the United States for all years, except for 2002 when it was marginally lower, and for 2004, when the rate was zero. The fatal accident rates for the non-general aviation sector for both countries are largely influenced by the commercial charter (Australia) and on-demand (United States) operational categories, which each have a much higher fatal accident rate than scheduled airline services. In Australia, commercial charter operations account for 32 per cent of the total air carrier activity. This has a greater impact on the overall air carrier fatal accident rate compared with the United States, where on-demand operations account for only 15 per cent of the total air carrier activity. If Australia's activity profile mirrored that of the United States, Australia's overall fatal accident rate would fall below that of the United States. Both Australia and the United States recorded a significant downward trend for the general aviation fatal accident rate. For most years, the rate of fatal accidents for all operations in Australia was slightly lower than that for Canada. Australia also recorded a significant decline in the rate of non-public transport fatal accidents during this period compared with the United Kingdom. Australia recorded one low-capacity regular public transport fatal accident, which resulted in eight fatalities, and New Zealand recorded two fatal accidents, which resulted in 10 fatalities. The general aviation fatal accident rate for Australia was lower than the rate recorded for New Zealand, and showed a downward trend. Overall, the findings showed that Australia's fatal accident and fatality rates were mostly similar to the corresponding rates of the other countries examined. Using North America and the United Kingdom to represent world's best practice and as a benchmark of aviation safety, the findings demonstrate that Australia has a good safety record.