The ATSB has changed the way in which aviation statistics are presented. This report represents the first in an ongoing series of reports provided in the new format. The report encompasses a rolling 10-year reporting cycle and replaces all individual spreadsheets previously available.

This report provides aviation accident and incident, collectively termed occurrence, data for the period 1 January 1998 to 30 June 2008. This data was provided to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau by 'responsible persons' as defined in the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003, Part 2.5. The data excludes non-VH registered operations in the sports aviation category, and is current as at 30 June 2008.

The data will be adjusted quarterly to reflect new information received during the reporting period.

In 2007 the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) produced the inaugural edition of Australian Aviation Safety in Review as part of the ATSB's role to enhance public awareness of aviation safety. The Review has been developed to provide a readily accessible analysis of the Australian aviation sector, with a strong focus on safety trends. This publication covers all major categories of aircraft operations, from regular public transport (RPT) to general aviation (GA), and includes some information about sports aviation.

Demographic and activity data on Australian aviation is provided in order to provide a context within which to examine accident trends. Accidents are presented both in terms of the raw number of accidents and as rates per 100,000 hours flown, to enable a comparison between operational categories. The latest year for which flying hours are available is 2006. Accordingly, this edition of the Australian Aviation Safety in Review covers the five calendar years 2002 to 2006, offering insights and information about key trends and emerging issues.

This is the second edition of Australian Aviation Safety in Review and the ATSB intends to update this report in the future as a means of informing both the aviation community and the wider public about Australian aviation accident and activity trends.

The ATSB released this report in June 2008. Since that time, the ATSB has received comments regarding the technical accuracy of the removal of particles from high efficiency particulate air filters (page 6 of the report). This report has been amended accordingly and contains an additional reference for readers on page 10.

Every year, an increasing number of people undertake air travel. Whether for business or pleasure, these journeys should be safe and enjoyable. However, there is continuing public concern about whether, or to what extent, aircraft cabins represent an increased risk of transmission of infectious disease. The purpose of this report was to review the current literature on the potential risk of disease transmission within an aircraft cabin.

The evidence suggests that passengers' health is not greatly at risk through air travel and widespread infections are unlikely. Although there have been cases of infectious disease transmission in aircraft cabins, there is evidence that such transmission was primarily due to the crowding together of a large variety of people in a confined space, not specifically due to aircraft cabin conditions. This suggests that the risk of transmission within an aircraft cabin is no greater than in other crowded and confined spaces, provided circulation and filtration systems are working properly. Perhaps of greater concern is the opportunity for infection to spread in airport terminals, where passengers who are travelling to or from many destinations are gathered together.

The increase in international travel has also heightened the risk for the global spread of infectious diseases. It is not possible to predict when the next pandemic will occur or how long it will last but many health officials think that it's only a matter of time. Although the increase in international air travel could assist with the spread of a future influenza pandemic, the aviation industry will also play a critical role in mitigating the consequences.

For many decades, fibre composites have been replacing traditional aluminium structures in a wide variety of aircraft types. From the first all-composite kit plane released in 1957, composites are widespread today in commercial aircraft and many other aircraft types. This is due to the cost and weight savings that materials such as glass/phenolic and carbon/epoxy offer aircraft manufacturers over aluminium, while maintaining or surpassing its strength and durability.

This study provides an overview of fibre composite use in aircraft and the issues associated with its use, with a focus on aircraft operating in Australia that contain these materials. There are almost 2,000 aircraft on the Australian civil register made of, or containing, fibre composite materials. This includes most of the mainline jet fleet, effectively all sailplanes and gliders, many popular general aviation aircraft, and a third of the growing amateur-built aircraft category.

There is a lot of conflicting or incorrect information in the aviation community about the safety and capability of fibre composite materials. Composite structures behave very differently under normal loads than equivalent metal structures. Fatigue and corrosion have been proven through trials of composite repair patches to be much less prevalent in composites compared with metals. Subsurface damage such as delamination however can go undetected for long periods and result in sudden catastrophic failure. It is important that operators of fibre composite aircraft be aware of correct detection and repair procedures for the unique types of damage that occur to composites.

First responders involved in post-crash cleanup operations have expressed concerns about the long-term effects from exposure to carbon fibres released from burning composites. Fibre dust can pose an inhalation risk similar to asbestos. Released fibres or splinters are needle-sharp, and can cause skin and eye irritation. In the event of a post-crash fire, smoke and toxic gases are also released from decomposing composites, presenting further health risks.

Financial year 2007-08 was in many respects a watershed year. In road safety, the November election of the Rudd Government led to the move of road safety from the ATSB to the Department proper from the end of March 2008 to better align with the new Government's priorities. While I was proud to chair the National Road Safety Strategy Panel from 1999 to 2008, the establishment of a higher level Commonwealth/State body holds the promise of making further gains in reducing the nation's unacceptably high road toll. However, I was personally sad to lose the road safety branch led by Joe Motha and John Goldsworthy and their dedication and professionalism from the ATSB and am grateful for all they did while in the Bureau.

In surface safety investigation, we exceeded our output targets and are well positioned to improve future timeliness of reports. I was particularly pleased with the final Pasha Bulker marine investigation report and the rail investigation report at Ban Ban Springs and associated work on the safety of very large trucks at level crossings. I thank Peter Foley in particular for his leadership in surface safety.

Internationally, we were instrumental in gaining International Maritime Organization approval of a new marine investigation code and the role of Patrick Hornby deserves special commendation. Our contribution to the Government 'ITSAP' assistance program to Indonesia included substantial input led by Alan Stray in the finalisation of the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee investigation reports on fatal 737 accidents involving Garuda and Adam Air. Alan and Kerryn Macaulay also ensured that the ATSB's part of the 2008 ICAO state audit was very positive. A wide range of other ATSB outputs, including aviation research, technical analysis, occurrence notifications, and IT, benefited from Kerryn's leadership.

The greatest organisational pressure during 2007-08 was faced by the aviation investigation branch led by Julian Walsh. It is very difficult to select up to 80 investigations from the more than 8,000 accidents and incidents reported annually and inevitably parties associated with occurrences on the margins may not agree with the selection. There are also competing priorities between investigating fatal general aviation accidents to a level sought by state and territory coroners (and the further resources needed in any ensuing inquests), and doing more investigation of fare-paying passenger regular public transport incidents where there may be more future safety value. There is often a further trade-off between numbers of new investigations and timeliness. I am extremely grateful for Julian's leadership in managing, with his team leaders, in this environment. The 'Miller Review' was a further pressure that required substantial ATSB input. The new Government's announcement, through portfolio Minister the Hon Anthony Albanese, of an aviation Green and White Paper process was seen as a significant opportunity and warmly welcomed by the ATSB.

I also wish to publicly thank the ATSB training manager, Colin McNamara, for volunteering to coordinate the ATSB's central office move from 15 Mort Street to 62 Northbourne Avenue. His planning during 2007-08 led to a smooth move in September 2008.

Kym Bills, Executive Director

The objective of the project is to analyse GPWS warnings in Australia with a view to addressing ICAO steps (e) Investigation of GPWS warnings and (f) Reduction of unwanted warnings, of the circular AN11/1.1.1993/61.

CFIT accidents are the most severe aircraft accidents. These kinds of accidents occur when an otherwise airworthy airplane is inadvertently flown into the ground or water. The number of fatalities per accident is extremely high as compared to any other type of accident. They also generally result in complete destruction of the airplane. If CFIT accidents were to be completely prevented, approximately half of the worldwide fatalities in aircraft accidents would also be prevented. CFIT accidents have a high leverage for safety improvement.

This information bulletin is designed for cabin crew and will supplement your airline's cabin crew emergency procedures manual and should enhance your knowledge about what can occur during an aircraft depressurisation.

Why are aircraft pressurised?

Modern aircraft are designed to fly at high altitudes. For example, a Boeing 747 aircraft normally cruises at an altitude of 28,000 – 35,000 ft. This is because aircraft consume less fuel and fly in relatively smooth air, avoiding bad weather and turbulence. However, the human body is not designed to survive at such high altitudes so the air pressure inside the cabin must be controlled.

The air pressure inside the cabin cannot usually be kept the same as the ambient air pressure at ground level as doing so would put excessive stress on the aircraft fuselage. Therefore, the cabin air pressure altitude (as measured by the equivalent outside altitude) gradually rises from take-off to a maximum of 8,000 ft during the cruise. During the descent to the destination airport, the cabin pressure altitude is gradually reduced to match the ambient air pressure of the airport. Without a fully functional pressurised cabin, passengers and crew need to use oxygen systems at the altitudes typically attained during cruise.  

What is depressurisation?

Depressurisation, also called decompression, is the reduction of atmospheric pressure inside a contained space such as the cabin of a pressurised aircraft.

Each year, 'responsible persons', as defined in the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003, Part 2.5, provide the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) with reports on aviation accidents and incidents, collectively termed occurrences. These reports are used by the ATSB to assist with the independent investigation of occurrences and for identifying safety trends.

This report provides aviation occurrence data for the period 1 January 1999 to 30 June 2009. The data contained herein is dynamic and subject to change pending the provision of new information to the ATSB.

The data will be adjusted biannually to reflect new information received during the reporting period.

This study reviewed safety trends in the Australian aviation charter industry for the period 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2006. It builds on a previous descriptive study that reviewed immediately reportable matters (IRMs) for regular public transport (RPT) aviation operations. Together, charter and RPT operations make up the air transport sector in Australia. Similar to the previous report, a subset of generally more serious IRMs were reviewed including: accidents; violations of controlled airspace (VCA); breakdowns of separation (BOS) and airproxes; fire, smoke, explosions or fumes; crew injury or incapacitation; fuel exhaustion; and uncontained engine failures. Charter flying activity, measured as flying hours and number of charter operators, was also reviewed.

Hours flown in charter operations initially declined over the study period with an increase across 2004 to 2006. However, the number of hours flown in 2006, the latest year reviewed, was not as high as the historical peak in charter hours observed in 1999. The number of charter operators decreased in 2005 and 2006, so fewer operators conducted more of the hours flown in those years.

Total IRMs reported and the IRM categories examined, were generally stable with the exception of accidents. The rate of accidents decreased significantly between 2001 and 2006. Occurrences involving fire, smoke or fumes, and airspace-related occurrences such as VCA and BOS/airprox, remained stable with no statistically significant increase in the rate across 2001 to 2006. The rate of fuel exhaustion occurrences for the period was 0.4 occurrences per 100,000 hours flown. The other IRM categories; crew injury/incapacitation and uncontained engine failures, were rare.

This review provided encouraging data on the charter accident rate, emphasised the stability of the rate of airspace related occurrences, and the rarity of uncontained engine failures and crew incapacitation in charter operations.

This report provides aviation accident and incident, collectively termed occurrence, data for the period 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2008. This data was provided to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau by 'responsible persons' as defined in the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003, Part 2.5. The data excludes non-VH registered operations in the sport aviation category, and is current as at 31 December 2008.

The data will be adjusted quarterly to reflect new information received during the reporting period.

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