A review of existing Commonwealth, State and Territory legislation relating to the transport of dangerous goods by rail, was undertaken. The review provides an overview of the status, coverage and adequacy of existing rail dangerous goods transport legislation. The review also examines options for the development of a nationally uniform regulatory regime for rail dangerous goods transport operations. Issues relating to inter-modal harmony with the road transport sector, and legislative options to achieve uniformity are also discussed. The review concludes that a nationally uniform rail dangerous goods regulatory regime, harmonised with the road transport sector, should be given a high priority due to safety, transport efficiency and economic reasons.

The details of 75 fatal aeroplane accidents were extracted from the BASI database. The largest proportion (36%) of the accidents occurred on private/business flights. The three most frequent first occurrences in accidents were loss of control; collision with terrain (control unknown); and wirestrike. Most accidents had more than one contributing factor. Over 70% of the accidents involved pilot factors. The most common pilot factors related to poor judgement and decision making.

In recent years, BASI has recognised that while pilot factors are of great importance, accidents frequently have their origins in systemic or organisational failings.

With the creation of the ATSB in July 1999, followed by the enactment of the Transport Safety Investigation Act (TSI Act) in 2003, Australia had for the first time a national body with a mandate for professional and independent rail safety investigations.

In its relatively short existence, the ATSB's rail safety unit has had a significant influence on rail safety in Australia. In particular, it has been instrumental in fostering an approach that emphasises the importance of system safety, rather than just focusing on the mistakes of operational personnel.

Other notable achievements of the ATSB in rail investigations have included raising awareness within the rail industry of the importance of modern health and safety standards for operational personnel, and highlighting specific accident types. These include accidents due to poor communications, signalling difficulties, derailments such as through dynamic track and rolling stock interactions, fatigue, and level crossing collisions.

This report tables rail safety occurrence data by state and territory between January 2001 and December 2007. Data is adjusted annually to reflect new information that comes to light during the reporting period. There is a lag period of approximately 3 to 4 months between the end of the reporting period and publication of these data. Previous versions of this publication should be discarded. These data are presented as counts and normalised using kilometres travelled and number of track kilometres. Data presented in this report conforms to Standard No. ON-S1: Occurrence Categories and Definitions. This report excludes tram and light rail or monorail operations.

On 2 June 2008, the ATSB was notified by the South Australian Department for Transport, Energy and Infrastructure that the data originally published in May 2008 for South Australian running line collision with road vehicle incidents prior to 2005 included collisions with trams while running on roadways. These incidents have been removed from Table 13 in this amended version of the report.

This report tables rail safety occurrence data by State and Territory between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2008. Data is adjusted biannually to reflect new information that comes to light during the reporting period. There is a lag period of approximately three to four months between the end of the six-monthly reporting period and publication of this data. The data is presented as counts, and normalised using kilometres travelled and number of track kilometres.

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Aircraft depressurisation events are rare, but they can occur with little or no warning. The faster you put on your oxygen mask, the better the chance that you will stay safe and remain capable of helping children and others. Reading this safety bulletin will help ensure that you can recognise and appropriately react to an aircraft depressurisation if one should occur.

Why are aircraft pressurised?

Modern aircraft are designed to fly at high altitudes. (For example, large jet aircraft normally cruise at an altitude of 28,000 – 35,000 ft). This is because aircraft consume less fuel and can fly in relatively smooth air, avoiding bad weather and turbulence. However, the human body is not designed to survive at such high altitudes so the air pressure inside the cabin needs to be controlled.

The air pressure inside the cabin cannot be kept the same as the ambient air pressure at ground level as doing so would put excessive stress on the aircraft. Therefore, air pressure altitude inside the cabin (as measured by the equivalent outside altitude) gradually rises from take-off to a maximum of 8,000 ft during the cruise. During the descent to the destination airport, the cabin pressure altitude is gradually reduced to match the ambient air pressure of the airport. Without a fully functional pressurised cabin, passengers and crew need to use oxygen systems at the altitudes typically attained during cruise.

What is depressurisation?

Depressurisation, also called decompression, is the reduction of atmospheric pressure inside a contained space such as the cabin of a pressurised aircraft.

This report provides aviation accident and incident, collectively termed occurrence, data for the period 1 January 1998 to 30 September 2008. This data was provided to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau by 'responsible persons' as defined in the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003, Part 2.5. The data excludes non-VH registered operations in the sport aviation category, and is current as at 30 September 2008.

The data will be adjusted quarterly to reflect new information received during the reporting period.

Since 1970 fatalities resulting from accidents between road vehicles and trains at level crossings have reduced by about 70 per cent. However, recently there has been an increasing number of accidents involving heavy road vehicles.

Between April 2006 and December 2007, the ATSB investigated 12 level crossing accidents. Of these 12 accidents, nine have involved heavy road vehicles, four of which have been collisions with long distance passenger trains. In addition, during the same period State authorities have investigated a further three significant accidents between heavy vehicles and passenger trains.

These accidents have cost the lives of 19 people, 13 on board the trains and six occupants of the road vehicles. In addition, over 60 people have been injured and the damage bill is estimated at well over $100 million.

Although fatalities and injuries resulting from accidents at railway level crossings are only a small proportion of the total fatalities and injuries that occur on Australian roads each year, railway level crossing accidents, particularly when they involve heavy road vehicles, have the potential to be catastrophic.

Heavy road vehicles such as road-trains and larger freight trains have become the norm in Australia for the good reason that they are an efficient way to transport goods over long distances between our metropolitan and regional centres. However, with the increased size comes an increased consequence in the event of a level crossing collision. It used to be somewhat rare to hear of a train derailing or of significant casualties on board the train as a result of a collision with a road vehicle. This is not the case today.

Some recent accidents have involved significant loss of life, the worst case being the tragic accident at Kerang when a semi-trailer collided with a Melbourne-bound passenger train on 5 June 2007. Eleven people were killed and 20 injured in this accident.

Another major collision between a B double truck and a freight train occurred at Lismore, Victoria on 25 May 2006. This accident resulted in the death of the truck driver and an estimated damage bill in excess of $30 million.

Maintenance is essential to aviation safety, yet improper maintenance contributes to a significant proportion of aviation accidents and incidents. This is because a small percentage of maintenance tasks are performed incorrectly or are omitted due to human error. Examples include parts installed incorrectly, missing parts, and the omission of necessary checks. While precise statistics are unavailable, it is likely that the great majority of maintenance errors are inconsequential, however, a small proportion present significant safety threats. In comparison to many other threats to aviation safety, the mistakes of maintenance personnel can be more difficult to detect, and have the potential to remain latent, affecting the safe operation of aircraft for longer periods of time.

While acknowledging that maintenance personnel are responsible for their actions, it must also be recognised that, in many cases, the errors of maintenance technicians are the visible manifestation of problems with roots deep in the organisation. A careful examination of each error, combined with a preparedness to inquire into why the error occurred, can help to identify underlying organisational problems. Effective countermeasures to maintenance error require a systemic approach, not only towards issues at the level of the technician and their work environment, but also to organisational factors such as procedures, task scheduling and training. Some countermeasures to the threat of maintenance error are directed at reducing the probability of error through improvements to training, equipment, the work environment and other conditions. A second, complementary, approach is to acknowledge that despite the best efforts, it is not possible to eliminate all maintenance errors, and countermeasures must be put in place to make systems more resilient to those residual maintenance errors that are not prevented.

Aviation organisations are increasingly introducing safety management systems (SMS) that go beyond legal compliance with rules and regulations, and instead emphasise continual improvement through the identification of hazards and the management of risk. The activities involved in managing the risk of maintenance error can be appropriately included within the SMS approach. Key activities include internal incident reporting and investigation systems, human factors awareness for maintenance personnel, and the continual identification and treatment of uncontrolled risks.

On 20 February 2009, this report was updated to include a list of resources and further reading on page 34.

This report analyses birdstrikes reported to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau between 2002 and 2006. In Australia, over the last five years, the number of birdstrike occurrences reported annually to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has risen from approximately 750 in 2002 to 1,200 in 2006. The report includes bird and bat strikes that occurred in Australian territory involving VH- and overseas registered aircraft. It excludes strikes involving non VH-registered Australian aircraft and those involving VH-registered aircraft that occurred overseas. Birdstrikes were analysed by year, month, phase of flight, type of operation, record source, effect on flight, time, aircraft damage, injuries, the nature of occurrence reports, flight disruption, aircraft movements, aircraft size, ingestion, bird size, species, and location. Location data are presented for major aerodromes, General Aviation Airport Procedures aerodromes and regional aerodromes. The report tables birdstrikes and aircraft movements, as well as species struck and species causing damage.

Birdstrike reporting was found to have almost doubled over the reporting period. There have been three injuries, but no fatalities. Around seven per cent of birdstrike events resulted in damage, and double-engine ingestion was recorded for eight of 5103 birdstrike occurrences. Birdstrike events vary by location, and rates of birdstrike events at aerodromes are only indicators of the effectiveness of control measures.