Value of impact-activated ELT

The accident occurred on 18 November 2016, when a Robinson R44 II helicopter was on a charter flight with one pilot and one passenger on board. About 41 km north-west of Mossman, Queensland, while flying above Mount Windsor National Park, the helicopter impacted dense rainforest after one of the main rotor blades struck and separated a section of the tailcone.

The helicopter broke-up into multiple fragments and descended through the forest canopy, and was subject to a post-impact fire.

The Australian Maritime Safety Authority’s Joint Rescue Coordination Centre detected a signal from the helicopter’s emergency locator transmitter (ELT), and the subsequent search and rescue operation was able to locate the wreckage and recover the seriously injured pilot. The passenger was fatally injured.

The activated transmitter led to the rescue of the pilot, who might otherwise have not survived.

The activation of the emergency location transmitter on impact resulted in the discovery of the accident site by the search and rescue helicopter about 1 hour and 48 minutes after initial detection of the ELT signal. The pilot may otherwise have not survived.

The ATSB investigation of the wreckage indicated there was low engine power and rotor speed at the time of the tail strike, which was likely the result of a main rotor blade stall event. The ATSB was unable to determine what precipitated the blade stall event.

The ATSB also found that the helicopter was likely operating in at least moderate turbulent flight conditions, which were not forecast.

It could not be determined if the wind and associated turbulence contributed to the accident, however it is important for pilots to consider the effect of the terrain on the weather forecast, which could result in a helicopter not achieving its predicted performance.

This accident highlights the importance of impact-activated ELTs, and the ATSB advocates for GPS encoded transmitters be used.

Read the final report: In-flight break-up involving a Robinson R44, VH-ZNZ, 41 km north-west of Mossman, Queensland, on 18 November 2016

The ATSB research report A review of the effectiveness of emergency locator transmitters in aviation accidents provides guidance to owners and operators on how they can maximise the reliability and effectiveness of emergency locator transmitters.

A fatal Tiger Moth accident

The ATSB is urging pilots to take time before they take off to consider their options and actions in the event of a partial power loss. Self-briefing on this subject before take-off can reduce the decision-making load if a power loss does occur.

The ATSB’s investigation into the fatal accident of a DH82A Tiger Moth aircraft reflects the challenging situation faced during a partial power loss shortly after take-off.

The accident occurred on 28 December 2015, when the Tiger Moth departed Pimpama Airfield, Queensland to conduct a 20-minute local adventure flight with the pilot and one passenger. About 27 seconds after take-off, the pilot observed a change in engine noise and a reduction in engine RPM. He reported that he retarded and then fully advanced the throttle, but the engine only returned to a similar lower power condition.

The pilot assessed that, as the aircraft still had partial power, he would make a left turn and return to the airfield to land. Following this decision, the aircraft’s performance deteriorated further so he attempted to perform a forced landing in a cleared area. Soon after he started the turn, however, the aircraft stalled and began to enter a left spin. The pilot recalled applying full right rudder in an attempt to stop the spin but the aircraft collided with the ground.

The passenger, who was in the Tiger Moth’s front seat, was fatally injured, while the pilot sustained serious injuries.

A partial power loss presents a more complex scenario than a complete power loss.

The ATSB investigation was unable to determine the reason for the partial power loss, but found that when the aircraft entered the spin, there was insufficient height to recover before ground contact.

A partial power loss presents a more complex scenario than a complete power loss, where a forced landing is inevitable. When faced with a partial power loss, pilots must evaluate whether or not they should try to return to the airfield.

Pilots also have to take into account the possibility that power may continue to deteriorate, may stay at the same reduced level, or may return to normal.”

When an emergency landing is required, flying the aircraft in a controlled manner, wings level and at the recommended glide speed has a better survivability outcome than when control of the aircraft is lost.

The dangers of partial power loss after take-off are the subject of the ATSB’s publication Avoidable Accidents No. 3 - Managing partial power loss after take-off in single-engine aircraft. The booklet provides information and advice regarding this complex scenario.

Read the final report: Loss of control and collision with terrain involving de Havilland DH82A Tiger Moth, VH-UZB, Pimpama Airfield, Queensland, on 28 December 2015

Serious injuries on board a bulk carrier ship

The ATSB is urging crewmembers to adhere to procedures that are created to keep them safe after a serious incident on a bulk carrier ship left two men seriously injured.

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The ATSB has completed the investigation into how two crewmembers on board the bulk carrier Shanghai Spirit suffered serious injuries after a scaffolding tower fell.  

This serious incident occurred on 29 January 2017, when the 140 m geared bulk carrier was anchored in Keppel Bay, about 15 nautical miles north-east of Port Alma Queensland. Deck crewmembers were using a mobile scaffold tower to conduct painting and routine touch-up work in the cargo holds. As the scaffold tower was moved with two unsecured crewmembers still on the upper tiers, it became unbalanced and toppled forward onto the deck. 

On hitting the deck, the scaffold tower came apart and the two crewmembers were entangled in the components. Emergency services were notified of the incident, and a rescue helicopter was dispatched, making two trips out to the vessel to transport the men to hospital. Both men had to remain in hospital for several days before they could be released.

This is not the first such occurrence that the ATSB has investigated.

This serious incident highlights the importance of adhering to procedures that assure safety, as well as the value of effective supervision, with the investigation finding that, contrary to established procedures, two crewmembers remained on an unsecured scaffold tower when it was moved across the floor of a cargo hold.

As a result, the top-heavy and unstable scaffold tower toppled and fell. The crewmembers themselves were unsecured, without the required safety harness and lines.

This is not the first such occurrence that the ATSB has investigated. Similar occurrences in 2003 and 2009 also resulted in serious injuries and, in one instance, the death of a crew member.

Owners, operators and crewmembers are reminded to plan and undertake risk assessments for assigned tasks in order to identify any shortcomings in procedures and required risk-mitigation measures.

Read the final report: Fall from height and serious injuries to crewmembers on board Shanghai Spirit, near Port Alma, Queensland, on 29 January 2017

A fatal collision with terrain

A fatal collision with terrain at a private airfield has highlighted the importance of obtaining all relevant information about local wind conditions before commencing an approach.

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The accident occurred on 20 January 2018, when a Cessna 182 carrying a pilot and passenger was completing the journey from The Vale Airstrip to a private airfield at Tomahawk, Tasmania. The pilot conducted a number of orbits and then approached the runway.

The pilot was unaware, however, that his choice of approach direction exposed the aircraft to a tailwind that significantly increased the groundspeed on final approach. This resulted in insufficient landing distance. Additionally, the final approach was not stable. In combination with the tailwind, this resulted in the aircraft coming in too high and fast.

The aircraft touched down more than halfway along the runway – well beyond the runway threshold – and it bounced several times. In response, the pilot commenced a go-around, but the aircraft collided with a tree beyond the end of the runway, and it impacted the ground. The passenger was fatally injured, and the pilot sustained serious injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged.

The investigation found that the pilot had not identified the direction of the local surface wind, although it was forecast. There was no windsock at the airfield, but there were a number of other means by which the pilot could have assessed the wind prior to commencing the approach.

If a safe landing cannot be assured, the pilot should abort the landing and go-around early.

ATSB Executive Director Transport Safety, Mr Nat Nagy said the investigation found that the selected landing direction meant that the aircraft had an increased tailwind and groundspeed on approach.

“The investigation also found that the final approach path was unstable,” Mr Nagy said. “What that meant was that the aircraft was both high and fast when it was coming into land which meant it landed well down the runway and bounced during that landing.”

The investigation also found that the go-around was initiated at a point from which there was insufficient distance remaining for the aircraft to climb above the tree at the end of the runway in the landing flap configuration and tailwind conditions.  

“The ATSB’s safety message out of this investigation is to remind all pilots that they should determine the local weather conditions, including wind direction and strength, prior to commencing an approach,” Mr Nagy said. “Most importantly, if a safe landing cannot be assured, the pilot should abort the landing and go-around early.”

Read the final report: Collision with terrain involving Cessna 182, VH-TSA, at Tomahawk, Tasmania, on 20 January 2018

Importance of flight helmets

The ATSB is reminding pilots, especially those involved in agricultural operations, to wear a correctly fitting helmet to reduce the risk of more serious head injury.

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On 1 December 2017, the pilot of an M-18A Dromader aircraft was carrying out agricultural spray operations on a paddock north-west of the Emerald Airport in Queensland.

At about 0620, the aircraft was seen completing a spray run and commencing a turn to the right to line up for another spray run. About three quarters through the turn, the aircraft pitched down and the right wing collided with the ground. The aircraft flipped, and come to rest, inverted, facing in the opposite direction about 20-30 m from the initial contact point.

The pilot was able to exit the aircraft and the aircraft was substantially damaged. The ATSB was unable to determine the reason for the aircraft’s downward pitch during the turn. The pilot had no recollection of the accident and no mechanical issue was identified that may have contributed to the accident.

The pilot was wearing his personal flight helmet during the flight.

…pilots involved with agricultural operations are particularly vulnerable to accidents involving major or fatal head injury…

The ATSB found that the pilot’s personnel flight helmet struck the internals of the cockpit and based on the extent of damage to the helmet, it probably prevented the pilot receiving a more serious head injury.

The International Civil Aviation Organization circular Safety in aerial work Part 1. Agricultural Operations(Opens in a new tab/window) discusses the importance of wearing a correctly fitting flight helmet and highlights the pilots involved with agricultural operations are particularly vulnerable to accidents involving major or fatal head injury and the need for a helmet to be part of a pilot’s personal flying equipment.

Read the final report: Collision with terrain involving PZL Warszawa-Okecie M-18A Dromader, VH-WHR, near Emerald Airport, Queensland, on 1 December 2017

Balloon accident injures four

The ATSB is urging pilots to study all available weather information when preparing for a flight. This important safety message comes from the investigation into the hard landing of a balloon that left four people injured.

The accident occurred on 13 January 2018, when the International Balloon Flight Company was conducting scenic charter flights in the Hunter Valley, New South Wales, using four of the operator’s balloons. One of the balloons, a Kavanagh B-425 balloon registered VH-OKX, was operating with 15 passengers and one pilot on-board.

In preparation for the flight, the operator had reviewed several weather websites to obtain weather models for the intended flight. Bureau of Meteorology forecasts were reportedly reviewed, but as the forecasts were for the general area, the operator stated the he preferred local weather models for specific areas. He advised that he knew the upper winds were stronger but was confident with the weather model.

Shortly after take-off, the balloons experienced strong winds and turbulent conditions. As a result, the balloon deviated from its intended flight path and landing area.

The pilots of the four balloons communicated with each other regarding the wind speed and decided to land at the first suitable site. The predetermined landing areas were no longer available to them, as the wind change had taken them further east than they had planned. The area selected was a large open field that was not one of their normal landing areas.

The exposure of the pilots and passengers to hazardous weather conditions during the flight, and the injuries sustained during the landing, were avoidable.

The pilot of VH-OKX re-briefed the passengers for landing and advised them to rest their backs on the basket padding and hold onto the internal grab handles.

In light winds, the basket normally remains upright on landing. However, in winds greater than about 10 kt, layover landings can occur. During these landings, the basket tips onto its side and is dragged until the balloon envelope deflates. The baskets are designed to withstand these type of events and have padding and grab handles on the inside of the basket for occupant protection and support. 

Following this landing, the balloon changed direction slightly and was dragged about 40 m towards a large bush in the centre of the field. The side of the basket struck the bush, bouncing it forcefully back into the air. It subsequently came down on one corner and was dragged a further 50-60 m before coming to rest. Due to the significant ground impact forces, one passenger was seriously injured and three others sustained minor injuries.

The ATSB found that the exposure of the pilots and passengers to hazardous weather conditions during the flight, and the injuries sustained during the landing were avoidable and the use of the aviation-specific products generated by the Bureau of Meteorology would have clearly identified the presence of weather that was hazardous to balloon operations.  

Read the final report: Hard landing involving Kavanagh Balloon, B-425, VH-OKX, 4 km south of Greta, New South Wales, on 13 January 2018

Fatigue experiences and culture in Australian commercial air transport pilots

Why the ATSB did the research

Fatigue is an inevitable risk in aviation. As it cannot be completely eliminated, it must be managed. Data on fatigue and its impact on air transport safety is generally only obtained if there is an incident or accident. As a result, there is generally a lack of understanding of the baseline level of fatigue in day-to-day Australian air transport across operators.

To provide the air transport industry, regulators and policy makers with further insights into industry perceptions of fatigue, the ATSB conducted a survey of commercial pilots engaged in passenger, freight, and aeromedical operations in the second half of 2016. To understand the reported level of fatigue during normal operations, the survey aimed to discover the amount of sleep and rest obtained by pilots, as well as their perceptions on the length of rests and duty times. The survey also aimed to capture data on the organisational aspects of fatigue, including how pilots feel about removing themselves from duty because of fatigue experienced and how they think management perceive this behaviour.

What the ATSB found

The majority of survey respondents reported they were sufficiently well rested by the end of their last duty. Over half of pilots reported having 7 hours of sleep or more in the previous 24 hours, and over 60 per cent reported having more than 14 hours in the previous 48 hours, at the end of the last flight. The survey also found a small but significant number of pilots, 10 per cent and 17 per cent, who reported obtaining less than 5 hours of sleep in the previous 24 hours, or less than 12 hours in the previous 48 hours, respectively, at the end of their last flight. These sleep thresholds have been shown to be associated with impaired performance.

Less sleep on duty was more prevalent for international and domestic jet airline pilots than other air transport pilots (regional, charter and aeromedical). While around one third of the respondents reported obtaining the same amount of sleep at home as they did while on duty, around half of international and domestic pilots reported obtaining less hours of sleep on duty than at home. About 15 per cent of international pilots responded they had no rest during their last international flight.

Domestic pilots completed duties on a stand-by day more often than other pilots. Some believed the rest period between duties was too short, duty periods were too long, and access to food during duties was more difficult compared with other pilots, indicating some pilots within this group have negative perceptions of rest opportunities provided by their employers.

Over 90 per cent of pilots indicated their employer offered a formal process for removing themselves from duty due to fatigue. About one third of respondents indicated they removed themselves from duty at least once in the past year, mostly between one and three days. The pilots who removed themselves from duty generally perceived their actions left a negative impression with management (with the exception of aeromedical pilots) and did not feel comfortable doing so.

Safety message

Responsibility to manage the risk of fatigue lies with both the individual pilot and organisation. It is the individual pilot’s responsibility to use rest periods to obtain adequate sleep and to remove themselves from duty if they feel fatigued. It is important for operators to implement policies to reduce the likelihood of fatigue-related issues through rostering practices and by providing an organisational culture where crew can report fatigue in a supportive environment. The results of this research suggest that operating in circumstances conducive to fatigue is an ongoing challenge for a proportion of Australian air transport pilots.

Publication details

Investigation number AR-2015-095
Publication type Research and Analysis Report
Publication mode Aviation
Publication date 22/01/2019
Subject matter Fatigue

A near collision

The ATSB is reminding pilots of the limitations of the see-and-avoid principle, and encourages the use of airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) technology after two Cessnas were involved in near collision south-west of Darwin Airport on 6 December 2017.

This serious incident occurred, when a Cessna 210 and a Cessna 206, both operating charter flights under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) from Darwin Airport to Port Keats departed in quick succession, and planned to track at 8,500 ft. Air traffic control had advised each pilot of the aircraft’s presence and plans.

The Cessna 210 was the trailing aircraft, but it was travelling faster than the C206. As the two aircraft converged, the pilot of the C210 lost sight of the other aircraft. With the wing structure obscuring the view, the pilot advised air traffic control but took no further action to ensure segregation between the aircraft as they drew nearer.

…the aircraft reportedly came within 5 metres of each other as they passed.

The situation culminated with the aircraft reportedly coming within 5 metres of each other as they passed. Owing to a combination of radar accuracy/resolution and the inaccuracy of the displayed height of the C210, the controller issued a safety alert only after the near collision had already occurred.

While see-and-avoid is the primary means of preventing collisions between VFR aircraft, the limitations of those techniques are well known. Recent advancement of airborne collision avoidance system technologies has made them viable for general aviation aircraft, and they should be considered. They provide valuable information to alert pilots of other aircraft in their proximity and can direct the pilot to take avoiding action, thereby reducing the risk of collision.

This report highlights an ongoing safety issue in aviation. Check out our research report, Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Principle, for more information on this important subject.

Read the final report: Near collision involving Cessna 210, VH-SYT and Cessna 206, VH-HPA, 46 km south-west of Darwin Airport, Northern Territory, on 6 December 2017

Correctly configured

The ATSB’s investigation into the engine failure and forced landing of a Beech Aircraft 76 Duchess highlights the importance of correctly configuring a multi-engine aircraft following an engine failure.

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The accident occurred on 1 June 2018, when the aircraft was conducting a private flight to Cessnock Airport, NSW, with a pilot and two passengers on board.

During the descent at night, the pilot felt the aircraft yaw toward the right and observed the right engine indications showing a loss of power. The pilot immediately commenced the engine failure checklist and configured the aircraft for single-engine flight. As part of that process, the pilot moved the propeller control to the feather position, but did not confirm that the right propeller had actually feathered. The aircraft could not maintain altitude and continued to descend, even after the pilot increased power on the left engine to maximum.

As the aircraft descended through about 5,500 ft, the pilot calculated it would not be able to clear the high terrain between its position and Cessnock. The pilot declared MAYDAY, and after advising air traffic control, elected to conduct a forced landing.

With no intercom-connected headsets to communicate with the passengers, the pilot did not attempt to warn them of the impending forced landing and focused on flying the aircraft.

The aircraft landed in a grassy field with the landing gear retracted. The pilot and passengers were not injured. However, the aircraft was substantially damaged.

The ATSB investigation found that, after the right engine failed, the propeller was not feathered, or did not feather. The increased drag of the unfeathered propeller prevented the aircraft from maintaining altitude, leading to the necessity of a forced landing.

The report highlights the importance of correctly configuring a multi-engine aircraft following an engine failure, and highlights the recurring safety concern of carburettor icing(Opens in a new tab/window).

The report also confirms the importance of conducting pre-flight passenger safety briefings. In this occurrence, the passengers were not briefed before the flight, nor were they warned about the impending forced landing.

Read the final report: Engine failure and forced landing of Beech Aircraft 76, VH-BDS, 49km north-west of Cessnock Airport, New South Wales, on 1 June 2018

Keep your control

The ATSB’s final report into the wirestrike and collision with terrain of a Cessna 172RG at Parafield Airport, South Australia, is an important reminder for pilots to fly in a controlled manner to increase the likelihood of a successful forced landing.

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On 3 July 2018, the Cessna VH-LCZ was on its final descent for landing. As the aircraft passed through 450 ft, its propeller speed reduced to 1,300 rpm. The pilot turned on the carburettor heat and switched the fuel tank selection from BOTH to LEFT. However, the engine did not respond.

Realising that the aircraft could not maintain enough altitude to reach the runway, the pilot started preparing for a forced landing. The pilot turned towards an unlit area ahead of the aircraft, which he thought was an open space, and pitched the nose of the aircraft down to achieve the optimum glide speed.

As he descended, the pilot heard the sounds of the fuselage striking treetops. The aircraft’s nose wheel then struck a power line and it collided with terrain. The pilot received minor injuries.

The ATSB found that the lack of application of carburettor heat throughout the flight, in conjunction with the weather conditions, which were conducive to severe carburettor icing at descent power, made it likely that the engine failed due to carburettor icing.

When faced with conducting a forced landing, flying in a controlled manner-that is wings level and the aircraft positioned to achieve the optimum glide speed- can improve your chances of surviving a forced landing.

The ATSB reminds pilots to maintain awareness of the weather conditions that are conducive to carburettor ice formation and to closely monitor their aircraft performance during times when the risk exists.

When faced with conducting a forced landing, flying in a controlled manner – wings level and the aircraft positioned to achieve the optimum glide speed – can improve the chances of surviving a forced landing.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s carburettor icing probability chart(Opens in a new tab/window) is a useful tool to help determine your icing risk.

Read the final report: Wirestrike and collision with terrain involving Cessna 172RG, VH-LCZ, Parafield Airport, South Australia, on 3 July 2018