Collision between freight train 6PM9 and track mounted excavator

Final report

Summary

At about 1005 on Monday 25 September 2006 a Melbourne bound freight train, 6PM9, travelling from Perth to Melbourne, collided with a track mounted excavator conducting track-work near Inverleigh, Victoria. There were no injuries and only minor damage to both the train and the excavator as a result of the collision.

Occurrence summary

Investigation number 2006008
Occurrence date 25/09/2006
Location Inverleigh
State Victoria
Report release date 26/03/2007
Report status Final
Investigation type Occurrence Investigation
Investigation status Completed
Mode of transport Rail
Rail occurrence category Safe Working Irregularity/Breach
Occurrence class Incident
Highest injury level None

Train details

Train number Train 6PM9
Type of operation Freight Train
Departure point Perth, WA
Destination Melbourne, Vic
Train damage Minor

Derailment of train 3DA2K, near Tarcoola, South Australia, on 1 November 2006

Final report

At about 2123 on 1 November 2006, freight train 3DA2K derailed near Tarcoola, SA. Eight multiple-unit freight wagons were derailed but there were no injuries.

Rail recommendation

[RR20080020]

Occurrence summary

Investigation number 2006012
Occurrence date 01/11/2006
Location Tarcoola
State South Australia
Report release date 29/02/2008
Report status Final
Investigation type Occurrence Investigation
Investigation status Completed
Mode of transport Rail
Rail occurrence category Derailment
Occurrence class Accident
Highest injury level None

Train details

Train number 3DA2K
Type of operation Freight Train
Train damage Substantial

Level crossing collision, near Tailem Bend, South Australia

Final report

Executive summary

At about 1100 on 4 October 2006, a prime-mover/low loader combination collided with train 4MR1 at the Magpie Drive level crossing, Tailem Bend, South Australia. At the time of the accident the crossing was controlled by passive signs comprising 'Stop' sign assemblies (RX-2) and approach warning signs.

The ATSB investigation into the accident concluded that it is likely that the truck did not come to a halt at the 'Stop' sign controlling the crossing. The driver was possibly distracted by the presence of the road-junction ahead and/or a preoccupation with arriving at his destination on time, which may have diverted his attention from the risks associated with negotiating the level crossing. The investigation also found that the viewing angle to the north-west of the crossing was substandard and coupled with restricted visibility from the truck driver's cab would have made it difficult for the truck driver to see the train without coming to a complete halt at the stop sign.

The investigation established that there was nothing the train crew could have done to prevent the accident. As a consequence of the collision the prime mover was heavily damaged and the trailer was written off, the truck driver suffered minor injuries. Damage to the train was confined to structural damage on the drag box and the onboard electrical system of the lead locomotive.

Rail recommendations

RR2007004 | RR2007005 | RR2007006 | RR2007007 | RR2007008 | RR2007009 | RR2007010 | RR2007011 | RR2007012

Occurrence summary

Investigation number 2006009
Occurrence date 04/10/2006
Location Tailem Bend
State South Australia
Report release date 15/06/2007
Report status Final
Investigation type Occurrence Investigation
Investigation status Completed
Mode of transport Rail
Rail occurrence category Level Crossing
Occurrence class Accident
Highest injury level Minor

Train details

Train number Train 4MR1
Type of operation Ballast Train
Train damage Minor

Derailment of Train 2CM3, near Seymour, Victoria, on 12 September 2006

Final report

Executive summary

At approximately 0523 on 12 September 2006, the crew of the Pacific National hauled Patrick PortLink freight train number 2CM3 advised train control that their train had parted and the lead bogie of freight wagon CQBY 0130N had derailed.

There were no injuries as a result of the train parting or derailment and only minor damage to the track and rolling stock.

The investigation found that the draft key on the 'A' end of wagon CQBY 0118A had dislodged from the coupler shank allowing the coupler to withdraw from the draft pocket and fall onto the track. The dislodged coupler bounced under the train and derailed the wheel set of a trailing wagon.

Rectification work by the wagon owner to prevent a recurrence of this event includes the fitting of new drop forged steel retainer and locking pins to all wagons in the CQBY fleet.

Occurrence summary

Investigation number 2006007
Occurrence date 12/09/2006
Location Seymour
State Victoria
Report release date 21/02/2008
Report status Final
Investigation type Occurrence Investigation
Investigation status Completed
Mode of transport Rail
Rail occurrence category Derailment
Occurrence class Accident
Highest injury level None

Train details

Train number 2CM3
Type of operation Freight Train
Train damage Minor

Collision between rigid tipper truck/quad axle trailer and freight train 4AM3, Lismore, Victoria, on 25 May 2006

Preliminary report

Preliminary report released 14 July 2006

The information contained in this Preliminary report is released in accordance with section 25 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 and is derived from the ongoing investigation of the occurrence. Readers are cautioned that new evidence will become available as the investigation progresses that will enhance the ATSB's understanding of the accident as outlined in this Preliminary report. As such, no analysis or findings are included in this report.

At about 0714 on 25 May 2006 a Kenworth K100E truck and dog trailer, loaded with 30 tonnes of citrus pulp, collided with the second locomotive of freight train 4AM3 at the Lismore to Skipton Road level crossing, Lismore, Victoria.

As a consequence of this collision the second and third locomotives, and 41 of the trains 64 wagons were derailed. The driver of the truck was fatally injured in the collision.

Recommendation RR20060034

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Australian Rail Track Corporation and VicRoads review the level of short term protection provided3 at the Lismore to Skipton Road level crossing, particularly noting the limited visibility of approaching trains to motorists at or approaching this crossing.

Final report

Executive Summary

At 0714:251 on Thursday 25 May 2006, a southbound Kenworth 1995 K100E rigid tipper truck and quad axle trailer collided with an eastbound freight train at the Lismore Skipton Road level crossing in southern Victoria. The 34 year old male driver of the truck was fatally injured in the accident. The two train crew were uninjured. The level crossing is ‘passive’; protected by advance warning signs, give way signs and pavement markings only. The speed limit for road traffic over the level crossing is 100 km/h. The line speed limit for trains at the crossing is 115 km/h but the train, in this instance, was limited to 110km/h.

Train 4AM3 was being hauled by three locomotives, was 1356 m long, weighed 4382 tonnes and was travelling at 112 km/h at the time of the collision. The truck and quad axle trailer combination was loaded with citrus pulp, was 19 m long and weighed 48 tonnes.

The truck collided with the side of the second locomotive, adjacent to the trailing bogie. The estimated speed of the truck was between 53 and 78 km/h at impact and more likely to be toward the upper end of this range. The force of the impact was sufficient to derail this locomotive and the following locomotive. Forty-one of the train’s 64 wagons then derailed as a result. This portion of the train (844.8 m long) was compressed into an area 128 m long, about 45 m wide and up to 12 m high.

At the time of the accident the area surrounding the level crossing was enveloped in very heavy fog. The evidence suggests that visibility was as low as 20 m and certainly no greater than 50 m.

The locomotive headlight was illuminated and the horn was sounded twice before impact. Testing established that the headlight was as specified and aligned correctly and that the sound levels of the horn were within expected levels. Although the train was travelling at 2 km/h over its permitted speed, it was still 3 km/h under the permitted track speed.

The emergency response was both timely and adequately resourced and site management processes were appropriate. The magnitude of the recovery task was such that the track was not re-opened until 0045 on Wednesday 31 May, nearly six days after the occurrence.

Neither the deceased truck driver nor the company that he worked for had any history in terms of traffic offences or other non-compliances that would indicate an increased risk for this type of accident. Notwithstanding this, the investigation found that that the truck was not being driven in a manner consistent with the prevailing conditions of reduced visibility or at a speed that would have allowed the truck to be stopped short of any hazard on the road.

The investigation found that the Lismore Skipton Road level crossing did not comply fully with the relevant standards relating to road signage or the guidelines for sighting distances for passive level crossings controlled by give way signs. However, it is unlikely that these factors contributed to the accident.

At the time of the accident the processes for calculating sighting distances at passive level crossings were contained in State warrants and varied considerably across jurisdictions. The investigation noted that the Australian Standard Manual of uniform traffic devices, 1742(7) was under review and that the draft contained several initiatives aimed at improving warnings for motorists at active level crossings and a consolidation of sighting distance formulas for passive level crossings.

The investigation noted that in times of reduced visibility it may not be possible for a motorist to safely negotiate a passive level crossing based on sighting distances alone. This is regardless of whether give way or stop control is used. The investigation also noted that the Lismore Skipton Road level crossing has been scheduled by the Victorian Department of Infrastructure for upgrade from passive to active protection in March 2007 and that the Australian Transport Council has recently approved a level crossing strategy aimed at modifying road user behaviour to improve railway level crossing safety.

Safety actions recommended, as a result of this investigation, relate to:

  • audits aimed at ensuring compliance with the relevant level crossing signage standards and sighting guidelines across Victoria
  • consideration of measures to promote the need for vehicle drivers to drive according to the environmental conditions and recognise the increased risk at passive level crossings in times of reduced visibility and,
  • ensuring the risks posed by the operation of B-double/higher mass limit trucks are evaluated by both road and rail authorities

Occurrence summary

Investigation number 2006004
Occurrence date 25/05/2006
Location Lismore
State Victoria
Report release date 07/02/2007
Report status Final
Investigation type Occurrence Investigation
Investigation status Completed
Mode of transport Rail
Rail occurrence category Level Crossing
Occurrence class Accident
Highest injury level Fatal

Train details

Train number 4AM3
Type of operation Freight Train
Departure point Adelaide
Destination Melbourne
Train damage Substantial

Derailment of XPT Passenger Train ST22, Harden, New South Wales, on 9 February 2006

Final report

Executive summary

On Thursday 9 February 2006 at about 0351 an XPT passenger train travelling from Melbourne to Sydney derailed near Harden in New South Wales. An inspection by the driver found one wheel on the trailing bogie of the leading power car had derailed. During recovery operations the axle of the derailed wheel was found to have completely sheared with a crack in the radius relief area between the gear and wheel seats.

The ATSB's investigation concluded that impacts from track ballast from unknown location(s) had led to the formation of the cracks in the axles. The investigation also concluded that routine testing of the axles carried out by the operator's maintenance contractor, using magnetic particle inspection (MPI), was ineffective and resulted in the fatigue cracks going undetected for a considerable period of time.

A number of safety actions have been undertaken by RailCorp and the Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator of New South Wales which include measures aimed at the early detection and prevention of axle fatigue cracks in XPT and other diesel fleet rail vehicles to limit the risk of further axle failures. Additionally, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau has issued a safety advisory notice to all rail vehicle operators in Australia that they should consider the risks associated with axle failures as a result of fatigue cracks initiated by ballast strikes and review their maintenance practices accordingly.

Occurrence summary

Investigation number 2006002
Occurrence date 09/02/2006
Location Harden
State New South Wales
Report release date 28/06/2007
Report status Final
Investigation type Occurrence Investigation
Investigation status Completed
Mode of transport Rail
Rail occurrence category Derailment
Occurrence class Accident
Highest injury level None

Train details

Train number ST22
Type of operation Passenger
Departure point Melbourne
Destination Sydney
Train damage Minor

Signal 161 Passed at Danger, Trans Adelaide Passenger Train H307, Adelaide, South Australia, on 28 March 2006

Final report

Executive summary

At 0701 on 28 March 2006, TransAdelaide passenger train H307 passed signal 161 at Adelaide Railway Station while it was displaying a red stop aspect. Train H307 then travelled the wrong direction along the Up track for approximately two minutes before stopping about 600 m past signal 161.

At the same time, Great Southern Railway Indian Pacific passenger train (1PA8) was approaching Torrens Junction where TransAdelaide's broad gauge line crosses the standard gauge Defined Interstate Rail Network (DIRN). The investigation found that the signalling system could not provide an appropriate indication to both trains and thus neither train driver was aware of the potential for a collision. Had train H307 continued on for a further 1000 m the two trains may have collided.

The investigation also concluded that driver distraction, conflicting signal indications (hand and fixed), and inexperience contributed to the occurrence

Rail Recommendations

[ RR20070032 ] [ RR20070033 ]

Occurrence summary

Investigation number 2006003
Occurrence date 28/03/2006
Location Adelaide Railway Station
State South Australia
Report release date 20/12/2007
Report status Final
Investigation type Occurrence Investigation
Investigation status Completed
Mode of transport Rail
Rail occurrence category SPAD (signal passed at danger)
Occurrence class Incident
Highest injury level None

Train details

Train number H307
Type of operation Scheduled passenger service
Departure point Adelaide
Destination Outer Harbor
Train damage Nil

Collision between freight train 4AM3 and an 'elevated platform vehicle', at North Geelong, Victoria, on 26 October 2006

Final report

Executive summary

At approximately 0832 on 26 October 2006 an Adelaide to Melbourne bound Pacific National freight train collided with an elevated platform vehicle containing a worker performing maintenance on the Separation Street overpass at North Geelong in Victoria. The worker was inside the elevated platform vehicle basket which was positioned underneath the overpass and directly above the rail line when it was struck by the train. The worker was seriously injured as a result of the collision.

At the time of the collision the North Geelong site was under the operational control of the North Geelong 'C' signal box with site protection being provided by a qualified track protector.

The investigation found that a deviation from the formally documented and agreed safety plan, combined with a subsequent misinterpretation and the miscommunication of the relevant safe working rules and procedures between operational staff, were the primary factors contributing to the collision.

Rail Recommendations

[RR20080021] [RR20080022] [RR20080023] [RR20080024] [RR20080025]

Occurrence summary

Investigation number 20060011
Occurrence date 26/10/2006
Location Separation St, Geelong
Report release date 08/05/2008
Report status Final
Investigation type Occurrence Investigation
Investigation status Completed
Mode of transport Rail
Rail occurrence category Collision
Occurrence class Accident
Highest injury level Serious

Train details

Train number 4AM3
Type of operation Freight Train
Departure point Adelaide, SA
Destination Melbourne, Vic
Train damage Minor

Level crossing collision between The Ghan Passenger Train (1AD8) and a Road-Train Truck, Ban Ban Springs, Northern Territory, on 12 December 2006

Final report

Executive summary

At approximately 1356 on 12 December 2006, a double trailer road-train truck drove into the path of The Ghan passenger train (1AD8) at the Fountain Head Road level crossing, Ban Ban Springs, Northern Territory. As a consequence, two locomotives, a wagon used for carrying passengers' private vehicles and nine passenger carriages derailed. There were no fatalities, however, the road-train driver and a female passenger were hospitalised and several other passengers and crew sustained minor injuries.

The investigation concluded that the truck was driven through the 'Stop' sign at the level crossing at a speed of about 50 km/h. The driver of the truck traversed the level crossing many times during the course of his 'working day' and had been in the habit of slowing rather than stopping at the level crossing 'Stop' sign. Factors influencing this act were the manner in which the task was normally performed, the expectation that a train would not be present and the operational constraints of road-train vehicles. It was also found that the ability of the road-train truck driver to hear the first two soundings of the train horn may have been compromised by his severe bilateral hearing loss.

The report identifies a number of safety issues and issues recommendations and safety advisory notices with the aim of preventing similar events.

Rail recommendations

[RR20080003] [RR20080004] [RR20080005] [RR20080006] [RR20080007] [RR20080008] [RR20080009] [RR20080010] [RR20080011] [RR20080012]

Rail Safety Advisory Notices

[RS20070001]

Occurrence summary

Investigation number 20060015
Occurrence date 12/12/2006
Location Ban Ban Springs Station
State Northern Territory
Report release date 13/02/2008
Report status Final
Investigation type Occurrence Investigation
Investigation status Completed
Mode of transport Rail
Rail occurrence category Collision
Occurrence class Accident
Highest injury level Serious

Train details

Train number 1AD8
Type of operation Passenger Train
Departure point NA
Destination NA
Train damage Substantial

Level crossing Collision, Elizabeth River, Northern Territory, on 20 October 2006

Final report

At about 1205 (CST) on 20 October 2006, a double trailer road-train truck drove into the path of a south bound freight train (6DA2) at a level crossing near the Elizabeth River Bridge, NT. The locomotive drivers sustained minor injuries while the truck driver was uninjured.

Occurrence summary

Investigation number 20060010
Occurrence date 20/10/2006
Location Elizabeth River
State Northern Territory
Report release date 28/06/2007
Report status Final
Investigation type Occurrence Investigation
Investigation status Completed
Mode of transport Rail
Rail occurrence category Collision
Occurrence class Accident
Highest injury level Minor

Train details

Train number 6DA2
Type of operation Freight Train
Departure point Berrimah terminal, Darwin
Destination Adelaide
Train damage Substantial