Executive summary

At about 1115 on 31 March 2008, a fire started in the engine room of the container ship MSC Lugano. The chief engineer operated the quick closing valves and the remote stops for the engine room fans and oil pumps. The crew closed the dampers for the engine room fans and the funnel vents and rigged fire hoses to boundary cool the engine room casing and funnel.

After about 50 minutes, the fire cut the electrical power supply to the emergency fire pump and water ceased to flow from the fire hoses. The master ordered the crew to close the engine room skylight and then muster. He then instructed the chief engineer to activate the ship's fixed fire extinguishing system.

At 1220, the master reported the fire to the Australian Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC).

By 1600, the crew had determined that the fire was extinguished. The engine room was ventilated, and the crew entered to assess the damage. They were able to re-start many of the engine room systems and restore electrical power, but they could not re-start the main engine. The ship was now about 90 miles south of Esperance, Western Australia and drifting towards the Archipelago of the Recherche.

The ship's owners entered into an agreement to tow the ship to Fremantle and, on 1 April, the tug Wambiri departed from Fremantle, Western Australia. Three other tugs, two based in Esperance and one that was in the vicinity towing a barge, were directed by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) to assist the ship until Wambiri arrived.

By 1245 on 5 April, Wambiri had rendezvoused with MSC Lugano and taken the ship in tow. The tow continued without incident and at 1506 on 13 April, the disabled ship berthed in Fremantle.

The report identifies a number of safety issues and advises of safety actions already taken and those recommended by the ATSB.

Executive summary

At 0541 on 9 May 2008, the Antigua and Barbuda registered container ship Francoise Gilot grounded while transiting the South Channel, Port Phillip, Victoria. The ship had sailed from Melbourne earlier that morning and was departing Port Phillip bound for Sydney.

The ship grounded between beacons 18 and 20 of the South Channel during a starboard turn around the Hovell Pile beacon at the entrance to the Channel. The ship was refloated at 0755 using its main engine following a water ballast transfer operation and it then returned to Melbourne where an underwater inspection of its hull revealed that it had not been damaged during the grounding.

The ATSB investigation found that the helmsman had put the helm to starboard instead of port during the turn around the Hovell Pile beacon and that he was probably affected by fatigue at the time. The investigation also found that neither the Port Phillip pilot nor the ship's master discussed the allocation of roles and responsibilities of the bridge team before the ship left the berth. Consequently, no one was actively monitoring the helmsman's actions when he was executing the pilot's orders and as a result, the helmsman's error was not detected until it was too late to avoid the grounding.

The report identifies a number of safety issues and the ATSB acknowledges the safety actions which have been taken by Reederei Alnwick Harmstorf and the Port Phillip Sea Pilots to address them. The ATSB makes two recommendations associated with two outstanding safety issues.

Executive summary

At about 1817 on 23 February 2008, the Marshall Islands registered passenger ship Van Gogh grounded briefly on the western shore of the Mersey River during a departure from Devonport, Tasmania. The ship was under the conduct of a harbour pilot who had taken over the conduct from the master about five minutes before, after the master had manoeuvred the ship off the berth.

As the ship left the berth, it began to be set towards the bulk carrier Goliath berthed ahead. Van Gogh was under the influence of the ebb tide and fresh water that was flowing from the Mersey River's catchment following heavy rain in the area in the previous 24 hours.

Van Gogh was difficult to manoeuvre at low speed because of its twin propellers and single rudder configuration. This, combined with the strong ebb tide and fresh water outflow in the river at the time of departure, resulted in there being insufficient water flow over its rudder to enable the pilot to manoeuvre the ship as he intended. In addition, the master did not inform the pilot that the crew would be using the ship's engines independently during turns in the river. This resulted in the pilot being concerned that his orders were being countermanded because he saw that the engine telegraph levers were not as he had ordered.

Following the grounding, the pilot successfully manoeuvred the ship back into the channel and the ship departed the port without further incident. There was no damage to the ship and no pollution resulted.

The report identifies a number of safety issues and acknowledges the safety actions which have been taken by Club Cruise International and the Tasmanian Ports Corporation to address them.

Executive summary

In September 2007, the crew of the Sierra Leone registered tanker Breakthrough joined the ship in China to prepare it for delivery to its new Nigerian owner. On 7 January 2008, the ship sailed from China.

On 20 January, the main engine began operating poorly after it was changed over from diesel to intermediate fuel oil because the fuel had not been effectively heated or purified. After drifting in the Indian Ocean for 21 days, the ship made its way to the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. At 1350 on 11 February, Breakthrough anchored off Direction Island in the Cocos Island group.

On 12 February, the weather deteriorated significantly, and the ship started to drag its anchor. The master ordered a second anchor let go and ran the main engine at dead slow ahead to ease the load on the anchor cables. The main engine could not provide sufficient thrust to prevent the anchors from dragging and, at 1545, Breakthrough's stern grounded, damaging the steering gear. On 13 February, the ship was successfully refloated and on 28 February, it was towed to Singapore for repairs.

The ATSB investigation found that the ship's owner did not implement an effective safety management system and did not provide sufficient support to the ship's master as required by the International Safety Management Code. The flag State's statutory certificates were issued by a management company solely with the purpose of allowing the ship to sail on an international voyage and did not appropriately represent the ship's ownership, operation or management. The ATSB also found that the ship's officers did not have adequate knowledge and experience to undertake the delivery voyage and did not effectively utilise their time before leaving China to familiarise themselves with the ship and its systems. The ATSB has issued one safety recommendation and three safety advisory notices.

Abstract

At 1230 on 9 February 2008, the Chinese registered bulk carrier Jin Hui berthed in Geelong, Australia. The ship's master had previously informed Australian authorities that there had been a fire in the ship's number three cargo hold. As a result, the emergency services were on standby when the ship arrived in Geelong.

When the number three cargo hold was opened, it was apparent that only two small areas of the cargo (palm kernel expeller) had been affected. These small areas of cargo were still smouldering, so they were sprayed with water and then discharged onto the wharf.

At 1530, the local fire authority declared the fire extinguished. The ship's normal cargo discharge was then allowed to begin.

Executive summary

At about 2102 on 21 January 2008, the Australian fishing vessel Allena collided with Northern Fortune, an Antigua and Barbuda registered container ship, off the Queensland coast. The fishing vessel's bow was badly damaged, but the crew were able to control the ingress of water and return the vessel to Bowen, Queensland, its home port.

The investigation determined that the lookout on board both Allena and Northern Fortune was ineffective and that neither vessel's watch keeper saw the other vessel in sufficient time to avoid the collision.

Additionally, the fishing vessel was not required to be fitted with an Automatic Information System (AIS) unit or a radar reflector and, consequently, it may have been difficult for the ship's third mate to detect the fishing vessel electronically.

After the collision, Northern Fortune's third mate did not stop to render assistance or ensure that the fishing vessel and its crew were safe because he claimed that he believed a collision had not occurred, only a close quarters passing.

The ATSB investigation report also found that the Queensland regulations for fishing vessel certificates of competency are ambiguous and are not consistent with current national standards. The regulations allowed Allen's skipper to operate the vessel up to 200 miles from the coast without appropriate training in navigation or the application of the collision regulations.

The ATSB has issued one recommendation and two safety advisory notices to address these safety issues.

Executive summary

At approximately 1417 on 13 December 2007 a tandem tip truck loaded with a 'bobcat' excavator drove into the side of the Indian Pacific passenger train (4SA8) at the passively controlled level crossing of Moloney Road near Virginia in SA. As a result of the collision, the truck driver was seriously injured. The locomotive drivers were shaken but not hurt. There were no injuries to passengers or the train's hospitality staff.

The investigation concluded that the accident occurred because the driver of the truck entered the level crossing while a train was on the crossing and that he did not come to a halt at the level crossing 'Stop' sign. It is likely that the truck driver was not expecting a train at the level crossing and accordingly did not stop.

Safety actions recommended as a result of the investigation include a review of the Australian Level Crossing Assessment Model (ALCAM) with respect to assessing the risks associated with level crossings having a history of incidents/accidents and measures to reduce the road/rail interface risk at the Moloney Road level crossing.

Rail Safety Recommendations [ RR20080026 ] [ RR20080027 ] [ RR20080028 ]

Abstract

At approximately 0935 on 16 November 2007 a small passenger van drove into the path of a Patrick Portlink freight train (6117) at the Moloney Road passive level crossing (Figure 1) near Virginia in SA. As a result of the collision, the two occupants in the van were fatally injured. The locomotive crew were shaken but not hurt. The train sustained minor damage but the van was destroyed.

Executive summary

At about 0400 on 17 August 2007, the 48th wagon of Australian Railroad Group iron ore train 6413 derailed on a right-hand curve in a cutting 595.9 km from Perth in the Stewart to Bonnie Vale section of the Defined Interstate Rail Network in Western Australia. Thirty one wagons in total were derailed and 25 of those wagons were seriously damaged. There were no injuries. The track sustained significant damage and was closed for 4 days.

Train 6413 consisted of three locomotives and 126 wagons loaded with iron ore. It was travelling from Koolyanobbing to the port of Esperance, via Kalgoorlie. Rail traffic in this area includes fast passenger trains, general interstate freight and iron ore trains.

Train 6413 had been authorised by train control to pass a signal that had failed to clear following the passage of the previous train. Both the train controller and the train crew were aware that one possible cause of the signal failure was a broken rail.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) investigation determined that the derailment occurred when a piece of rail containing a large, previously undetected vertical split head defect, disintegrated under train 6413. A rail insert that had recently been used to replace a section of defective rail found during a routine track inspection probably contained the defect. Alternatively, it was possible, but less likely, that the parent rail on either side of the insert may have contained an undetected vertical split head.

As a result of the investigation, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau identified a number of safety issues concerning train operations, record keeping and rail replacement practices.

Executive summary

At about 1135 on Monday 6 August 2007, a loaded sewage truck drove into the path of the south-bound passenger train, The Ghan (7DA8), at the Murrow Farm level crossing near Two Wells, South Australia. The driver of the truck was seriously injured and the truck was destroyed. The train's lead locomotive was severely damaged in the collision but the train driver was uninjured. Two minor injuries were recorded by passengers on the train and there was minor damage to the track.

The investigation found that there was insufficient sighting distance for the truck driver to see The Ghan approaching from the north before he crossed the railway track. There was vegetation growing adjacent to the rail track which impeded the sighting for the driver of the truck and the maintenance practices for the clearing of vegetation at the Murrow Farm level crossing were inadequate to maintain effective sighting of trains. Programmed works that had identified the vegetation as a sighting hazard which was to be rectified within 28 days, had not been carried out in accordance with the relevant maintenance specification. The maintenance priority had been revised from 28 days to 180 days without a reassessment of the sighting hazard.

As a result of this investigation, the ATSB has identified safety issues primarily related to maintenance practices for the control of vegetation in the rail corridor which require action to reduce the risk of future collisions at this and other level crossings. The ATSB also acknowledges safety action already undertaken by the Australian Rail Track Corporation in response to identified safety issues.

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