While enroute between Corryong and Bathurst, the pilot of VH-ICS called Canberra Approach and requested a clearance to enter Canberra controlled airspace. An attempt was made by air traffic control to identify the aircraft but due to poor radar coverage, in the area and the aircraft's altitude, this could not be achieved. In response the pilot was instructed to remain outside controlled airspace.

Subsequently a brief radar return from VH-ICS was observed in the Wagga controlled airspace, about 20NM west of the planned track of the aircraft. There was inadequate radar contact to allow radar separation standards to be applied. The aircraft track conflicted with that of VH-AWW which was tracking in the opposite direction.

The pilot of VH-ICS said, that in hindsight, he should have planned a route that had more navigational aids to assist with track maintenance. He was tracking on a back bearing from the Corryong NDB and was unable to obtain a distance from the Canberra international DME. Hence, he was unable to accurately determine his position and ascertain that he was off the planned track.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The route planning by the pilot was poor.

2. The aircraft was not equipped with a domestic DME.

3. The enroute track maintenance by the pilot was inadequate.

The helicopter was engaged in a search for a missing aircraft. The search area was in a valley bounded by sheer cliffs reaching to heights of 2,000 ft above the valley floor. Whilst the helicopter was flying at a height of 1,000 ft about 150 metres out from a cliff face, the main rotor struck and severed a power transmission spur line. The helicopter remained controllable, and the pilot was able to land in a clearing about two kilometres away for damage assessment.

The pilot reported that he had not seen the cable, which stretched in a single span from the cliff top to the valley floor, nor had he experienced any handling difficulties with the helicopter after the collision.

The pilot was taxiing towards his parking spot along a narrow taxiway. He noticed a fuel tanker parked on the edge of the taxiway and moved to one side of the taxiway to avoid contact. Unfortunately, he did not allow sufficient room and the right wing, then the nose, struck the tanker.

The pilot reported that on lift off, the helicopter rolled to the left. Right cyclic control was applied but did not appear to have any effect. The helicopter was landed immediately but contacted the ground heavily. The pilot later said that he must have pushed the left pedal during the landing, which spun the helicopter through 90 degrees, causing most of the damage. He also thought the cyclic friction control may not have been fully released before flight.

The aircraft was taxiing towards Gate 53 at Perth International Terminal. The visual docking guidance system in use at Gate 53 consists of a centreline guidance light and two side marker stop boards. The rear side marker board is for DC10 type aircraft and aircraft using a middle or second entrance door. The side marker board closer to the aerobridge entrance is for most aircraft using a forward entrance door, including the A310. The pilots did not see the side marker board adjacent to the aerobridge, as the aerobridge weather shield almost completely obscured it, and were taxiing towards the second board when the top of the left engine collided with the aerobridge structure.

The pilots were not familiar with Perth Airport and relied on information supplied in the Jeppesen documentation for their pre-arrival briefing. Investigation revealed that Jeppesen use information from the Australian Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP), Aerodromes (AGA) section to provide briefing material in their documentation regarding visual docking guidance systems.

The information available to the pilots about the side marker boards was not clear and did not indicate that there may be more than one board on the gate they were to use.

Further investigation revealed that there are a number of different visual docking guidance systems in use at Federal Airports Corporation (FAC) airports and that operational use of these systems is not clearly explained in an easily accessible format in the AIP and Jeppesen documents.

Significant factors

The following factors are considered relevant to the development of the incident.

1. The information presented in the Jeppesen documentation about the side marker boards was not clear and did not indicate that on the selected gate there may be more than one marker board; and
2. The FAC airports have a number of different visual docking guidance systems in service. Instructions for use of the differing systems are not clear, nor are they presented in an easily accessible format in the AIP and Jeppesen documents.

SAFETY ACTION

From this investigation the Bureau issues the following Safety Advisory Notice: SAN 960061

The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation suggests that the Federal Airports Corporation:

1. reviews the positioning of side marker boards at gates used by international operators. The review should ensure that the boards are sufficiently visible to the pilot to permit full understanding before the aircraft moves into the parking position; and
2. reviews the number of different types of visual docking guidance systems in use at both domestic and international terminals under its jurisdiction. The review should aim to reduce the number of different systems in use and to standardise the presentation of the system to users.

The exercise for the student was to be an engine failure on take-off before the decision speed of 88 knots. On take off the engine was failed at 80 knots. The student re-acted incorrectly and lifted the aircraft off, instead of closing the throttles and rejecting the take-off. The instructor took control, closed the throttles and landed the aircraft on the runway. As the aircraft slowed an uncontrollable swing right developed and the aircraft came to a stop to the right of the runway.

Inspection of the aircraft showed that the right main gear leg had collapsed. The upper section of the gear leg had split and allowed the lower section to detach. The damage was consistent with a heavy touch down on the right gear leg.

One observer reported that the aircraft appeared to descend rapidly to the runway from a height of about 30 feet, touching down on the right gear leg first.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Unexpected reaction by the pilot under check in lifting the aircraft off when the speed was below the decision speed.

2. Heavy touch down on right main gear leg, following instructor actions when he took over at a low airspeed.

At about 120 kts on the take-off roll, the crew heard a loud bang followed by a series of lesser bangs, accompanied by significant vibration. The take-off was rejected, and the aircraft was brought to a stop without further incident.

The initial investigation found substantial internal damage to the number two engine. Later specialist strip examination of the engine determined that a single stage nine blade from the high-pressure compressor had failed due to progress of high cycle fatigue cracking. It was found that the cracking had propagated from an impact mark at the trailing edge of the blade, close to the root. The specialist report considers that this mark, caused by impact from a foreign object, was the root cause of the failure event.

The investigation found that there were no operational aspects associated with the occurrence.

VH-UZP departed Townsville on the Townsville-Collinsville track but was then cleared to track direct to Mackay. VH-JJY, a faster aircraft, departed Townsville six minutes later and climbed initially on the Townsville-Bowen track before also being given a direct track to Mackay. The aircraft were thus on converging tracks.

VH-JJY was subsequently cleared to divert up to 10 NM right of track to avoid thunderstorm cells. This brought the aircraft into potential conflict with VH-UZP, so the controller instituted a stepped climb procedure between the two aircraft. He then noted that VH-JJY was not diverting far off track so he cleared that aircraft to climb through the level of VH-UZP which by this time was level at FL210. The controller instructed VH-JJY to expedite climb to FL 220. However, VH-JJY then diverted further right of track (but still within 10 NM of track) and did not climb at the rate the controller expected. This resulted in a breakdown of separation standards between the aircraft. Recorded radar data indicated that when the aircraft were 3 NM apart, there was 200 ft vertical separation. The prescribed standard is 5 NM or 1,000 ft.

Neither crew was given traffic information on the other aircraft. The controller, on realising that separation standards could be infringed, gave the leading aircraft (VH-UZP) a heading change from 125 degrees to 140 degrees. This was not of sufficient magnitude to ensure that the separation would be maintained.

Significant Factors

The following factors are considered relevant to the development of this incident:

1. Weather avoidance considerations resulted in the aircraft diverting off track.

2. Appropriate separation standards were not applied following the diversion of VH-JJY off track.

The pilot had been spreading superphosphate in a paddock to the north of the strip. To get to the paddock the aircraft had to climb over hills. This was achieved with the assistance of updraughts off the hills. On the accident flight the pilot found the updraughts were not present and the aircraft was not climbing adequately. Concerned that he would not be able to clear trees ahead the pilot dumped the load and attempted to turn left. The aircraft struck a tree and spun to the ground. The pilot escaped from the wreckage, but the aircraft caught fire and was destroyed.

After flying through some heavy showers, the pilot detected a vibration in the aircraft. He knew that the main rotor abrasion tapes sometimes came loose in rain, and when he detected a performance loss, he suspected that loose tapes may have been the reason for the vibration. He decided to land to remove the tapes. With maximum power selected, the pilot could not arrest the sink rate during the approach for the run on landing, and the helicopter landed heavily and bounced. As a result of the hard landing, the main rotor blades severed the tail boom.

Damage to the main rotor blades was such that it could not be determined if the blade tape had lifted prior to the accident. No other defects were discovered that could have contributed to the loss of performance.