The pilot of a Cessna 182, VH-EWV, while taxiing for departure at Ayers Rock, turned into an unserviceable taxiway in order to conduct engine checks before take-off. The certified air ground radio operator at the aerodrome asked the pilot if his operations were normal, as this was not a normal procedure. The pilot confirmed that his operations were normal. A Cessna 207, VH-UAA, passed the other aircraft on the taxiway, and continued onto the runway. The pilot of UAA broadcast his intentions and started the take-off run. The broadcast was heard by the radio operator, but not by the pilot of EWV, who also broadcast his intentions to enter the active runway. This broadcast was not heard by either the radio operator or the pilot of UAA. As EWV approached the runway, the radio operator instructed the pilot to hold position. The pilot did not hear the instruction, however, on seeing the other aircraft moving toward his position, stopped immediately near the runway strip. The pilot of UAA continued the take-off, passing at high speed and in close proximity to EWV. The role of the certified air ground radio operator was to provide information, not to give instructions, however the radio operator considered his actions to have been appropriate. The investigation found that the pilot of EWV understood the procedures to be used at the aerodrome. However, it was not possible to determine why communications to and from the pilot were not heard.

VH-JZW had conducted two unsuccessful ILS approaches in IMC to Sydney runway 16 left (16L). JZW was being radar vectored for a third ILS attempt when the pilot elected to proceed to Bankstown. The pilot was unable to execute the approaches within the required tolerances for azimuth and glide slope tracking because of a glide slope failure in the cockpit and the geographic disorientation of the pilot.

During the first ILS approach, the pilot established the aircraft on the localiser and initiated a descent at 600ft per minute. The pilot then noticed large fluctuations of the glide slope needle with intermittent fail flag indications on the instrument. The pilot performed a DME/height check which confirmed that the aircraft was high. Consequently, the pilot increased the descent rate and considered a LLZ/DME approach. The pilot estimated that the aircraft was still too high and elected to conduct a missed approach. The Sydney Tower controller reported that JZW crossed the runway 16L threshold at 1000 ft. During the second approach attempt, the Tower controller reported that JZW was established on the localiser at 10 DME. During this sequence, the pilot noticed that the glide slope needle was still fluctuating unpredictably with intermittent fail flag indications.

The pilot then elected to conduct a LLZ/DME approach. The Tower controller observed the aircraft on radar to deviate to the right and then track between the 16L and 16R localisers. When the Tower controller advised the pilot of these deviations, the pilot attempted to track towards the 16L localiser. JZW failed to intercept final and crossed the 16L centreline at 6 nm on a south-easterly heading at 2,000 ft and descending. The Tower controller instructed JZW to execute a missed approach to ensure that JZW avoided an area of high buildings along its projected track. During the second approach sequence, the pilot stated that there were difficulties contacting Sydney Tower and that the DME lock had inadvertently been activated. The pilot elected to conduct a third approach to runway 16 right. The pilot was radar vectored to intercept the localiser but experienced ongoing and excessive glide slope indications coupled with general anxiety and uncertainty about radio communications and the aircraft's DME unit. Consequently, the pilot elected to divert to Bankstown and landed without incident.

The high workload, limited instrument flying experience, and the distractions precipitated by the radio communications difficulties and a failure of the aircraft's glide slope contributed to this incident. A post-flight inspection revealed that the aircraft's glide slope unit was faulty. The glide slope unit was repaired and functioned correctly when the pilot conducted an ILS approach into Sydney two days after the current incident. The operator is considering installing a new ILS unit in the aircraft in addition to providing the company line pilots with a CASA approved PC-based synthetic IFR trainer to help improve pilot instrument flying skills.

The aircraft failed to comply with the Melbourne runway 34 ARBEY 6 STAR tracking instructions at BUNKY. At BUNKY, the aircraft was observed on radar to track to FENTONS HILL instead of tracking to DEERS. The crew, in answer to a query from air traffic control (ATC), confirmed that they were turning at BUNKY but radar indicated that the aircraft failed to execute the turn. 

Consequently, ATC cancelled the STAR clearance and the crew were instructed by the approach controller to turn right onto a heading of 200 degrees. The crew acknowledged this instruction but failed to execute the turn. The crew finally commenced the turn at Fentons Hill some 10nm after the initial STAR transition point (BUNKY) for Melbourne runway 34. 

The aircraft was subsequently radar vectored to land on runway 34. It was undetermined as to why the crew did not turn at BUNKY or fully comply with the controller's subsequent instructions. It appears that the crew probably misidentified FENTONS HILL as BUNKY. There was no breakdown in separation.

The pilots of a Bell 212 helicopter (VH-HHW) and an Aerospatiale AS-350B2 Squirrel helicopter (ZK-HNE) were engaged in aerial filming for a motion picture sequence above the middle of Rees Valley in the Southern Alps of New Zealand.

The pilots were very experienced in aerial filming, and conducted a thorough pre-flight briefing for the "point in space filming sequence". The briefing included flightpaths, airspeed, altitude, emergency actions, abort procedures, clearance distance and weather minima. The location features provided few peripheral visual cues for hovering and judging the rate of closure and distance between the helicopters.

The Squirrel was in a hover facing North-West or upstream towards the mountains at 2,500 ft above ground level (AGL) filming the Bell in a fly-by manoeuvre. The filming sequence required the Bell to descend from 3,500 ft AGL at 70 knots towards the Squirrel passing by the right side of the Squirrel (North-West to South-East) and then continue flying straight ahead. The Australian company Operations Manual (Section D4.1-Still and Motion Photography) required the pilot of the Bell to maintain "normal separation" with another aircraft involved in an aerial filming sequence. This separation was defined by the Chief Pilot as 150 m.

During this manoeuvre, the second run for the day, the main rotor blade of the Bell struck the top of the vertical fin of the Squirrel. The pilot of the Squirrel reported some moderate wake turbulence from the rotor tip vortices of the Bell during this pass but neither pilot realised the helicopters had collided. Consequently, the minor damage was not discovered until the helicopters returned to Queenstown at the end of the day's filming.

Inspection found that the top of the Squirrel's vertical fin had been struck by the Bell's main rotor blade. There were two small dimple indents on the leading edge of the main rotor blade cap and some paint scratching in from the end of one main rotor blade. The first dimple was 146 mm from the blade tip and the second dimple was 57 mm from the blade tip.

The investigation revealed that the "point in space filming sequence" manoeuvre can induce a "rejoin illusion" in pilots that limits their ability to accurately judge closure rates. In particular, the pilot of the Bell may have initially experienced an apparently very slow closure rate on the Squirrel followed by a rapid, difficult to judge, increase in apparent closure rate from approximately 100 m to run. The closure rate of the Bell was approximately 120 ft per second. The rejoin illusion is more marked with higher closure rates and the smaller the aircraft being approached. In addition, the black paint scheme of the Squirrel against the relatively dark background of the terrain may have made it even more difficult for the pilot of the Bell to judge the position of the other helicopter. This poor visual contrast had been discussed in the pre-flight briefing.

In addition, the investigation found that the workload of the Squirrel pilot was very high which may have precluded his ability to detect the impending collision and to call an abort. The Squirrel pilot was the aerial director of the film sequence and was subject to additional airborne communications and the professional pressure required to produce quality direction as well as maintain the helicopter in a 2,500 ft AGL hover in strong winds with limited visual cues. Furthermore, it is possible that the Squirrel pilot may have drifted laterally towards the Bell 212 because it is very difficult to maintain an exact stationary hover at altitude with limited visual references.

The absence of a clear and specific quantitative definition for "normal separation" in the Operations Manual for the Bell 212 (Section D4.1- Still and Motion Photography) represented a latent failure in the operator's procedures. Following this incident, the Operations Manual was amended to clarify the definition of "normal separation". In addition, company pilots involved in New Zealand operations were issued with an Operational Memo that imposed a specific quantitative interpretation of "normal separation".

The operator of the Squirrel amended their procedures to stipulate that camera helicopters in high hovers without nearby visual references were required to maintain a minimum indicated airspeed of 10-15 knots to reduce the possibility of subtle lateral drift. In addition, the operator documented specific lateral clearance limitations between helicopters engaged in aerial filming sequences.

Organisational and regulatory issues that became apparent during the investigation included separation distances between aircraft in close proximity and the definition of formation flying. The Australian Civil Aviation Regulation 163 AA states that aircraft must not be flown in formation unless each of the pilots in command has been approved by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) to fly in formation and the formation is pre-arranged between the pilots in command. For the purposes of the regulation, two or more aircraft are considered to be in formation if they are flown in close proximity to each other and they operate as a single aircraft with regard to navigation, position reporting and control. In addition, aircraft are considered to be in formation during join-up and breakaway (CAR 163 AA 5(b)). New Zealand CAR 91.227 has similar provisions.

The New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) legislation was the relevant legislation in force at the time of this incident and CAR 91.227 stated that no pilot shall operate an aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard. Formation flight is defined as more than one aircraft which navigate and report as a single aircraft; and are no more than one nautical mile laterally and within 100 ft vertically from the formation leader. The aircraft were flown so close to each other as to create a collision hazard. Close formation flying training and certification may have assisted the pilots to avoid a collision on this occasion. Both CAA and CASA are currently reviewing and developing the safety requirements, advisory material, and acceptable standards for operations where aircraft are flown in close proximity to each other in a commercial operation, such as aerial film making.

The organisational and regulatory issues have been addressed in greater detail in the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand Aircraft Accident Report 99/2768.

VH-TJZ was cleared for a rolling take-off from runway 16 right (16R). During the take-off roll at approximately 40 knots IAS, the Tower controller cancelled TJZ's take-off clearance and instructed TJZ to hold position. TJZ was brought to rest abeam taxiway F with light braking. During this sequence of events, VH-EKN was on short final approach to runway 07 when the Tower controller instructed the crew to execute a go-around manoeuvre.

During the climb to cruise altitude, the pilot in command noticed that the co-pilot's head was resting on a side window and that he was not responding. After gaining assistance from cabin crew he found that the pilot had been ill into an airsickness bag. The co-pilot was restrained in his seat and a return to Brisbane was requested. The co-pilot regained and then lost consciousness a number of times during the arrival. Weather conditions were suitable for a visual approach, and an uneventful landing was made.

The pilot was examined by a company doctor, and although no obvious reason for his illness was found, a viral infection was suspected. The co-pilot had been restrained in his seat for his own safety during the landing and his head had been allowed to tilt forward. The doctor suggested that crews be warned that in this type of situation, if the sick crew member's head is not held back, there is a possibility of suffocation due to an obstructed airway.

The aircraft was on the take-off roll, commencing rotation at approximately 113 knots indicated airspeed when the crew noted a flight of possibly three ducks off the left-hand wing. Shortly after the crew reported that the number one engine suddenly experienced a destructive failure and shutdown with no cockpit indication. The crew continued the take-off and retracted the main landing gear.

They reported that the gear cycled very slowly and that they were apprehensive about a possible bird strike to the gear as well as the engine. Because of this concern they then proceeded to a diversion airport where emergency services were available. Enroute, they reported no problems in continuing the flight on one engine. At the diversion airport they extended the main landing gear and proceeded to land without further incident. During post occurrence examination, outward penetration shrapnel damage was evident on the low-pressure compressor case which indicated an uncontained failure of the case. The damage appeared to be the result of the shedding of portions of the low-pressure compressor fan blades. Additionally, secondary damage caused by shrapnel penetration of the low-pressure compressor case resulted in several areas of outward denting of the number one engine cowl.

The number one engine cowling contained the penetration. There was no significant damage to the fuselage of the aircraft. The JT-15D-4 incorporates an emergency shutoff feature which prevents possible low-pressure turbine overspeed in the event of a low-pressure turbine decouple. Metered fuel to the fuel manifolds is automatically cut off to prevent possible overspeed of the low-pressure turbine assembly. It appears that in this occurrence, the axial displacement of the low-pressure compressor fan during the bird ingestion event had activated the emergency shut off feature. A bird feather recovered internally from the damaged aircraft number one engine was sent for examination. An ornithologist reported that analysis of the feather indicated the feather was that of an Australian Wood Duck, with an average full-grown weight of 800 to 815 grams.

Confirmation of the exact number of birds ingested into the engine during the occurrence could not be confirmed, therefore, compliance to published foreign objects ingestion requirements could not be conclusively established.

During a flight controls check prior to take-off, the aircraft experienced an apparent binding of the elevator control system at a location just forward of the aft stop. The flight was aborted and the aircraft returned to the gate for further investigation. Maintenance personnel carried out further investigation into the control system, to include a complete operational check of the elevator control system. The subsequent checks completed both powered and unpowered revealed none of the ratcheting and binding reported by the flight crew. After a thorough check the aircraft was returned to service.

The identification and planned level (FL290) of the aircraft was coordinated with the Melbourne Sector 12 controller. The aircraft was observed on radar to maintain FL250. The amended level was not coordinated with sector 12. There was no infringement of separation standards. 

An investigation by Airservices Australia found:

1. that the sector did not have specific procedures to ensure that controllers on adjacent sectors were notified when sector 12 opened/closed,

2. the Hume sector controller did not coordinate the change of level with the sector 12 controller,

3. a console display notifying active sectors had not been updated, and

4. that the display did not provide an indication of combined sectors. Consequently, there had been some confusion in relation to the required coordination between sectors. The investigation is continuing.

While cruising at 8,000 ft, enroute from Brisbane to Maryborough, the crew of the Shorts 360 aircraft heard a loud bang emanate from the left engine, followed by an increase in the engine's inter-turbine temperature indication. The crew shut-down the engine in accordance with company operating procedures and diverted for a landing at Maryoochydore. Following an initial inspection, the operator removed the engine and forwarded it to the manufacturer for an investigation and report. The manufacturer found that the engine's number 1 bearing had failed. The bearing balls and races exibited "spalling", and fatigue fracturing of the bearing roller cage was evident. The investigation report concluded that due to the severe secondary damage to the bearing assembly, the reason for the failure of the bearing could not be determined.