During the climb to cruise altitude, the pilot in command noticed that the co-pilot's head was resting on a side window and that he was not responding. After gaining assistance from cabin crew he found that the pilot had been ill into an airsickness bag. The co-pilot was restrained in his seat and a return to Brisbane was requested. The co-pilot regained and then lost consciousness a number of times during the arrival. Weather conditions were suitable for a visual approach, and an uneventful landing was made.

The pilot was examined by a company doctor, and although no obvious reason for his illness was found, a viral infection was suspected. The co-pilot had been restrained in his seat for his own safety during the landing and his head had been allowed to tilt forward. The doctor suggested that crews be warned that in this type of situation, if the sick crew member's head is not held back, there is a possibility of suffocation due to an obstructed airway.

The aircraft was on the take-off roll, commencing rotation at approximately 113 knots indicated airspeed when the crew noted a flight of possibly three ducks off the left-hand wing. Shortly after the crew reported that the number one engine suddenly experienced a destructive failure and shutdown with no cockpit indication. The crew continued the take-off and retracted the main landing gear.

They reported that the gear cycled very slowly and that they were apprehensive about a possible bird strike to the gear as well as the engine. Because of this concern they then proceeded to a diversion airport where emergency services were available. Enroute, they reported no problems in continuing the flight on one engine. At the diversion airport they extended the main landing gear and proceeded to land without further incident. During post occurrence examination, outward penetration shrapnel damage was evident on the low-pressure compressor case which indicated an uncontained failure of the case. The damage appeared to be the result of the shedding of portions of the low-pressure compressor fan blades. Additionally, secondary damage caused by shrapnel penetration of the low-pressure compressor case resulted in several areas of outward denting of the number one engine cowl.

The number one engine cowling contained the penetration. There was no significant damage to the fuselage of the aircraft. The JT-15D-4 incorporates an emergency shutoff feature which prevents possible low-pressure turbine overspeed in the event of a low-pressure turbine decouple. Metered fuel to the fuel manifolds is automatically cut off to prevent possible overspeed of the low-pressure turbine assembly. It appears that in this occurrence, the axial displacement of the low-pressure compressor fan during the bird ingestion event had activated the emergency shut off feature. A bird feather recovered internally from the damaged aircraft number one engine was sent for examination. An ornithologist reported that analysis of the feather indicated the feather was that of an Australian Wood Duck, with an average full-grown weight of 800 to 815 grams.

Confirmation of the exact number of birds ingested into the engine during the occurrence could not be confirmed, therefore, compliance to published foreign objects ingestion requirements could not be conclusively established.

During a flight controls check prior to take-off, the aircraft experienced an apparent binding of the elevator control system at a location just forward of the aft stop. The flight was aborted and the aircraft returned to the gate for further investigation. Maintenance personnel carried out further investigation into the control system, to include a complete operational check of the elevator control system. The subsequent checks completed both powered and unpowered revealed none of the ratcheting and binding reported by the flight crew. After a thorough check the aircraft was returned to service.

The identification and planned level (FL290) of the aircraft was coordinated with the Melbourne Sector 12 controller. The aircraft was observed on radar to maintain FL250. The amended level was not coordinated with sector 12. There was no infringement of separation standards. 

An investigation by Airservices Australia found:

1. that the sector did not have specific procedures to ensure that controllers on adjacent sectors were notified when sector 12 opened/closed,

2. the Hume sector controller did not coordinate the change of level with the sector 12 controller,

3. a console display notifying active sectors had not been updated, and

4. that the display did not provide an indication of combined sectors. Consequently, there had been some confusion in relation to the required coordination between sectors. The investigation is continuing.

While cruising at 8,000 ft, enroute from Brisbane to Maryborough, the crew of the Shorts 360 aircraft heard a loud bang emanate from the left engine, followed by an increase in the engine's inter-turbine temperature indication. The crew shut-down the engine in accordance with company operating procedures and diverted for a landing at Maryoochydore. Following an initial inspection, the operator removed the engine and forwarded it to the manufacturer for an investigation and report. The manufacturer found that the engine's number 1 bearing had failed. The bearing balls and races exibited "spalling", and fatigue fracturing of the bearing roller cage was evident. The investigation report concluded that due to the severe secondary damage to the bearing assembly, the reason for the failure of the bearing could not be determined.

The aircraft was enroute to Mount Buller on a medivac priority flight after having departed Essendon. During climb out to cruise level, the aircraft experienced a caution advisory indicating low oil pressure of the number two engine. The crew initiated emergency procedures and completed an uneventful precautionary landing near Thomastown.

Further investigation revealed oil leakage in the area of the number two engine deck. An engine magnetic particle detector receptacle was found loose and backing out, because of a failed lockwire, thereby causing the oil leakage. The engine number two and three modules were replaced as a precaution and the aircraft returned to service.

The crew had been issued a runway 34R MARUB2 SID with a requirement to maintain 5,000 ft and had confirmed this altitude on contact with Departures North. The aircraft was then observed on radar to climb above the assigned altitude. The controller confirmed the altitude requirement and passed traffic information on a crossing A320 at 6,000 ft.

The B737 crew immediately descended from 5,400 ft to 5,000 ft. Concurrently the crew of the A320 responded to a TCAS Resolution Advisory and climbed from 6,000 ft to 6,700 ft. A plot of the recorded radar data showed that the B737 had levelled at 5,400 ft and that the two aircraft had come within 600 ft of one another. The required standard was 1,000 ft and, therefore, an infringement of separation standards had occurred. The company operating the B737 conducted an investigation into the circumstances surrounding this incident and a copy of their report was duly lodged with the Bureau.

Their investigation found that a captain under training was flying the aircraft. A training captain occupied the right crew seat and performed the crew functions of the pilot not flying. The captain under training was hand-flying the aircraft at the time of the incident. Although he had correctly set the assigned altitude of 5,000 ft in the window of the Mode Control Panel, the Flight Director (FD) did not capture the 5,000 ft level-off altitude and, despite the training captain having alerted him to the approaching assigned altitude, he had allowed the aircraft to climb above the assigned 5,000 ft altitude. An intermittent fault in the altitude selection function of the FD had been detected a few days earlier but because the problem was not thought to be an aberrant operation, it was not reported. After this occurrence the problem was reported and a few days later manifested itself in a 'hard' failure.

The Mode Control Panel of the Flight Management System was subsequently replaced. The investigation concluded that the slow response of the captain under training had allowed the aircraft to exceed the assigned altitude. The company's Standard Operating Procedures were found to be adequate and, despite this event, did not require amendment. However, a recommendation was made that training captains require pilots under training to use greater levels of automation in busy flight phases in order to enhance their monitoring role.

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During the initial climb after take-off, the pilot of the Cessna 402 observed that the nose landing gear had failed to retract. While orbiting clear of the airfield, the pilot commenced troubleshooting and found that the hydraulic system circuit breaker had tripped. After resetting the circuit breaker, several further retraction attempts failed to resolve the problem. The pilot then attempted to lower the landing gear using the emergency function. These attempts were also unsuccessful. After briefing the passengers on emergency procedures and with RFFS in position, the pilot commenced the landing with an unlocked nose gear. During the approach, the pilot shut down both engines and turned off the fuel. He then realised that the aircraft would land short of the runway.

The aircraft came to rest 10 metres outside of the airport boundary fence. The pilot and passengers were uninjured. Engineering inspection of the aircraft revealed a wire in the electrical loom to the left main landing gear which had shorted to structure. When a selection was made with the landing gear selector lever, power applied to move the electro-hydraulic shuttle valve from the idle position to either up port or down port would pop the circuit breaker. This prevented the nose gear from completing the cycle to the fully down position and also prevented the return of all the gears to the up and locked position. The emergency blow down bottle was removed and examined. It was found to require a force well in excess of the maintenance manual requirement to operate the mechanism. These two defects prevented the landing gear from being locked down.

The pilot of VH-MGZ was instructed to taxi for runway 30 and to hold short of runway 35. The aircraft was later observed approaching the holding point and taxiing at a considerable speed. The pilot was instructed to stop immediately. The aircraft came to a halt just within the flight strip of runway 35. VH-CSN was sent around from short final approach. The pilot reported that he had been distracted by his preparation for a navigation exercise and by the two passengers on board his aircraft.