Managing the use of pitot probe covers at Brisbane Airport

Safety Advisory Notice

Brisbane Airport Corporation and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority have both previously recommended that operators use covers on their aircraft’s pitot probes during turnarounds to mitigate the risk of insects building nests in them and significantly affecting the reliability of airspeed indications. In addition to using pitot probe covers, rigorous processes need to be in place to ensure that covers are removed prior to flight.

What happened

During a take-off roll at Brisbane Airport on 18 July 2018, the flight crew of an Airbus A330 (international operation) detected an airspeed anomaly including red speed (SPD) flags on both primary flight displays. The flight crew continued the take-off and climb and carried out several checklists before returning to Brisbane Airport.

A subsequent inspection after the aircraft landed identified that pitot probe covers were fitted to the aircraft’s three pitot probes, which made the probes ineffective for flight.

Why did it happen

The ATSB investigation is continuing, and the full reasons and context associated with the pitot probe covers not being removed prior to flight, and the take-off being continued with unusable airspeed information, are still being examined.

In recent years there have been several reports of insect activity disrupting aircraft systems at Brisbane Airport. These included blocked pitot probes, mainly from nests built by mud-dauber and other wasps, resulting in airspeed discrepancies and other effects.

The international operator did not routinely use pitot probe covers for turnarounds at Brisbane Airport or other locations. Shortly after the previous flight on 18 July, covers were placed on the aircraft’s three pitot probes by a local engineering support person. Due to miscommunication, the operator’s certifying engineer was not aware of their fitment, and subsequent inspections during the turnaround by personnel from the operator and the ground handling service provider did not identify that they had been fitted.

Safety advisory notice

AO-2018-053-SAN-003 (72.68 KB)

: The Australian Transport Safety Bureau advises all operators that conduct flights to Brisbane Airport to consider the use of pitot probe covers and, if covers are used, ensure there are rigorous processes for confirming that covers are removed before flight.

Read more about this ATSB investigation: AO-2018-053

Reconstruction of pitot probe covers on 9M-MTK, showing pitot cover damage and rub marks on aircraft skin from the streamer

Reconstruction of pitot probe covers on 9M-MTK, showing pitot cover damage and rub marks on aircraft skin from the streamer (Source: ATSB)

Source: ATSB

Publication details

Investigation number AO-2018-053
Series number AO-2018-053-SAN-003
Publication type Safety Advisory Notice
Publication mode Aviation
Publication date 30/08/2018

Collision at sea

The ATSB is highlighting the importance of vessels taking early and effective avoiding action and keeping a proper lookout.

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The ATSB’s investigation into the collision of a container ship and a fishing vessel reflects an ongoing problem on the Australian coast ­– collisions between small vessels and trading ships.

This serious incident occurred in the Tasman Sea on 23 January 2018, in the very early hours of the morning. The visibility was clear and the seas were calm, with a south-westerly wind up to 10 knots. The container ship Beijing Bridge was en route to Melbourne from Taiwan while the fishing vessel Saxon Onward was northbound for Eden, New South Wales. 

The vessels had been aware of each other’s presence well before the collision took place. About 45 minutes before the collision, Saxon Onward’s watchkeeper had sighted the masthead lights and green sidelight of an approaching ship (Beijing Bridge) on the starboard bow. Meanwhile, the third officer of Beijing Bridge was the officer of the watch and the sole lookout on that vessel’s navigational bridge. He had seen Saxon Onward, along with another fishing vessel, and both vessels were acquired on Beijing Bridge’s radar.

…These are measures that every ship needs to be taking.

As the two vessels closed on each other, they both realised that risk of collision existed and both took action. Beijing Bridge’s course alteration was not substantial, not made in good time, and actually increased the risk of a collision. Saxon Onward made a substantial course alteration, but it was made too late and resulted in the collision. Saxon Onward collided with Beijing Bridge, with the trawler’s port bow impacting the ship’s starboard side. As the trawler scraped down the ship’s side, the skipper stopped the engine and the crew mustered in the wheelhouse.

Beijing Bridge showing surface damage to the hull on the starboard side

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Source: Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)

There were no injuries or pollution reported by either vessel. Saxon Onward suffered substantial damage to its hull but was able to make its way unassisted to the nearby port of Eden. Beijing Bridge resumed its passage and berthed in Melbourne later the same day.

ATSB Chief Commissioner Greg Hood said since 1990, the ATSB have conducted investigations into 39 collisions, with most seeing a recurring type of occurrence.

“Trading ships and small vessels are continuing to collide with each other off the Australian coast,” Mr Hood said.

“Thankfully, this incident did not result in anyone being harmed, but the potential for more serious consequences is concerning.

“Every ship needs to take early and effective action to avoid other vessels and maintain a proper lookout – which is a requirement under international regulations.”

Read the final report: Collision between the container ship Beijing Bridge and fishing vessel Saxon Onward, Tasman Sea, about 3 NM south-east of Gabo Island, Victoria, on 23 January 2018

Further information:
The ATSB has previously published safety bulletins, Safety Bulletin 01 - Ships and Fishing vessels and Safety Bulletin 05 - Fisherman and Safety Awareness at Sea, aimed at highlighting the risks faced by fishing vessels and raising awareness of the common contributory factors present in these collisions.

On board fire from hot work

The ATSB reminds ship operators of the constant danger of ship fires from on board hot work for the removal of sea fastenings.

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The ATSB’s final investigation report into a fire on board BBC Xingang, Newcastle, New South Wales, has been released.

On 11 December 2017, hot work (oxy-acetylene welding techniques) were required for the removal of sea fastenings on the ship’s tween deck. Before work started, a safety meeting, between relevant crew and the contracted hot work team, was held to discuss safety measures and procedures.

A fire watch team was arranged and fire blankets were placed in the gaps between the tween deck pontoons to protect the cargo below. However, the hot work created molten metal and other hot material that burnt through to the cargo below and ignited the cargo coverings. The fire was quickly extinguished on discovery.

ATSB Executive Director, Transport Safety, Mr Nat Nagy said ship fires from hot work to remove sea fastenings are a constant danger.

Implementation of comprehensive risk controls and procedures should include detailed task-specific appraisals, risk and hazard assessments, work permits, and toolbox meetings.

“This is the third time the ATSB has investigated ships fires that were found to be caused by hot work to remove sea fastenings,” Mr Nagy said.

“It’s important that ship crews do not underestimate the safety risk of this common activity and remain vigilant while undertaking hot work.”

“Implementation of comprehensive risk controls and procedures should include detailed task-specific appraisals, risk and hazard assessments, work permits, and toolbox meetings, Mr Nagy said.

The ATSB investigation found the flammable nature of the cargo coverings had not been adequately identified in the lead-up to the hot work and the fire watch was not instructed to monitor the area immediately below the hot work.

“Ship operators need to be mindful that the responsibility for the implementation of these controls rests with the ship’s master, especially when shore labour is involved and multiple organisations’ safety and work procedures could apply,” Mr Nagy said.

Read the final report: Fire on board the general cargo ship BBC Xingang, Newcastle, New South Wales, on 11 December 2017

No redundancy increases risk

The ATSB is reminding ship operators and ship manufacturers of the increased operational risk of using newly designed equipment without any redundancy plan in place.

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The reminder follows the release of the ATSB’s final investigation report into the loss of propulsion on the cruise ship Norwegian Star, in the Bass Strait, 22 NM SW of Cape Liptrap, Victoria, on 10 February 2017.

Shortly after entering Bass Strait, the starboard propulsion unit—the ship’s only operational propulsion unit—failed, leaving the ship without propulsion and drifting about 22 NM SW of Cape Liptrap, Victoria.

The investigation, carried out by the Victorian Office of the Chief Investigator, Transport Safety, on behalf of the ATSB under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003, found the ship’s port propulsion unit had been non-operational since 24 January and that the ship had sailed from Darwin to Melbourne, via Cairns and Sydney, with just the starboard propulsion unit operational.

Victorian Chief Investigator, Transport Safety, Chris McKeown said underlying factor in the starboard propulsion unit failure was a design error in the repairs it had undergone in December.

“The December repairs included a modification resulting in insufficient clearance between the brush holder and sliprings of the propulsion unit’s AC generator,” Mr McKeown said. “Despite the manufacturer’s internal quality management system, this was not identified during the review and approval stages of the design.”

We would recommend against using newly modified equipment without redundancy.

“Overall, the design for the modifications was a proven and used concept, but the detailed design work required for its specific use on the Norwegian Star was not.”

“The decision to sail from Melbourne with only one operational propulsion unit was not in breach of any regulatory requirement, however, we would recommend against using newly modified safety critical equipment without redundancy,” Mr McKeown said.

Read the final report: Loss of propulsion on passenger cruise ship Norwegian Star, Bass Strait, near Cape Liptrap, Victoria, on 10 February 2017

Regular helicopter underwater escape training

Research of accidents into water has shown that occupants who survive the initial impact will likely have to make an in-water or underwater escape, as helicopters usually rapidly roll inverted post-impact. The research has also shown that drowning is the primary cause of death following a helicopter accident into water.

Sonar image of helicopter on seabed

Figure 5: Sonar image of helicopter resting on the seabed, on its right side. Source: Pilbara Ports Authority and contractors working on their behalf.


Source: Pilbara Ports Authority and contractors working on their behalf

What happened

On 14 March 2018, at about 2330 Western Standard Time, an Eurocopter EC135 helicopter, registered VH‑ZGA departed Port Hedland Heliport, Western Australia to collect a marine pilot from a departing ship.

The flight was conducted at night under the Visual Flight Rules. A pilot, recently employed by the operator, was flying the helicopter, under the supervision of a training and checking pilot.

At about 2348, the helicopter was operating in vicinity of the ship when it descended and collided with the water. The training and checking pilot escaped from the helicopter and was rescued a short time later. The location of the other pilot was unknown, and a search commenced.

On 17 March 2018, the helicopter wreckage was located on the seabed and the missing pilot was found inside.

Why did it happen

The ATSB investigation is continuing. The ATSB emphasises that it is too soon to conclude factors involved in the pilot under check not surviving the accident.

Notwithstanding, HUET (helicopter underwater escape training) is considered to provide individuals with familiarity with the crash environment and confidence in their ability to cope with the emergency situation. Interviews with survivors from helicopter accidents requiring underwater escape frequently mention they considered that HUET had been very important in their survival. Training provided reflex conditioning, a behaviour pattern to follow, reduced confusion, and reduced panic.

The training and checking pilot had completed a HUET course within the previous 3 years. Although the pilot under check had completed a HUET course, that training was conducted 9 years ago.

Safety advisory notice

AO-2018-022-SAN-001: The Australian Transport Safety Bureau advises helicopter operators involved in overwater operations of the importance of undertaking regular HUET for all crew and regular passengers to increase their survivability in the event of an in-water accident or ditching.

Regular training can assist survivability

Regular HUET courses can assist occupants following a ditching or water impact. That training enables them to practice the techniques to make an in-water or underwater escape from a cockpit or cabin.

Safety advisory notice video statement(Opens in a new tab/window)

Read more about this ATSB investigation: AO-2018-022.

Publication details

Investigation number AO-2018-022
Series number AO-2018-022-SAN-001
Publication type Safety Advisory Notice
Publication mode Aviation
Publication date 03/05/2018

Know when to go-around

The ATSB’s investigation into the collision with terrain of a Cessna 206, registration VH-WZX, at Apollo Bay Airfield in Victoria, underlines the importance of pilots executing an early and correctly executed go-around during approach and landing.

On 31 January 2018, the pilot of VH-WZX touched down at Apollo Bay Airfield and then bounced and floated along the runway. The pilot attempted to complete the landing, but the aircraft continued to float and drift right, over the adjacent grass fly-over area, where it possibly bounced for a second time. With one quarter of the runway remaining the aircraft then touched down on the grass and bounced again.

After commencing a late go-around, the pilot did not immediately follow the go-around procedure as directed by the aeroplane flight manual. As a result, the aircraft did not climb as expected and struck the airfield boundary fence and continued flying. After striking the fence, the pilot again deviated from the aircraft manufacturer’s recommended go-around procedure and the aircraft descended and impacted a tree. The pilot then completed a left circuit for the runway and landed safely.

The incident highlights the need for pilots to anticipate, plan and execute early and correctly executed go-arounds.

ATSB Executive Director Nat Nagy says the incident highlights the need for pilots to execute an early go-around as recommended by the aircraft’s manual.

“The best way to avoid a late go-around is to anticipate and plan an early decision point for when to commence a go-around,” Mr Nagy said. “We support the advice of the Federal Aviation Administration, who suggest that if the landing cannot be made in the first third of the runway, you should execute a go-around.”

“In this instance, the go-around was not only late but was not carried out in line with the aircraft’s manual, making it harder for the aircraft to avoid obstacles and increasing the risk of collision.”

“While the outcome of the incident was fairly minor, it could have been much worse,” Mr Nagy said.

Read the final report: Collision with terrain involving Cessna 206, VH-WZX, Apollo Bay, Victoria, on 31 January 2018

For more information on when and how to execute a go-around read the FAA’s Airplane Flying Handbook, Chapter nine Approaches and Landings(Opens in a new tab/window)

Prepared for ditching

The ATSB’s report into the partial engine power loss and ditching of a Robinson R44, near Hamilton Island, Queensland, found adequate preparation and post-landing actions by the pilot lead to a positive outcome from an emergency ditching.

On 8 November 2017, passengers of a scenic flight were given a safety briefing advising them to wear their seatbelts and life jackets, which they complied. About 40 minutes into the one-hour flight, the helicopter began to lose engine power. After unsuccessful attempts to increase power, the pilot elected to conduct an autorotation onto the water.

The pilot successfully landed the helicopter on the water, shut down the engine, and applied the rotor brake. The pilot then activated the emergency locator transmitter and instructed passengers to inflate their life jackets and prepare to exit the helicopter, if necessary. The passengers and the pilot, who were uninjured, were rescued by the crew of a local vessel about an hour later.

Transport safety is a shared responsibility.
Operators, pilots and passengers all need to understand and follow safety instructions, procedures and policies.

ATSB Executive Director, Transport Safety Nat Nagy says the incident highlights the importance of pilots conducting a thorough pre-flight safety briefing and for passengers and aircraft to be properly equipped for an emergency situation.

“Transport safety is a shared responsibility,” said Mr Nagy. “Operators, pilots, and passengers all need to understand and follow safety instructions, procedures and policies.”   In this instance the combination of the emergency floatation system, passengers wearing their life jackets and the pilot’s post-landing actions resulted in a positive outcome from a potentially dangerous situation.

“Without the emergency floatation system the risk of the helicopter sinking with the passengers and pilot on board would have been far greater.”

Read the final report: Partial engine power loss and ditching involving Robinson R44, VH-WRR, 49 km N of Hamilton Island Airport, Queensland, on 8 November 2017

Level crossing collision

The ATSB’s investigation into the collision between a freight train and road-train truck reflects the ongoing concern of safety at level crossings.

The incident occurred on 11 July 2017, as a road-train was proceeding down the Cobb Highway from Broken Hill, New South Wales (NSW) toward Condobolin, NSW. The road-train was hauling two trailers, loaded with 43.7 t of road-base material. The driver knew there was a level crossing ahead, having used it on many occasions over the previous month, including multiple times that very day. The level crossing was equipped with flashing lights, an audible warning device (bell), as well as passive warning signs posted on the road approaching the crossing.

As the road-train negotiated a sweeping right-hand turn before the road straightened towards the level-crossing, the driver saw the flashing lights indicating that a train was approaching. He would later recall that the alignment of the road’s bends and the roadside vegetation meant that he did not see the flashing lights until his vehicle had travelled through the bend and was within 180 m from the crossing.  

The driver started to brake, but then assessed that the road-train might not stop in time, so he accelerated to cross ahead of the train.

It is troubling that this continues to be a problem in Australia.

The train driver saw the road-train accelerate and he sounded the locomotive’s horn. The train consisted of two locomotives and 27 wagons loaded with lead and zinc. About 100 m from the crossing, the train driver made an emergency brake application and activated the ‘emergency in progress’ alarm on the train radio. The train crew then relocated to the floor of the locomotive cab in preparation for a collision.

The train subsequently collided with the rear corner of the last trailer of the road-train, travelling a further 319 m before stopping. The train crew and the driver of the road-train were shaken but otherwise unhurt.

ATSB Executive Director, Transport Safety, Nat Nagy says that collisions at level crossings occur too frequently.

“From July 2016 to June 2017, there were 27 railway crossing collisions between trains and road vehicles,” Mr Nagy said. “That is too many.”

Although motorists are primarily responsible for avoiding a collision with a train at railways crossings, prudent road design and/or advance warning of a train’s presence at railway crossings should be considered as a strategy to lower the risk of road and rail vehicle collisions.

The ATSB report urges road and rail authorities to consider measures to enhance the awareness of motorists approaching railway crossings, especially at location with restricted sighting due to curved approach roads.

“It is troubling that this continues to be a problem in Australia,” Mr Nagy said. “The risk of continuing fatalities or serious injuries is real.”

Read the final report: Level crossing collision between freight train 8426N and road-train truck, Cobb Highway, Ivanhoe, New South Wales, on 11 July 2017

Qantas takes steps to improve safety

On 13 March, 2017, a Qantas Airways Boeing 737 was travelling to Canberra on a scheduled passenger flight from Perth Airport, Western Australia. There were two flight crew, five cabin crew, and 177 passengers on board.

As the aircraft began descending towards Canberra Airport, it encountered increasing turbulence, and the flight crew switched on the ‘Fasten Seat Belt Sign’, calling for cabin crew members to be seated within one minute of the announcement. The crew began to move towards their seats, securing the cabin as they went.

At 22,000 feet, an abrupt change in the direction of the wind resulted in the aircraft airspeed increasing towards the maximum allowable operating speed.

To prevent an overspeed, the pilot flying applied backpressure on the control column, so as to override the autopilot. This was a common practice for B737 flight crews at Qantas, and the first officer recalled that this was part of initial training for the B737. The expected outcome was that the autopilot would revert to a different mode and raise the aircraft’s nose.

A cabin crew member who had not yet reached her seat felt the cabin floor drop and then quickly come up

In this case, however, the autopilot disengaged, and the aircraft moved abruptly. A cabin crew member who had not yet reached her seat felt the cabin floor drop and then quickly come up. The force of the aircraft’s movement resulted in her fracturing her leg, while a second cabin crew member fell and hit her head on a trolley.

The injured crew member was given first aid and the aircraft landed without further incident. Paramedics met the aircraft to attend to the two injured cabin crew.

The method of intervention by the pilot was understandable, and consistent with previous responses of other flight crew in similar situation. Modification of the autopilot, however, had inadvertently left the aircraft vulnerable to this type of scenario.

Qantas has taken steps to address the dangers that this manoeuvre can create. They have issued a safety information notice, warning of the potential dangers of that approach.

The report also highlights the manufacturer’s preferred use of speedbrakes to prevent overspeed. Boeing has advised that they are considering a revision to the overspeed guidance in the 737 flight crew training manual.

“It’s encouraging to see organisations taking steps to address problems as they emerge,” said Nat Nagy, the ATSB’s Executive Director, Transport Safety. “This method of intervention to prevent overspeed had been used 20 times in the past six years, but this occurrence and the resulting investigation has provided an opportunity to make transport even safer.”

Read the final report: Flight path management occurrence involving Boeing 737, VH-VZZ, near Canberra Airport, Australian Capital Territory, on 13 March 2017

Flying near obstacles

The ATSB’s investigation into a main rotor tip strike involving a Eurocopter AS350-BA VH-PHU, 9 km WNW of St. Leonards (ALA) in Victoria found the pilot did not notice an obstacle encroaching into the helicopter landing site (HLS).

The pilot of the Eurocopter approached the Jack Rabbit Vineyard HLS (a tennis court) on 4 July 2017. This was the first time the pilot had used the site. During the approach the pilot identified the key boundaries of the site, including a brick wall at its southern end, but did not notice vegetation intruding into the site.  

Believing that another helicopter was moving into the site, the pilot slowly hover-taxied the helicopter towards the south-west corner of the site. The tips of the helicopter’s main rotor blades struck the vegetation. The pilot was able to safety land and reposition clear of the obstacle. The incident resulted in damage to all three main rotor tips.

All pilots, no matter how experienced, are not immune to errors and experience alone will not protect them from an accident.

ATSB Executive Director Transport Safety Nat Nagy says the incident reinforced the need for pilots to have strong situational awareness when flying near obstacles.

“Strong situational awareness is critical to maintaining aircraft safety, especially when flying in new and confined locations,” Mr Nagy said. “To get a good understanding of a landing site, pilots are encouraged to do a 360-degree reconnaissance.”

“In this instance, the pilot did an abbreviated reconnaissance and didn’t notice an obstacle that needed to be avoided.”

The ATSB investigation found this choice of reconnaissance may have been the result of the pilot’s over-confidence in their pre-planning and flying ability.

“All pilots, no matter how experienced, are not immune to errors and experience alone will not protect them from an accident,” Mr Nagy said.

For insights into how accidents can happen to experienced pilots, download a copy of the ATSB publication, Avoidable Accidents No.6 – Experience won’t always save you: Pilot experience is not always a protection against an accident, from the ATSB website.

Read the final report: Main rotor tip strike involving Eurocopter AS350-BA, VH-PHU, 9 km west-north-west of St. Leonards (ALA), Victoria, on 4 July 2017