The danger at level crossings

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The continuing problem of road users failing to yield to trains at level crossings has been highlighted in the ATSB’s latest investigation into the fatal 2012 accident near Port Germein in South Australia.

The accident occurred on 19 March at the Port Flinders Causeway Road level crossing. A Pacific National ore train was travelling on the interstate main line between Port Augusta and Port Pirie. As the train drew closer to the level crossing, it slowed for a temporary speed restriction of 50 km/h. About 200 m from the level crossing, the train driver saw two motor vehicles travelling towards the crossing. He immediately sounded the train’s horn.

The first car, a yellow Hyundai Accent, appeared to be slowing; the train driver sounded the horn a second time just as the vehicle disappeared from his view behind some thick vegetation. As the car re-emerged from behind the vegetation, it looked as if it would stop at the crossing. The train driver sounded the horn a third time, continuously. However, the car continued and entered the level crossing into the path of the train. The train driver made an emergency brake application, but given the train’s closeness to the level crossing and its relative size and weight, it was unable to stop before colliding with the car.

Although they vaguely recalled hearing a horn, they did not relate this to the
approaching train...

The front of the train struck the passenger side of the motor vehicle and then continued to travel around 256 m past the level crossing. The car’s passenger died in the accident and the driver sustained serious injuries. The locomotive crew were shaken but not hurt. The motor vehicle was severely damaged, the train received minor damage. There was little damage to the track and fixed infrastructure.

The driver of the motor vehicle was a local resident and had regularly traversed the level crossing. Although they vaguely recalled hearing a horn, they did not relate this to the approaching train and could recollect little else regarding events prior to the accident.

Damaged vehicle from collision with train

The level crossing was controlled by passive approach warning signs and a ‘Stop’ sign at the crossing. These required a road user to stop the vehicle at the ‘Stop’ sign and detect the presence of any train through direct visual observation.

The ATSB concluded that the motorist’s attention may have been diverted during a critical period when they would normally have stopped to look for a train.

The ATSB urges all drivers of motor vehicles to be vigilant and obey road traffic signage, especially at level crossings where accidents can easily result in fatalities, serious injuries and extensive damage to infrastructure.

Read the final report: Collision involving a motor vehicle and train 4460S, 10 km south of Port Germein, South Australia, on 19 March 2012

Hazards of flying over water

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On 9 December 2012 the pilot of a Robinson R22 helicopter took off from a fishing camp at the mouth of the Normandy River in Queensland on a private flight.

The pilot was flying north along the coastline at about 600 ft above the ground when he saw an object in the water about 100 m from the coast. The pilot turned the helicopter towards the object and descended to take a closer look.

As the pilot approached the object the helicopter’s tail rotor hit the water which caused the helicopter to rotate to the right before the pilot lost control. The pilot closed the throttle, and the helicopter settled into the water, before rolling over to the right. Unharmed, the pilot escaped via the passenger door and swam to shore before walking back to the fishing camp he left earlier.

Flat light can completely obscure features of the terrain, creating an inability to distinguish distances and closure rates.

The pilot reported that the wind was about 20 knots with a high smoke haze and flat light conditions. Flat light is an optical illusion also known as ‘sector or partial white out’ that causes pilots to lose their depth-of-field and contrast in vision. Flat light conditions are usually accompanied by overcast skies inhibiting good visual clues. These conditions can occur anywhere in the world, primarily in snow covered areas but can also occur in dust, sand, mud flats or over water. Flat light can completely obscure features of the terrain, creating an inability to distinguish distances and closure rates. It can give pilots the illusion of ascending or descending when actually flying level.

The dangers of flying helicopters over water have long been recognised. In July 1985 Robinson Helicopter Company issued 

Safety Notice SN-19 (709.55 KB)

about the hazards of flight over water, making special reference to the potential for pilots’ loss of depth perception over water. The safety notice recommended maintaining a height of 500 ft AGL and avoiding manoeuvres over water below 200 ft AGL.

Read the final report: Loss of control involving a Robinson R22, VH-HTD, Princess Charlotte Bay, Queensland, on 9 December 2012

Always lodge a SARTIME

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An accident involving a Cessna 172N highlights the importance of lodging a Search and Rescue Time (SARTIME) Plan or flight note before flying.

The accident occurred on 7 November 2012, when the pilot of a Cessna 172N crashed his aircraft in a remote paddock near Brisbane while practising for a flight test. The pilot had not submitted a flight plan, nor had he left a flight note with a responsible person or lodged a Search and Rescue Time (SARTIME) with Airservices Australia. The pilot reported having little memory of the flight but said he had planned to fly to the southern training area to practise holding heading and altitude for his upcoming flight test.

Basic safety preparation before each flight could save your life and, at the very least, speed up your rescue.

Following the accident the pilot recalled regaining consciousness and crawling to the aircraft to broadcast a distress call on the aircraft radio. The aircraft was fitted with a personal locator beacon (PLB) but the pilot was unable to locate it after the accident to activate it.

An aircraft in the area reported hearing two faint mayday calls on the Brisbane Centre Frequency. These were not heard by the Brisbane Centre. The area controller requested the pilot of another aircraft in the area to track south from Kagaru to investigate. At about 1410, the crashed Cessna was spotted in a paddock. The pilot was the only person on board and had suffered severe injuries as a result of the accident. The ATSB assessed that the aircraft had been airborne for around 45 minutes, placing the accident about 3 hours before the aircraft was located.

The flight had not been authorised by an instructor prior to the flight. The flying school has now amended their procedures to ensure that no student pilot is provided with aircraft keys before the flight is authorised.

Read the final report: Collision with terrain involving Cessna 172N, VH-JGR, near Kagaru, Queensland, on 7 November 2012

Communicate at aerodromes

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The ATSB continues to emphasise the importance of maintaining effective communication at non-towered aerodromes, after an airspace-related incident involving a Beech 200 Kingair, and an Ag-Cat bi-plane at Swan Hill Aerodrome, Victoria.

The incident occurred on 21 November 2012, when the Kingair was approaching to land on runway 26 at Swan Hill. The pilot had broadcast the aircraft’s position and his intentions both when joining the circuit, and again when turning onto base leg. There was no response. When the Kingair was about 2.7 km from the runway 26 threshold, the pilot noticed a crop-spraying bi-plane, commencing a right descending turn ahead of him, approaching the same runway.

The pilot of the Kingair immediately made a radio broadcast but received no response. The pilot of the Kingair elected to continue the approach, and monitor the biplane carefully. Both aircraft landed safely. 

Communication at non-towered aerodromes is an ongoing safety concern...

The ATSB investigation found that the biplane was not fitted with a radio. The pilot normally maintained a listening watch on a hand-held radio device. However, to avoid damage from the weather and chemicals he removed the hand-held radio when the aircraft was not flying. On this occasion, the pilot had inadvertently left the radio at home. The bi-plane pilot reported conducting a thorough visual check of the runway 26 approach as he joined the circuit, but did not see the Kingair.

Communication at non-towered aerodromes is an ongoing safety concern for the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. ATSB research has found that of the 709 safety occurrences at non-towered aerodromes during 2003–08, 388 were attributed to a breakdown in communication. Safety around non-towered aerodromes has been highlighted in the ATSB’s Safety Watch initiative.

Read the final report: Airspace related event involving Kingair, VH-VAH and Ag-Cat, VH-IFE, Swan Hill Airport, Victoria, on 21 November 2012, which contains more details about the incident and links to useful educational material.

Risks of flying in poor weather

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ATSB investigators have found that the fatal aircraft accident in New South Wales in 2012 was the result of a situation in which many pilots have found themselves: flying into weather conditions that cannot be dealt with. This is a frequent accident risk that the ATSB has been drawing to the attention of Australia’s general aviation community.

The accident occurred on 4 June 2012, as the pilot flew a Cessna 182Q from Walgett to Mudgee. The pilot, the only person on board, was flying under the Visual Flight Rules (VFR), a set of regulations that dictated he could fly only under favourable weather conditions. He had taken off in good weather conditions, and climbed to 5,500 ft. 

From 2006 to 2010, there were 72 such occurrences reported to us, and seven of those resulted in fatal accidents. Fourteen people were killed in these accidents.

During the flight, however, the cloud base lowered, and the pilot descended the aircraft to avoid flying in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). These are conditions where a pilot has limited visibility and will need to use aircraft instruments to fly safely. The aircraft descended until it was flying about 1,000 ft above flat terrain, either close to or in the cloud. While flying at that level the aircraft crashed into a rock face in mountainous terrain near Tooraweenah, NSW. The pilot died in the accident and the aircraft was destroyed. 

“The issue of pilots who fly into IMC while operating under VFR is an ongoing concern to the ATSB,” said Martin Dolan, Chief Commissioner of the ATSB. “From 2006 to 2010, there were 72 such occurrences reported to us, and seven of those resulted in fatal accidents. Fourteen people were killed in these accidents. Essentially, about one in ten VFR into IMC events results in a fatal outcome.”

The ATSB has been working to educate pilots about the dangers surrounding VFR into IMC. A booklet providing examples and advice on the subject forms part of the ATSB’s well-received Avoidable Accidents series. 

The ATSB’s Avoidable Accidents booklets, including Accidents involving Visual Flight Rules pilots in Instrument Meteorological Conditions, feature case studies on regularly occurring accidents that could have been prevented with good flight management and preparation. The booklets also provide helpful hints and strategies to help pilots stay safe when flying.

Read the final report: Visual Flight Rules in Instrument Meteorological Conditions and controlled flight into terrain involving Cessna 182Q, VH-CWQ, 15 km north of Tooraweenah, New South Wales, on 4 June 2012, which provides links to further resources.

Amateur-built aircraft Part 2: Analysis of accidents involving VH-registered non-factory-built aeroplanes 1988-2010

Why have we done this report

In the last three decades, Australia has seen a significant growth in the number of amateur-built aeroplanes (aircraft built for personal use from an original design, established plans or kit, which are not entirely built and assembled in a factory).  However, the safety record of amateur-built aircraft in Australia had not been robustly established.

What did this report do

The ATSB investigated the safety history of amateur-built aircraft in Australia through analysis of accident data held in the ATSB’s occurrence database from 1988 to 2010. Comparisons were made between accidents involving amateur-built aircraft and those involving similar factory-built aircraft to help identify whether the rate and types of accidents differed between these two groups of aircraft.

What the ATSB found

Amateur-built aircraft had an accident rate three times higher than comparable factory-built certified aircraft conducting similar flight operations between 1988 and 2010. The fatal and serious injury accident rate was over five times higher in amateur-built aircraft, in particular due to relatively more serious injury accidents.

The pilots of amateur-built aircraft involved in accidents were significantly more experienced overall than factory-built aircraft accident pilots. However, they were significantly less experienced on the aircraft type that they were flying at the time of the accident.

Over half of the accidents were precipitated by mechanical events, which were mainly complete or partial engine failures. Following the amateur-built phase one test period, mechanical failures were still significantly more common when compared with factory-built aircraft. A quarter of accidents were from loss of aircraft control. Structural failures were not common precursors in amateur-built aircraft.

Collision with terrain and forced landing accidents were more frequent in amateur-built aircraft. Collisions with terrain, hard landings, and runway excursions were more likely to result in a serious injury from an amateur-built aircraft accident than for factory-built accidents.

Safety message

Builders of amateur-built aircraft should select, install and maintain aircraft engines carefully as engine issues are the most likely reason why an accident will occur. Careful consideration to occupant protection at the time of building is also encouraged as serious injuries have been disproportionally more common.

Owners of amateur-built aircraft should ensure they have adequate training in the same type of aircraft before operating the aircraft they have built, or purchased second-hand.

Publication details

Publication number AR-2007-043(2)
Investigation number AR-2007-043(2)
Series number 2
Publication type Research and Analysis Report
Publication mode Aviation
Publication date 26/03/2013
Authors Wilson, D. A., Taylor, R. P., Stanton, D. R., & Godley S. T.
Subject matter Amateur built aircraft

Spotlight on amateur-built aircraft

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A report released today by the ATSB identifies important opportunities to improve the safety of amateur-built aircraft in Australia.

Over the past three decades, amateur-built aircraft (aircraft built for personal use from an original design, established plans or kit, which are not entirely built and assembled in a factory) have become increasingly popular in Australia. This is the first detailed examination of their safety record. The ATSB’s research has identified key differences in the safety record of amateur-built aircraft when compared with similar factory-built aircraft and established an important baseline on which to improve safety in this growing sector of the aviation community. 

“Between 1988 and 2010, there was a significant difference in the accident rates of amateur-built aircraft and comparable factory-built certified aircraft flying similar operations,” said Dr Stuart Godley, manager of the ATSB’s safety research section. “In fact, the amateur-built accident rate was three times higher.” In addition, the fatal and serious injury accident rate was over five times higher in amateur-built aircraft, in particular due to relatively more serious injury accidents.

Builders of amateur-built aircraft should select, install and maintain aircraft engines carefully as engine issues are the most likely reason for an accident to occur.

“Overall, the pilots of amateur-built aircraft are significantly more experienced as pilots,” said Dr Godley. “They’ve been flying for a long time, they know aircraft, and they want the challenge and intellectual satisfaction of building a customised aircraft. Some of the aircraft are one-offs—unique designs—but the majority are either built from plans or a prefabricated kit that they’ll buy and put together themselves.”

However, pilots involved in accidents in amateur-built aircraft are significantly less experienced on the aircraft type that they were flying at the time of the accident. More than half of all amateur-built aircraft accidents occur prior to the pilot accumulating 35 hours on the aircraft type. This included owner-builders and recent purchasers of second-hand amateur-built aircraft. 

A significant finding is that over half of the accidents were precipitated by mechanical events, which were mainly complete or partial engine failures. Although common during the amateur-built phase one test period (first 25 to 40 hours), mechanical failures were also significantly more common after this test phase when compared with factory-built aircraft. 

A quarter of accidents were from loss of aircraft control, generally due to aircraft handling issues involving pilots with limited experience on the aircraft type. However, structural failures were not common precursors in amateur-built aircraft accidents.

“We are encouraging owners of amateur-built aircraft to ensure that they have adequate training in the same type of aircraft before operating the aircraft they have built, or purchased second-hand,” said Dr Godley. 

There are very few suitable aircraft available for type-training and instruction for amateur-built aircraft and the ATSB found that 20 per cent of pilots in these accidents had less than 10 hours experience on the aircraft type. Owners of amateur-built aircraft should ensure they have adequate training on type before operating new built or purchased aircraft.

Builders of amateur-built aircraft should select, install and maintain aircraft engines carefully as engine issues are the most likely reason for an accident to occur. Careful consideration to occupant protection at the time of building is also encouraged as serious injuries have been disproportionally more common.

Read the research report: Amateur-built aircraft Part 2: Analysis of accidents involving VH-registered non-factory-built aeroplanes 1988-2010

Avoidable Accidents No. 5 - Starved and exhausted: Fuel management aviation accidents

Safe flight depends on reliable power. Despite the money and effort spent on ensuring aircraft engines are reliable, equally reliable systems are needed to ensure that engines always get the fuel they need.

This report discusses procedures that pilots can use before and during a flight to help them be absolutely sure they will have sufficient fuel to land at their destination aerodrome with reserve fuel intact. It does not discuss procedures to ensure fuel quality, such as checking all fuel drain valves for contaminants or using approved fuel, although these remain important. Nor does it discuss fuel system integrity measures, such as the maintenance of fuel filler cap seals.

The report will look at two main reasons why fuel stops getting to an engine during flight.

  • Fuel exhaustion happens when there is no useable fuel remaining to supply the engine(s).
  • Fuel starvation happens when the fuel supply to the engine(s) is interrupted although there is adequate fuel on board.

The more tanks you have to choose from, the greater the potential to make a mistake and to select the wrong fuel tank.  

Key message

  • Accurate fuel management starts with knowing exactly how much fuel is being carried at the commencement of a flight. This is easy to know if the aircraft tanks are full, or filled to tabs. If the tanks are not filled to a known setting, then a different approach is needed to determine an accurate quantity of usable fuel.
  • Accurate fuel management also relies on a method of knowing how much fuel is being consumed. Many variables can influence the fuel flow, such as changed power settings, the use of non-standard fuel leaning techniques, or flying at different cruise levels to those planned. If they are not considered and appropriately managed then the pilot’s awareness of the remaining usable fuel may be diminished.
  • Keeping fuel supplied to the engines during flight relies on the pilot’s knowledge of the aircraft’s fuel supply system and being familiar and proficient in its use. Adhering to procedures, maintaining a record of the fuel selections during flight, and ensuring the appropriate tank selections are made before descending towards your destination will lessen the likelihood of fuel starvation at what may be a critical stage of the flight. 

Conclusion

Fuel exhaustion is more likely to occur on flights when there is little flight fuel margin, that is, landing with just reserve fuel on board. In these circumstances, particular attention to detail in fuel management is warranted.

The chance of fuel exhaustion can be reduced by:

  • using more than one source of information to obtain consistent results about the fuel on board before flight
  • the use of a consistent procedure that is regularly checked to know the exact rate of fuel consumption
  • monitoring the flight to ensure that sufficient fuel will remain on board in the event of unplanned delays.
  • Fuel starvation usually happens when the selected tank is run dry. In addition to the factors relevant to fuel exhaustion, the chance of starvation can be further reduced by:
  • ensuring the pilot is fully familiar with the operation of the fuel system for both normal and abnormal operations
  • adhering to pre-flight procedures and checks to ensure the correct tank is selected before take-off and landing
  • using a fuel log during flight to provide a record of the fuel usage from each tank
  • selecting the appropriate tank before descending to the destination and ensuring that tank has adequate fuel for landing. 

Publication details

Publication number AR-2011-112
Publication type Avoidable accidents
Publication mode Aviation
Publication date 25/03/2013
ISBN 978-1-74251-293-8

Avoidable Accidents No. 1 - Low-level flying

Image of crashed plane.

Introduction

This publication is the first in a pilot education series by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) on avoidable accidents. In this report, we will focus on accidents involving unnecessary and unauthorised low flying; that is, flying lower than 1,000 ft (for a populous area) or 500 ft (for any other area) above ground level without approval from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).

Between 1999 and 2008, there were 147 fatal accidents reported to the ATSB involving aerial work, flying training, private, business, sport and recreational flying in Australia. Of those fatal accidents, at least six were associated with unauthorised and unnecessary low flying. Those six accidents, along with a seventh non-fatal accident, presented here as case studies, were chosen by aviation safety investigators at the ATSB to highlight the inherent dangers of unauthorised low flying and to offer some lessons learnt from each case. It is hoped that these lessons learnt will help pilots make more accurate risk assessments and better decisions before electing to fly at low levels. 

Before you decide to conduct low-level flying, ask yourself whether there is a legitimate or operational reason for you to do so.

At low altitudes, there are many obstacles to avoid and there is a lower margin for error. Recognising the risks and hazards of low-level flying, CASA requires pilots to receive special training and endorsements before they can legally conduct low-level flying. In the accidents described in this booklet, most of the pilots had neither of these, and none had a legitimate reason to be flying below 500 ft. Some legitimate reasons for flying at low level include aerial stock mustering, crop spraying, and firefighting operations. For most private pilots, there is generally no reason to fly at low levels, except during take-off and landing, conducting a forced or precautionary landing, or to avoid adverse weather conditions.

What is sad and unfortunate about the accidents described in the following case studies is that they were all avoidable.

Conclusion

These case studies serve as salient reminders of the risks associated with low-level flight. Out of the seven accidents documented in this report, only one had survivors. Low-level flying is inherently unsafe for a number of reasons, so it should be avoided at all costs when there is no operational reason to do it (regardless of whether you have been trained and/or approved to do so). 

Flying at low level is unsafe because: 

  • there are more obstacles to avoid, many of which are hard to see until it is too late (e.g. powerlines and birds)
  • pilots have a higher workload because there are more hazards to negotiate in the environment
  • there may be turbulence and windshear that pilots do not encounter at higher levels and
  • there is very little time to recover control of the aircraft if something goes wrong.

From the accidents described here, it is apparent that the two major hazards of low flying are wirestrikes and pilots’ reduced opportunity to recover their aircraft from a stall or loss of control. 

It is important to keep in mind that powerlines also exist in remote areas where you least expect. For example, the pilots of the Stuart Highway accident probably did not expect powerlines in the remoteness of the Northern Territory, and the pilot of the Lake Eildon accident probably did not expect to encounter powerlines above the expanse of a large lake. 

The effects of wirestrikes at low level are obvious — significant damage to the aircraft, usually leading to a loss of control and, because of the lower margin for recovery, subsequent impact with the ground or water. Pilots must keep in mind that not only do powerlines exist at low levels and in remote areas, they are also not easy to identify. Even against a clear blue sky, wires are difficult to spot for a number of reasons. Wires can oxidise to a blue/grey tinge and may blend into the background (ATSB, 2006), or the wire may be obscured by terrain. Single wires are difficult to detect from the air and can be encountered in the most unexpected places in rural areas. Even if a pilot has spotted a powerline, his or her ability to judge its distance from the aircraft can be distorted by optical illusions or a lack of nearby visual reference points. 

Pre-flight assessment and planning is an important part of any flight. Make sure you have maps of your intended flight path with you when you fly, and study them before you get into your aircraft to identify any terrain, wire, or other obstacles that you need to avoid should operational circumstances necessitate flight at low level. If you have been trained and are qualified for low flying, and low flying is necessary, ensure that you conduct an aerial survey of the area from an appropriate height before you conduct any low flying.

Low-level flying also presents fewer opportunities to recover from a loss of control compared to flight at higher altitudes. It takes time to react and to regain control of an aircraft, and the closer to the ground you are, the less time and distance you have. Flying at low altitudes is not only risky when things are going right; it becomes downright perilous when things are going wrong. 

Before you decide to conduct low-level flying, ask yourself whether there is a legitimate or operational reason for you to do so.

Publication details

Publication number AR-2009-041
Series number 1
Publication type Avoidable accidents
Publication mode Aviation
Publication date 25/03/2013
ISBN 978-1-74251-289-1

Sun-glare – a contributing factor

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The Australian Transport Safety Bureau is drawing pilots’ attention to the effects of sun-glare when flying, after a Robinson R22 crashed into Lake Marradibbadibba in South Australia. 

The accident occurred at about 1520 on 31 October 2012. The pilot (the only person on board) had commenced mustering in the helicopter on Innamincka Station at about 0730 that morning. Due to flying low over the sandy and swampy terrain, the helicopter’s windscreen became dirty, leading to poor visibility. During one break, the pilot tried to clean the windscreen with water but this did not improve visibility. 

The accident demonstrates the effect
that sun-glare can have when relying
on visual cues.

The accident happened when the pilot conducted a low-level turn over the edge of the lake and experienced significant sun-glare from the water.  Even though he was wearing sunglasses, the pilot became disoriented due to the sunlight and dirty windscreen. A few seconds later, the helicopter crashed into the surface of the lake and sank rapidly into 2.5 to 3 m of water.

The pilot was not wearing a helmet that day because it was damaged. Nevertheless, he escaped the accident without injury and swam to shore. The helicopter was seriously damaged.  

The accident demonstrates the effect that sun-glare can have when relying on visual cues. In addition, although the pilot was uninjured as a result of this accident, previous ATSB investigations have shown the benefit of wearing a helmet. 

The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has conducted research into sunlight and its association with aviation accidents. A link to that report, along with more details of the accident can be found in the investigation report AO-2012-146.