The Pilot-under-Instruction selected the left fuel tank during the pre-landing checks as the aircraft joined the circuit on left base leg. Approximately 20 seconds later, and after the aircraft had commenced descent for landing, the engine stopped. The selector lever was returned to the right hand tank position but the fuel boost pump was not turned on. The engine did not restart immediately and the Pilot-in-Command elected to concentrate his efforts on a forced landing. The aircraft touched down in an uncleared bush area and overturned when the nosegear collapsed. The subsequent investigation determined that the fuel selector panel had been fitted with a decal which indicated an incorrect position for the left tank. The decal had been modified some time prior to the accident, with a coloured pen, to show the correct position. The colouring had subsequently worn off, resulting in both correct and incorrect positions being visible. The fuel selector was also fitted with detents to help locate the correct selection positions. A build up of grease and wear on the detent combined to make the left tank detent less positive than normal. When the pilot had moved the selector, he had not noticed the detent, and had inadvertently shut off the fuel to the engine. During his pre-flight inspection, the Pilot-under-Instruction had noted that the selector was different from that discussed during a briefing given by the Pilot-in-Command on the aircraft systems. However, he had not alerted the Pilot-in-Command to the anomaly.

Circumstances:

The aircraft had been engaged in spraying operations and was about to take-off after refilling with water. During loading the aircraft had been positioned on a heading of about 30 degrees to the left of the take-off direction. The pilot turned the aircraft onto the take-off heading and commenced the take-off run. Shortly after the aircraft struck a concrete water trough positioned near the edge of the strip which had not been seen by the pilot. Substantial damage was caused to the propeller and left landing gear.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot diverted his attention from the operation of the aircraft.

Circumstances:

The pilot had completed spreading the third load of herbicide on a paddock and was setting course for his employer's home base when the engine lost power. After conducting emergency checks engine power was restored. The mixture was leaned and a climb initiated while continuing to return to the strip. While the aircraft was still some distance from home the engine stopped. The pilot conducted a landing, downwind and downhill, across a contour bank in a wheat paddock. Examination of the aircraft by the owner disclosed that the aircraft had run out of fuel. The pilot had been using higher power settings and richer mixture settings than anticipated by the owner, who was monitoring the pilot's performance. The pilot had not landed into wind, nor had he selected an appropriate landing area when faced with the need to conduct a forced landing.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not monitor the fuel state adequately.

2. The engine failed due to fuel exhaustion.

3. The pilot did not select a suitable area for the forced landing. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

The pilot reported that on returning from a local flight he made an approach to land in light wind conditions. He was not satisfied with this or the subsequent approach, and go arounds were carried out. The third approach was normal, although the aircraft floated for some distance before touching down. The pilot was unable to bring the aircraft to a halt within the confines of the strip, and it came to rest in a gully. He then observed that the wind had changed from a headwind to a tailwind of about 10 knots, and this had evidently affected the landing performance of the aircraft.

Circumstances:

About 45 minutes after DEPARTURE the radio communications, and radio navigation aid signals became weak, and a squeal was heard through the audio system. The pilot realised that he had an electrical problem, but he did not check the ammeter, or the positioning of the alternator switch believing that he had turned the switch on after start. Approaching Canberra, the pilot was given an airways clearance to maintain 4000 feet. All communications were then lost. He squawked code 7600, and proceeded as per the flight plan to Canberra, maintaining VMC as all his navaids had now ceased to operate. On arrival, the pilot observed that emergency services were being positioned along Runway 30. He commenced an approach from 4000 feet, (2112 feet above ground level), approximately 1000 feet above normal circuit height. The pilot now felt under a great deal of stress and was becoming task saturated. On downwind he placed the landing gear selector in the down position but failed to check if the gear had extended. Turning onto final approach he selected the flaps down, which failed to operate. He then noticed that the landing gear position lights were not illuminated, but he did not verify the landing gear position with the manual extension handle. The Tower directed a green light at the aircraft which convinced the pilot that his landing gear must be down. Shortly after touchdown the partially extended landing gear collapsed. The aircraft was found to have a completely discharged battery. The engine was started using ground power and the alternator operated normally, which recharged the battery. The electrical and radios systems were also found to function normally.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not notice that the alternator was not supplying charge to the battery.

2. The aircraft suffered a loss of electrical power in flight.

3. The pilot did not carry out appropriate trouble checks to determine the cause of the electrical problem.

4. The pilot became task saturated and failed to ensure that the landing gear was down and locked.

Circumstances:

The pilot intended to ferry the aircraft to another property. He reported that the engine started normally, and he immediately taxied the aircraft to the closest end of the airstrip and commenced to take-off without having given the engine sufficient time to warm up. He later informed his employer that he had carried out all the necessary pre-take-off checks, including checking the carburettor heat operation. Shortly after becoming airborne the engine failed and the pilot was forced to land in a rough paddock. Inspection of the engine revealed that the carburettor heat scat hose, from the exhaust muff to the carburettor, was detached. No other faults were found which might have caused the engine to fail. The weather was fine and calm, the temperature five degrees Celsius, and the relative humidity approximately 70 per cent. From the Carburettor Icing - Probability Chart, as published in the Aviation Safety Digest Number 108, these conditions were conducive to serious carburettor icing under any power setting. The most probable cause of the engine failure was carburettor icing, and as the carburettor heat scat hose was adrift there was no means of providing heat to the carburettor to clear any ice accumulation. The pilot, in his haste to depart, did not check for the change in engine note and rpm which would indicate that the carburettor heat was functioning when he operated the carburettor heat control during the pre-take-off checks. This occurrence was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not conduct adequate checks before take-off.
2. Carburettor heat system inoperative because of disconnected hose.
3. Engine failure, probably because of carburettor icing.
4. Pilot forced to land on unsuitable terrain.

The pilot was conducting a charter flight to a property with a student pilot as passenger. The weather in the area of the destination was overcast with local rain showers and thunderstorms. Approaching the property the pilot made a long descent, under the cloud cover, to a low altitude to attract the attention of the property owner so that he would meet the aircraft on its arrival. At the bottom of the descent, as the pilot applied power for the go-around, the aircraft collided with powerlines. Slack in the long powerline span, and its separation from the support poles during the impact, allowed the aircraft to carry forward and land straight ahead on a road. During the landing roll the aircraft collided with heavy farm equipment parked at the side of the road causing severe damage to the tailplane and left hand flap. The pilot and passenger were wearing sunglasses in reduced light conditions which may have contributed to their failure to see the powerlines.

Circumstances:

The parachutist was completing his 39th jump, and his 5th jump using the particular type of rig. The jump sequence was planned as a free-fall from 9000 feet to 3500 feet, including work with another parachutist, followed by individual parachute deployment and landing. The jump sequence was part of the parachutist's training and there is evidence that he had had difficulty with his free-fall control on the 37th jump. The jump proceeded normally until the parachutists reached 3500 feet. At that point, the parachutist moved away from the other parachutist, as briefed, and commenced his deployment sequence. The parachutist was observed to enter an unstable descent condition, prior to parachute deployment, lying on his back with his legs trailing the trunk of his body. The parachutist's speed was estimated at 250 km/hr which was approximately 60 km/hr higher than normal. The reserve parachute deployed more rapidly then normal and, following deployment, it was observed to be out of shape as it descended in a rapid spiral. The parachutist died as a result of injuries that he received from either the opening shock or the impact with the ground. An inspection of the parachuting equipment did not disclose any pre-existing defect that may have contributed to the accident. The reserve parachute had suffered considerable damage. The drogue and bridle (the line between the drogue parachute and the parachute bag) had separated from the parachute bag, the parachute bag (a container which is part of the canopy deployment system) was torn, several of the risers (lines between the harness and canopy) had snapped or were damaged and the slider (a cloth panel which slides up and down the risers and acts to control the opening speed during the canopy deployment) was torn and had burn marks caused by the risers. There was no damage to the harness. The main parachute and drogue were still packed in their pockets, and the main parachute deployment handle was still attached to the Velcro on the harness. The main parachute cutaway handle and the reserve parachute deployment handle had been activated. The damage path and witness evidence indicated that the reserve drogue and bridle had deployed at an angle of 180 degrees to the normal deployment path (i.e. the drogue and bridle had exited the top of the harness, near the parachutists’ shoulders. It was then turned back by the airflow and travelled along the parachutists back, at a very fast speed from shoulders to legs, before appearing near the parachutists’ feet. The reserve parachute had opened unevenly with the risers looping back over the slider during the opening. The parachutist had been having difficulty with his free-fall control, and the equipment that he was using on the fatal jump was not his normal rig. He was observed descending in an unstable condition at high speed immediately prior to reserve parachute deployment. It has been determined that the parachute's opening shock, under the observed conditions, would greatly exceed the design limits of the parachute causing the damage that was observed. The damage to the parachute would account for the reported rapid spiral after the parachute deployed. It could not be determined why the parachutist did not deploy his main parachute. The rig that the parachutist was using was not his own and he had borrowed it to familiarise himself with it. It is possible that, under the stress of an unstable descent, the parachutist pulled what he thought was the main parachute deployment handle, but which was the main parachute cut-away handle. The main parachute cut-away handle, on the borrowed rig, was in a similar position to the main parachute deployment handle on his own rig. Once the parachutist had activated the main parachute cut-away he was left with no option but to deploy his reserve parachute.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The parachutist was unfamiliar with the equipment that he was using, and it is possible that this unfamiliarity led him to pull the deployment handles in the incorrect sequence.

2. The parachutist was unable to control his stability during the period immediately prior to release of the reserve parachute.

3. The parachutist's instability affected the opening sequence of the reserve parachute which, in turn, caused substantial damage to the parachute and this affected its operating capabilities.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was being used for dual circuit training. Following a normal touch down a loud bang was heard, the nose dropped, and the aircraft skidded to a halt with the nose gear collapsed. The nose landing gear strut had fractured at the base of the cylinder. Microscopic examination of the fracture surfaces found a single event overload failure by bending, with no evidence of any pre-existing defects. The failure mode suggests that the nosewheel was either cocked to the left or the aircraft was yawed to the left when the nosewheel contacted the runway.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The nose landing gear strut had failed at the base of the cylinder due to a single event overload.

2. The nosewheel was cocked to the left, or the aircraft yawed to the left when the nosewheel contacted the runway.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was being flown for a visual night circuit to runway 11 after completing an instrument approach. The wind was reported as 5 to 10 knots from the south-west. The pilot reported that after touchdown the aircraft commenced to veer to the right. Although left braking and steering was applied, the aircraft continued to veer until it lurched to the right and stopped, as though the right wheel had become bogged. After vacating the aircraft, the pilot found the right main gear oleo had broken away and the aircraft was resting on the right main gear mount, which had dug into the runway surface. A metallurgical examination of the landing gear showed that the inner oleo strut tube had failed as a result of the propagation of a fatigue crack to a critical length. No manufacturing fault was detected; however, the landing gear had a high total time in service history. No other failures of this type are contained in Civil Aviation Authority records, and it is considered that it may have been a "one-off" event.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The landing gear had a high total time in service.

2. Tensile failure of bronze filler in a fatigue and/or large loading environment.

3. Fatigue fracture of inner oleo strut tube.