The takeoff was carried out downhill, at maximum gross weight, on a 570 metre agricultural strip with a load of superphosphate. When the aircraft had not become airborne with 60 metres of strip remaining, the pilot commenced dumping the load. However, the aircraft overran the strip before becoming airborne and flew very low over the surface of a farm dam. The landing gear impacted the earthen dam wall and the left maingear assembly detached from the airframe. The aircraft continued descending down a gully, through scrub, before settling into rocks. It then slewed around and came to rest upright. As the pilot vacated the wreckage, a fire erupted in the engine bay. The aircraft was subsequently destroyed by fire. An inspection of the wreckage did not reveal any fault that may have contributed to the occurrence. From a witness's description of the combined noise of the engine and propeller during the takeoff roll, it is probable that the pilot attempted the take off without the propeller in the full fine pitch position. Examination of the wreckage found the pitch control setting in the mid-range position.

Circumstances:

The aircraft had been engaged on a flight from Shepparton, Victoria to Pine Creek, Northern Territory, and was scheduled to make a refuelling stop at Broken Hill. After arrival in the circuit area at Broken Hill the pilot decided to carry out an additional circuit to facilitate spacing with another aircraft operating in the circuit. During the second circuit, the engine lost power. The pilot turned the aircraft to enter a long final for runway 14. The aircraft touched down in an area of mine tailings, ran up a slope and became airborne before the right wing struck a tree causing the aircraft to roll to the right and come to rest inverted. An inspection of the wreckage revealed that there was no useable fuel in the left fuel tank, however, the right fuel tank contained approximately 70 litres of fuel. There was also evidence that further fuel had drained from the right tank but not from the left tank. An examination of the engine and other aircraft systems did not reveal any fault that may have contributed to the loss of engine power. The aircraft was refuelled to full tanks five days prior to DEPARTURE from Shepparton, and a preflight inspection carried out on the day of DEPARTURE. Calculations indicate that it is likely that the pilot selected the right fuel tank for the DEPARTURE and that the left tank was selected at the first enroute reporting position, about 30 minutes later. That fuel tank then remained selected until the loss of engine power.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot probably mismanaged the aircraft fuel system.

2. The engine probably failed due to fuel starvation.

3. The aircraft landed on unsuitable terrain.

The aircraft was being used for Examiner of Airmen training. For the first part of the flight from Essendon, the captain flew the aircraft from the left crew seat as captain and the other pilot performed the co-pilot role from the right seat. An instrument approach was flown at Mangalore followed by three touch and go landings. During the touch and go landings the co-pilot operated the flap selection lever and the captain operated the undercarriage lever in accordance with standard operating procedures. The positioning of the flap and landing gear selectors either side of the throttle quadrant is mirrored. After a full stop landing, a shut-down and a mutual briefing, the captain occupied the right crew seat and performed the role of co-pilot as well as supervisory pilot. The other pilot flew the aircraft while acting in command under supervision from the left seat. During a touch and go landing on runway 23 the pilot under supervision lowered the nosewheel to the runway and then advanced the power levers to takeoff power. The supervisory pilot selected flaps up and advised the pilot under supervision of the selection. Unexpectedly the pilot under supervision then selected the landing gear up before the aircraft had left the ground. The supervisory pilot attempted to prevent the gear up selection but was unable to because of the physical location of the landing gear lever and the speed at which the pilot under supervision had moved his hand. The landing gear retraction cycle progressed far enough to turn both mainwheels inwards causing them to drag along the runway whereas the nosewheel remained in the down position. Hearing a loud scraping noise, the pilot under supervision immediately reselected landing gear down. Both pilots elected to retard the power levers and abort the takeoff. The aircraft slid to a halt within 200 metres on its rear fuselage and nose wheel. When the pilot under supervision selected the landing gear up the aircraft was travelling at about 90 knots. It was light on the mainwheels. The oleos were no longer compressed enough to activate the "squat switch" which guards against inadvertent landing gear retraction on the ground. The pilot under supervision had previously been given endorsement training on the aircraft. He had almost completed the thirty hours acting in command under supervision required before being considered for unsupervised command duties. His training had not been concentrated. About twelve months had elapsed since the training began. Prior to joining the Civil Aviation Authority, he had not flown turbo-prop or turbo-jet aircraft nor had he previously experienced two pilot crew techniques. He had experienced some difficulty understanding the particular crew roles during the training because he had flown with several supervisory pilots who used slightly different practices. The pilot's selection of landing gear up was the result of a reflex role reversal at a time of reasonably high workload. The pilot believes his actions were triggered by the supervisory pilot saying "Flaps selected UP".

Circumstances:

The aircraft was engaged in spraying a large paddock. The weather was fine with a light wind. On the third run of the fifth load, the markers were positioned in such a way that there was a tree located directly on the intended swath run. A second tree lay behind, and to the right, of the first tree. The pilot estimated he could carry out a turn and pass between the two trees, to enable the spray pattern to be kept reasonably uniform. The pilot misjudged the manoeuvre and overshot the turn, resulting in the right wing of the aircraft striking a branch protruding from the second tree. About half a metre was lost from the outboard section of the right wing. The right aileron was bent and remained attached to the aircraft solely by the inboard hinge. The right spray boom was ruptured, allowing chemical to escape. Partial control was maintained, and the pilot made an emergency landing, without further damage, on an adjoining paddock. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation. The report is based on information provided by the pilot.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot made an improper in-flight decision in attempting to manoeuvre the aircraft between the trees.
2. The pilot misjudged a turn in a confined area.

The student pilot was returning from his first solo trip to the training area where he had been practicing steep turns. He made a straight in approach for Runway 11 Left. The current Terminal Information (ATIS) reported the wind as 060 degrees 10 to 15 knots, crosswind mean 8 maximum 13 knots. As the aircraft touched down it started to drift to the right. The pilot attempted to correct this with rudder and started to apply power. The aircraft ground looped to the left through 45 degrees. The nose leg failed and the propeller contacted the runway. The aircraft came to rest on the grass to the left of Runway 11 Left. This accident was not the subject of a formal on-scene investigation.

The approach to land was made in light wind conditions and at an approximate rate of descent of 200 feet per minute. The landing was firm. When the basket impacted with the ground the pilot flying the balloon was thrown forward and fell onto the passenger. The passenger's leg was broken. The rate of descent was not excessive and should not have caused the occupants to be thrown about if they were correctly braced prior to touchdown. The pilot reported that he lost concentration at a critical moment and did not brace himself sufficiently for the landing.

During the landing approach the pilot became preoccupied with his proximity to the preceding aircraft approaching the same runway. On touchdown the aircraft bounced slightly and then the pilot lost directional control. He tried to regain control but was not successful in doing so. The aircraft ran off the runway, entered soft ground and overturned. The accident occurred on the pilot's first solo flight in the aircraft type and the landing was his first solo landing. He said that having done further training in the type since the accident, it had become evident to him that the aircraft felt quite different to land with one on board instead of two. He also felt that he should have done more circuits and landings prior to going solo.

The pilot also believed that his preoccupation with the preceding aircraft resulted in insufficient attention being paid to airspeed. With hindsight he should have made a go-around rather than persevere with the landing attempt. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation and this report is based on information supplied by the pilot.

Circumstances:

The pilot with considerable rotary wing but limited fixed wing experience, was conducting a flight to an airstrip which he had previously inspected by motor vehicle. The airstrip is aligned 080 degrees magnetic, approximately 870 metres long, and is located on the northern side of a tree enclosed paddock. On arrival, and without further assessment of the airstrip characteristics, the pilot joined the circuit for a landing to the east into a slight headwind. During final approach he lined-up to the right of the airstrip until alerted by the front seat passenger. The pilot then realigned the aircraft with the actual strip while continuing the approach. Despite being high he did not consider going around. Crossing the threshold the pilot estimated his height as 50 feet above ground level with an airspeed of 90 knots. The aircraft bounced on initial landing and did not settle until almost 400 metres beyond the threshold. During the landing roll and with only 250 metres remaining, the pilot considered but then disregarded going around. He applied heavy braking causing the main wheels to lock-up. The aircraft skidded and overran the strip before entering a three metre wide track of soft soil, with a slight rise of firm ground on the far side, which partially dislodged the landing gear. It then continued for a further nine metres before coming to rest ten metres to the right of the airstrip centreline, on a heading of 115 degrees magnetic. The aircraft Flight Manual landing weight chart indicates that the airstrip length was adequate.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot failed to perform an adequate pre-landing inspection of the airstrip.

2. The pilot carried out an inaccurate approach to land.

3. The pilot failed to carry out a go around.

4. Insufficient stopping distance remained following touchdown.

During routine fuel management enroute, the pilot had selected in turn the right TIP tank, the right MAIN tank and then the left MAIN tank. To complete his pre-descent checks, the pilot elected to leave the fuel selector on what he thought was the left MAIN tank. The pilot had previously notified a change of destination as Kingoonya due to the onset of last light. At about 1800 feet on descent, the engine coughed and stopped although the propeller kept turning. The pilot completed his trouble checks including changing the tank selection to the next position to the left on the selector panel which he thought was the left TIP tank. Engine power was not restored, so the pilot continued to concentrate on the forced landing. At a few hundred feet above the ground, the pilot recalled making a final check of the fuel selector position and found that it was in the OFF position. The left MAIN tank was reselected but the engine did not respond before the aircraft touched down. During the landing roll, the nosewheel struck a fallen branch and the noseleg folded under the nose cowl. The investigation established that the pilot had flown only five hours in the last three months, one hour in the last thirty days and had a total of only eleven hours on type.

Circumstances:

The pilot was familiar with the area and had been given instructions by the property owner that he was to fly spray runs parallel to rows in the crop. The pilot misinterpreted these instructions which resulted in him flying parallel to the eastern boundary of the area rather than the western boundary. He then became partly disoriented with respect to the position of a single wire power line. The right wing of the aircraft struck the wire and the outer 120cm of the leading edge of the wing was lost. The rudder was also damaged by the wire. The pilot was able to retain control of the aircraft and landed without further incident. The pilot reported that the early morning light conditions were less than ideal for seeing wires.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not clarify the instructions he was given.
2. Visibility was limited because of the early morning light conditions.
3. The pilot did not see or avoid the wire.